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INTRODUCTION
Fiduciary law is messy. Courts routinely impose fiduciary
duties in myriad relationships, including trustee-beneficiary,
employee-employer, director-shareholder, attorney-client, and
physician-patient. In each of these relationships, courts require
fiduciaries to adhere to a general obligation of loyalty,1 but countless
variations on that theme tailor the general obligation to the specific
context. In addition, courts regularly impose fiduciary obligations ad
hoc in relationships where one person trusts another and becomes
vulnerable to harm as a result.2 Surveying this landscape, one of the
leading commentators on the law of fiduciary obligation concluded
that it is "atomistic,"3 and despite attempts to articulate a principled
description of fiduciary relationships, 4 the prevailing view remains
that fiduciary law is "elusive."5 The purpose of this Article is to craft a
unified theory of fiduciary duty.
1. On the nature of fiduciary duty as a duty of loyalty, see infra Part I.
2. See infra Part II.
3. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 915 (1988).
4. See infra Part III.
5. For a sampling of recent academic commentary, see Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power
of Attorney's Place in the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001) ("A clear
characterization of fiduciary obligation is elusive and its exact nature is much debated."); Peter
J. Hammer, Pegram v. Herdrich: On Peritonitis, Preemption, and the Elusive Goal of Managed
Care Accountability, 26 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 767, 771 n.6 (2001) ("The term fiduciary is a
slippery concept."); Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary-Insolvent: The Fiduciary
Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 479, 482 (2000) ("Despite its long history, the exact contours of the concept have
remained elusive.").
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The unified theory of fiduciary duty offered here advances two
primary goals: (1) It articulates the principles that distinguish
fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships, 6 and (2) it rationalizes the
content of fiduciary obligations)' This account of fiduciary duty is
offered as a descriptive theory in the spirit of James Gordley's call to
"give a systematic and sensible account of our law."8 Moreover, both of
the primary goals serve the aspiration of equality, which is often
expressed as the desire to treat like cases alike.9
6. It is often said that fiduciary duty has developed more by metaphor than principle. See,
e.g., DeMott, supra note 3, at 879 ("Applicable in a variety of contexts, and apparently developed
through a jurisprudence of analogy rather than principle, the fiduciary constraint on a party's
discretion to pursue self-interest resists tidy categorization."). As described in some detail below,
see infra Part II, courts approach fiduciary claims by asking first whether they arise in the
context of an established fiduciary relationship, such as trustee-beneficiary. One function of a
unified theory is to ensure that the identification of "fiduciary relationships" proceeds in a
principled manner. See infra Parts IV and V.
7. The nature of "fiduciary" duty is examined in Part I below, and the intensity of the
fiduciary obligation is explored in Part VI below. While the fiduciary principle-the principle of
loyalty-remains constant among the various fiduciary relationships, the intensity of fiduciary
duties varies. A unified theory of fiduciary duty explains and justifies that variation. See infra
Part VI.
8. James Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2000). According to Gordley, such an account requires something
other than articulating a general principle and then "show[ing] how the principle explains as
many of the decided cases as possible." Id. at 1871. Commenting on the task of rationalizing the
law of restitution, Gordley expressed his fear that courts and scholars will "manipulate the case
law to fit the principle, or formulate an unconvincing principle to fit the case law, or both, and
then present the end result as the common law." Id.
9. Of course, achieving that aspiration requires some judgments about which attributes
"count" when deciding whether cases are alike. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 571, 596 (1987) (observing that the statement "like cases should be decided alike" is "so
broad as to be almost meaningless," and that the real issue is "whether we should base our
decisionmaking norm on relatively large categories of likeness, or by contrast leave a
decisionmaker more or less at liberty to consider any possible way in which this particular array
of facts might be unique"). The critical resource theory described here takes cues from the courts
on this point. In other words, the theory is descriptive, and no attempt is made to evaluate the
normative desirability of imposing fiduciary duties in cases that meet the description of fiduciary
relationships offered here.
The literature on equality in judicial decisionmaking is voluminous. See generally RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969);
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994) (1961);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); Kent Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality": Two
Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1997); Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV. 377
(1999); Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759 (2001); Jeremy
Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1991); Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike,
62 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974).
While the charge to "treat like cases alike" is certainly challenging-and perhaps
incoherent-it is also without doubt an important feature of the Western conception of law. See,
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1399
The theory proposed here is animated by the view that
fiduciary relationships form when one party (the "fiduciary") acts on
behalf of another party (the "beneficiary") while exercising discretion
with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary. The
italicized typeface highlights the three core requirements of a
fiduciary relationship. Each requirement plays an important role in
distinguishing fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships. When
combined, these requirements show how the duty of loyalty that is the
essence of fiduciary duty protects beneficiaries against opportunistic
behavior by fiduciaries.10
The "on behalf of' requirement describes relationships in which
one person acts primarily for the benefit of another. Even though a
fiduciary may be compensated for her work, she acts on behalf of the
beneficiary by considering the interests of the beneficiary and
selecting actions that are designed to serve those interests, even when
such actions impose costs on the fiduciary. Because the prospect of
mutual benefit motivates almost all contractual relationships,
however, this requirement cannot easily distinguish fiduciary
relationships. It is most useful in circumstances where the other two
e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 627 (2001) ("[Jludges conform to the doctrine of
stare decisis because the principle of precedent is deeply' ingrained in our Anglo-American legal
culture.... They accept the principle that treating like cases alike is an important element of
legal justice and necessary to the functioning of the legal system."); Robin West, Integrity and
Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1317-
18 (1997) ("Cases of legal injustice-of the system's refusal or inability to render decisions that
effectively treat like cases alike-are so offensive, I believe, because they fly in the face of our
experiential sense that all of us, as human beings, share a common, universal nature.").
10. The most commonly cited definition of opportunism is Oliver Williamson's:
Opportunism is "self-interest seeking with guile." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. This
definition is often criticized for being too narrow. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Negligence-
Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 957 (1992) (defining
opportunism as "any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party's reasonable
expectations based on the parties' agreement, contractual norms, or conventional morality").
Kenneth Davis offers the following definition of opportunism in the fiduciary context:
"Opportunism reflects the fiduciary's departure from the pattern of conduct she would engage in
were she alone to bear the full costs and enjoy the full benefits of her actions." Kenneth B. Davis,
Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1985).
Opportunism usually conveys moral disapproval, see Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the
Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65,
71 (1994), but opportunistic actions are not necessarily morally suspect. Timothy J. Muris offers
another oft-cited definition of opportunism that does not imply such judgments: "[W]hen a
performing party behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not
necessarily contrary to the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the
other party to the performer." Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981).
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requirements are satisfied. For example, in landlord-tenant cases, the
tenant exercises discretion with respect to a critical resource
belonging to the landlord (i.e., the rental property), but does not act
primarily for the benefit of the landlord.
*The "discretion" requirement implies that the fiduciary makes
choices about how to perform her obligations. What distinguishes a
fiduciary from many other contracting parties, however, is that a
fiduciary exercises discretion with respect to a critical resource
belonging to the beneficiary, whereas most contracting parties
exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance under
the contract. Moreover, to say that a fiduciary exercises discretion
implies something more than having mere access to critical resources.
This admittedly fine distinction helps to differentiate fiduciaries and
service providers, such as electricians or mechanics.
The "critical resource" requirement is the most innovative
feature of the new theory. Lawyers have long understood that one who
deals with property on behalf of the beneficial owner of the property is
subject to fiduciary duties.11  The quintessential fiduciary
relationship-the trust-follows this pattern. Despite the obvious
connection between property and fiduciary duty in the trust context,
property-based theories of fiduciary duty have not commanded
widespread support because so many fiduciary relationships appear to
exist without the requisite property. 12 Fiduciary relationships based
on confidential information and cases proscribing the use of
relationship-specific "opportunities" have been cited as evidence that a
property-based theory is too narrowly drawn.1 3 In these cases, it is
argued, there is no "property" at the core of the relationship.
11. Some commentators even generalize their description of fiduciary duty to standards
similar to the one proposed in this Article. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 10, at 4 ("The source of the
fiduciary problem is the joinder of the fiduciary's discretionary control over some nontrivial
portion of the principal's assets and affairs with the unavoidable fact that the interests of the
principal and the fiduciary are not perfectly aligned."); Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45, 53-54 (1993) ("Courts recognize
fiduciary duties only in certain types of agency-like or trust-like contracts where it is appropriate
to require a party who controls another's property to act in the other's interests.").
12. For a recent attempt to develop a property-based theory of fiduciary duty, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Confining Fiduciary Duties (2002) (unpublished paper, on file with author). For
attempts to develop a property approach to the law of restitution, see Daniel Friedmann,
Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1879 (2001); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L: 1 (2000).
13. See, e.g., J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 53-54 (1981) ("The most universal
criticism of the property theory is that it requires many things which are not in the traditional
sense property to be considered as property in order for the rule to work."); Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. .425, 435 (1993) (describing
the property theory as "flat wrong, unless we treat 'property' as silly putty").
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The term "critical resource" is introduced here to avoid the
pitfalls associated with relying on the legal concept of "property."14 In
many instances, a critical resource will be something that is widely
recognized as property-for example, money or land that is placed in
trust. In other instances, a critical resource will be something valued
by the beneficiary but not ordinarily considered property' 5-for
example, the confidential information shared by a client with an
attorney. For purposes of articulating a theory of fiduciary duty, an
exact definition of the boundaries of the term "critical resource" is not
required. The important point is that something lies at the core of the
fiduciary relationship and binds the fiduciary to the beneficiary. 16 If
the purported beneficiary of a fiduciary duty offers nothing beyond a
vague expectation that another would act loyally, courts should refuse
to impose fiduciary duties.
The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty accurately
describes established categories of fiduciary relationships and
provides a framework for analyzing relationships that fall outside of
those categories. Moreover, the critical resource theory reveals that
the beneficiary's vulnerability emanates from an inability to protect
against opportunism by the fiduciary with respect to the critical
resource. This insight suggests that fiduciary law can be justified on
the grounds that it deters opportunistic behavior.17
This description of fiduciary relationships bears a strong
resemblance to the description of "firms" in the property rights theory
pioneered by economists Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John
Moore ("GHM"). is The central insight of the property rights theory of
14. For a more detailed discussed on the distinction between "critical resources" and
"property," see infra Part VI.C.
15. Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman state, "The asset may take various forms,
including cash, stock, land, a patent or copyright, valuable information, a business opportunity,
or a business enterprise." Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 n.6 (1991).
16. The ambiguity in such a core concept may strike some readers as a fatal flaw in the
theory. But such an objection should have no more force here than the claim that the ill-defined
contours of the concept of "property" should lead to the abandonment of property rights. In both
instances, courts or legislatures make a determination that public policy warrants legal
protection.
17. For a debate concerning the policy of deterrence in the fiduciary context, see Hanoch
Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138, 157-62 (1999)
(arguing that "the availability of a profits-based recovery must be a function of the deterrence
issue"); Weinrib, supra note 12, at 34 (stating that "the fiduciary's liability to disgorge profits is
not an example of a policy of deterrence impacting the relationship from the outside, but is
rather the remedial consequence that reflects the nature of the obligation owed by the fiduciary
to the beneficiary"').
18. See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-55
(1995) [hereinafter HART, FIRMS]; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits
1404 [Vol. 55:1399
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the firm is that an appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the
assets of a firm reduces the likelihood that one party will unfairly take
advantage of the other participants within the firm.19 Under this view,
the owner of property may deter opportunistic behavior by threatening
to withdraw the property from the firm or by threatening to otherwise
deprive another participant in the firm of access to the property.
These insights can be generalized to all fiduciary relationships
(not just firms) by asserting that the defining attribute of fiduciary
relationships is found in the allocation of residual control over critical
resources. Just as property owners have the right to define how their
assets are used,20 beneficiaries exert residual control over their critical
resources.2 1 While such control provides important opportunities for
self-help by the beneficiary, the threats associated with residual
control may not deter opportunism. For example, the fiduciary may
balance the potential benefits from opportunism against the potential
costs associated with being terminated and decide to assume the risk
of detection.
Even if the beneficiary can bring an action against the
fiduciary in tort or contract, the best that the beneficiary can expect in
most cases is compensation for actual harm done. If the fiduciary's
expected benefits from opportunism exceed the beneficiary's expected
harm, compensatory remedies will not deter the opportunistic
behavior.2 2 In these instances, fiduciary duty improves deterrence by
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119
(1990) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Property Rights].
19. GHM typically refer to "assets" rather than "critical resources." Raghuram Rajan and
Luigi Zingales-the intellectual heirs to GHM-use the latter term. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387, 388 (1998).
20. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 741
(1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Right to Exclude] ("A's right to exclude with respect to Blackacre
leads directly to A's right to dictate the uses of Blackacre, because no one else will be in a
position to interfere with the particular uses designated by A.").
21. That beneficiaries have residual control over critical resources follows from the
definition of "critical resource" employed in this Article. As discussed in more detail in Part IV.C
below, a critical resource is anything belonging to the beneficiary that-when subject to the
discretion of the fiduciary-provides the fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically.
22. For important articles on the notion of "efficient breach," see Richard Craswell, Contract
Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 632-36
(1988); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Anthony T.
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 485 (1980); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 344-47
(1984).
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providing restitution rather than compensation. 3 The important
lesson is that fiduciary duty performs roughly the same economic
function as ownership.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Part I
provides a brief description of the loyalty obligation that comprises
fiduciary duty. Part II surveys the judicial landscape and extracts the
principles most often used by courts to distinguish fiduciary from
nonfiduciary relationships. Particular attention is given to cases
involving "confidential relationships," as these are some of the most
difficult cases for courts under current standards. Part III describes
several unsuccessful attempts to rationalize fiduciary law. These
theoretical justifications fail either because they are overinclusive (i.e.,
they cannot distinguish fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships) or
because they are underinclusive (in that they exclude some fiduciary
relationships). Part IV uses the property rights theory of the firm as a
conceptual foundation for the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty.
Each of the three requirements of fiduciary relationships is then
examined in turn. The law of agency illuminates the "on behalf of'
requirement; "critical resources" are distinguished from "property";
and the "discretion" requirement is explored in the difficult case of
service providers. Part V applies the critical resource theory of
fiduciaiy duty to explain easy cases and resolve hard cases. Part VI
describes the justification for the content of fiduciary duties that is
implied by the critical resource theory. The basis of this notion is that
fiduciary law provides protection against opportunistic behavior, and
the strength of that protection varies inversely with the potential for
self-help on the part of the vulnerable party. Finally, Part VII briefly
explores three additional implications of the critical resource theory of
fiduciary duty.
I. THE NATURE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
When the term "fiduciary duty" is used in this Article, it refers
to a duty of loyalty. This duty has been described as a duty of
23. Douglas Laycock has summarized the importance of restitutionary remedies as follows:
The restitutionary claim matters in three sets of cases: (1) when unjust enrichment is
the only source of liability; (2) when plaintiff prefers to measure recovery by
defendant's gain, either because it exceeds plaintiffs loss or because it is easier to
measure; and (3) when plaintiff prefers specific restitution, either because defendant
is insolvent, because the thing plaintiff lost has changed in value, or because plaintiff
values the thing he lost for nonmarket reasons.
Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1284 (1989).
For more on the respective remedies under fiduciary duty, tort, and contract, see infra Part
viII.c.
1406 [Vol. 55:1399
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"unselfishness" 24 or an "obligation to behave as if [the fiduciary] has
adopted an other-regarding preference function." 25 Each of these
formulations has some merit, but for reasons discussed in this section,
each is slightly misleading. For present purposes, therefore, "fiduciary
duty" connotes an obligation to refrain from self-interested behavior
that constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary as a result of the fiduciary
exercising discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical resources.
Obviously, this description of fiduciary duty requires some
unpacking. In particular, the notion of "wrong" may seem opaque to
those unfamiliar with the law of restitution.26 Fiduciary duty has often
been conceived as an equitable wrong, in contradistinction to tort,
which is a legal wrong. 27 Breach of contract and breach of statutory
duty are also considered legal wrongs.28 The unifying attribute of all
wrongs is that "one person misappropriates a protected interest of
another."29 The protected interest in a fiduciary relationship is the
beneficiary's interest in the critical resource. 30 As a general matter, a
wrong is committed in the fiduciary context when the fiduciary does or
has something that is inconsistent with the beneficiary's interest in
the critical resource.
Breach of fiduciary duty is sometimes associated with "unjust
enrichment,"31 but this association can be more confusing than
24. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 537, 542 (1997).
25. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1783 (2001).
26. If Andrew Kull is right, this could be a very large group. Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995) ("To put it bluntly, American lawyers today
(judges and law professors included) do not know what restitution is.").
27. See, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1767, 1779 (2001); Mark P. Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927,
1935 n.43 (2001). "Tort" and "wrong" are often used synonymously. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 3 (1937) (stating that "[a] person is not permitted to profit by his own
wrong at the expense of another," in a section entitled "Tortious Acquisition of a Benefit").
28. Birks, supra note 27, at 1779.
29. See Friedmann, supra note 12, at 1879.
30. Whether the critical resources belong to the beneficiary-or, in the words of property
law, are "owned" by the beneficiary-is an issue that is exogenous to fiduciary law. Similarly,
whether the fiduciary has committed a wrong against the beneficiary as a result of the
fiduciary's discretion with respect to those critical resources is informed by principles outside of
fiduciary law.
31. See Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 L. REV. Q.
472 (1968). As a means of distinguishing fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships, reference to
unjust enrichment is not helpful. The obvious problem with this approach is that whether a
person is unjustly enriched may depend on whether the person is a fiduciary. Defining the
relationship by reference to unjust enrichment, therefore, is simply tautological. See DeMott,
supra note 3, at 913 ("But the principle of unjust enrichment cannot explain as a general matter
why some people are under the fiduciary constraint and others are not, and it inevitably requires
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helpful. Taken at face value, the term "unjust enrichment" seems to
imply an "open-ended and potentially unprincipled charter of
liability."32 As noted in the recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution, however, the law relating to unjust enrichment is
concerned "with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to what is
more appropriately called unjustified enrichment," which is
"enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis: [I]t results from a
transfer that the law treats as ineffective to work a conclusive
alteration in ownership rights." 33
Even this narrower conception of unjust enrichment is too
broad to capture the essence of fiduciary obligation. The duty that is
distinctive of fiduciaries arises out of a concern that the fiduciary will
take advantage of the beneficiary. It is not a concern about
inadvertent harm, but about self-interested behavior. This nuance is
best seen by distinguishing "wrongful enrichment" from "unjust
enrichment."34 While "[e]very wrongful enrichment can be dressed up
in the language of unjust enrichment,"35 the key to maintaining the
distinction is to determine whether the plaintiff is required to rely on
the defendant's wrongful action to sustain a claim. Under this view,
culpability is simply not relevant to claims of unjust enrichment,36
which is limited in the main to cases involving mistakes.37 Although
all commentators seem to agree that breach of fiduciary duty falls
within the boundaries of the law of restitution, identifying breaches of
fiduciary duty as wrongs rather than cases of unjust enrichment
a case-by-case examination of particular facts to determine whether the obligation applies.");
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 435 ("This is perfectly circular... [and] can fit any rule
while predicting no outcomes.").
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (Discussion
Draft 2000).
33. Id.
34. Birks, supra note 27, at 1777; James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and
Wrongs, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1869 (2001). Mark Gergen would add a third category called
"policy-based restitution." Gergen, supra note 27, at 1931.
35. Birks, supra note 27, at 1783. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT makes no attempt to distinguish these concepts. See, e.g., § 3 cmt. a ("Any profit
realized in consequence of intentional wrongdoing is unjust enrichment because it results from a
wrong to the plaintiff.").
36. Birks, supra note 27, at 1788.
37. Birks uses mistakes as the primary examples of his structure. See, e.g., id. at 1779
(analyzing the "receipt of a mistaken payment"); cf. Laycock, supra note 23, at 1284-85
(describing various cases in which unjust enrichment is the only source of liability). For a
detailed examination of mistakes, see Hanoch Dagan, Mistakes, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1795 (2001).
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highlights an important feature of fiduciary law-namely, its focus on
opportunism. 8
Obviously, this conception of fiduciary duty is limited to the
duty of loyalty, as opposed to the duty of care. References to a
"fiduciary duty of care" are common, 39 and fiduciaries routinely owe a
duty of care. Of course, many other people also owe a duty of care.
More importantly, while the content of that duty of care may be stated
in terms of ordinary negligence or gross negligence, depending on
context, the intensity of the duty of care is not dependent on whether
the person acting is a fiduciary. In short, the duty of care is "not
distinctively fiduciary."40
Unlike the duty of care, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is
distinctive. Although fiduciaries are not the only people who owe a
duty of loyalty-Part VII.A below argues that the implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing in contract law is a form of loyalty
obligation-the content of the duty of loyalty imposed in the fiduciary
context is unique. In other words, the requirements imposed by the
duty of loyalty change as one moves from contractual relationships to
fiduciary relationships. In the fiduciary context, the duty of loyalty
requires the fiduciary to adjust her behavior on an ongoing basis to
avoid self-interested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary. By
contrast, the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires
loyalty to the other contracting party only to the extent that the terms
of the contractual relationship reasonably contemplate the actions in
38. Conflating wrongs and cases of unjust enrichment can also have immediate practical
effects. See Edelman, supra note 34, at 1870 (citing differences in choice-of-law rules, statutes of
limitation and respose, varying interest rates, and available defenses).
39. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1089 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 434 (2000); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel
or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan and Kamar's Price Discrimination in the
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1260 (2001). The Delaware Supreme Court
recently embraced the notion of a "triad" of fiduciary duties: loyalty, care, and good faith. See
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (noting that "directors of Delaware
corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith"); Malone
v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (observing "[t]hat triparte fiduciary duty does not operate
intermittently but is the constant compass by which all director actions for the corporation and
interactions with its shareholders must be guided"); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 361 (Del. 1993) (referring awkwardly to the "triads of their fiduciary duty"). The Delaware
Court of Chancery has resisted adopting this framework. See In re Gaylord Container Corp.
S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n. 41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that "the subsidiary requirement
to act in good, rather than bad, faith toward the company and its stockholders" lies within the
traditional duty of loyalty).
40. DeMott, supra note 3, at 915.
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question.41  Stated another way, both contracting parties and
fiduciaries may be allowed to engage in self-interested behavior. 42 For
this reason, fiduciary duty should not be equated with a duty of
selflessness. 43 However, the fiduciary must refrain from self-interested
behavior that wrongs the beneficiary, whereas contracting parties may
act in a self-interested manner even where the other party is injured,
as long as such actions are reasonably contemplated by the contact. 44
In short, fiduciaries are expected to be much more scrupulous about
their self-interested behavior than mere contracting parties.
The emphasis here on the fiduciary's self-interested behavior
might, at first blush, seem to be merely the flip side of a requirement
that the fiduciary act in the interests of the beneficiary. 45 A failure to
act in the interests of the beneficiary, however, may arise in several
contexts: when the fiduciary acts in the interests of a third party,
when the fiduciary (otherwise) fails to exercise proper care, or when
the fiduciary acts in a self-interested manner. While any action that
harms the beneficiary might in some sense constitute a breach of
loyalty, courts typically reserve the label "loyalty" for self-interested
41. This statement is qualified with the word "usually" to account for those cases in which
courts impose "good faith" obligations beyond the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties. As will be discussed below, see infra Part VIII.A, the critical resource theory
acknowledges the blurred line that separates fiduciary relationships and contractual
relationships. To the extent that loyalty obligations originate from sources outside of the
contract, they tend to have a fiduciary character.
42. In recognition of the fact that conflict-of-interest transactions may sometimes work to
the advantage of the beneficiary, fiduciary law typically allows the parties to a fiduciary
relationship to "contract out" of fiduciary duties. Moreover, in some fiduciary relationships-
notably partnerships, where each partner has a fiduciary obligation to the partnership-the
fiduciaries simultaneously work on their own behalf when they work on behalf of the beneficiary.
43. To the extent that the rhetoric of Meinhard v. Salmon suggests a duty of selflessness,
Judge Cardozo goes too far. See 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that the "thought of self
was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation").
44. See Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 633-34 n.101 (1997) (" '[G]ood faith' requires one party to 'consider' the other party's interest
in exercising discretion under their contract and thus seeks limits on the extent to which the
party may serve his own interests. But it does not seek (as does the classic fiduciary stricture) to
prevent him or her from serving those interests, whether or not at the risk of some harm to the
other party.").
45. DeMott, supra note 3, at 882 ("If a person in a particular relationship with another is
subject to a fiduciary obligation, that person (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of the
other person (the beneficiary)."). There is some tension between the standard for breach of
fiduciary duty and the "on behalf of' requirement discussed below. See infra Part I.B. All
fiduciaries work on behalf of beneficiaries, but loyalty is not measured by the failure to provide
the benefits of the relationship. Only when such a failure results from self-interested behavior on
the part of the fiduciary are concerns about loyalty raised.
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actions. Actions that advantage a third party at the expense of the
beneficiary are usually treated as a. breach of the duty of care.46
Courts emphasize self-interested behavior (rather than other-
regarding behavior) for another reason: Whether a fiduciary is
engaged in other-regarding behavior is often too difficult to assess
because it ultimately depends on either the fiduciary's motives or the
effect of the fiduciary's actions on the beneficiary, neither of which
may be transparent. As noted in the prior paragraph, there may be
competing explanations for an action that is contrary to the interests
of the beneficiary, some of which do not involve a breach of the duty of
loyalty. In these circumstances, whether the actions of the fiduciary
were other-regarding cannot be determined merely by observing the
effect of the actions (e.g., harm to the beneficiary). Moreover, fiduciary
claims do not require proof of actual loss to the beneficiary. The
"harm" caused by a breach of fiduciary duty may be nothing more than
an infringement of the beneficiary's right to control the fiduciary.
Finally, even where a fiduciary's actions do not seem reasonably
contemplated to serve the interests of the beneficiary, judges must
guard against the risks associated with hindsight bias.47
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO FIDUCIARY DUTY
Justice Frankfurter wrote, "To say that a man is a fiduciary
only begins the analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom
is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?"48 As it
turns out, identifying someone as a fiduciary is no simple
undertaking. Courts frequently consider whether fiduciary duties
46. The intuition here seems to be that a fiduciary who is not motivated by self-interest
would not intentionally serve the interests of a third party ahead of the interests of the
beneficiary. Evidence that such action has occurred, therefore, suggests negligence. For
discussions of this point in the corporate context, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 590-96
(1992); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 284-86 (1998).
47. See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 767, 782-85 (2000).
48. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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apply to a given relationship49 but have been extremely vague in
articulating the standards for making this determination. 50
Many courts sensibly divide the universe of fiduciary
relationships into two parts: "formal" fiduciary relationships and
"informal" fiduciary relationships. 51 Formal fiduciary relationships are
those well-settled cases-such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward,
partner-partner, director-shareholder, and attorney-client-where
fiduciary duties apply as a matter of course. 52 Informal fiduciary
relationships-often referred to as "confidential relationships" 53-are
49. Fiduciary duties do not arise only in contractual relationships. See, e.g., Stone v. Davis,
419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) ("A fiduciary relationship need not be created by contract; it
may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed."). Indeed, it is often said that agency relationships are consensual-
not contractual-and fiduciary duties are an important feature of agency relationships. See, e.g.,
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Miller, 765 A.2d 587, 593 (Md. 2001).
50. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S., 433 P.2d 769, 771 (Colo.
1967) (stating that a fiduciary relationship is one that "might have impelled or induced [one of
the parties] to relax the care and vigilance it would and should have ordinarily exercised in
dealing with a stranger"); Dunn v. Dunn, 786 So. 2d 1045, 1053 (Miss. 2001) ("In determining
whether a fiduciary relationship exists, we have to look to see if one person depends upon
another."); Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co. v. Daniel, 771 So. 2d 924, 930 (Miss. 2000) ("A
fiduciary relationship may arise between parties to a contract where the parties share a mutual
interest in obtaining the results called for in the contract.").
51. While the approach of dividing potential fiduciary relationships into two categories is
long-standing, the designation of the two categories as "formal" and "informal" is relatively new.
The first case using these terms seems to be Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 529
N.Y.S.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). More recent cases include Meridian National v.
American Commercial Industries, No. L-00-1056, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 324, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 2, 2001); Railroad Street & Co. v. Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc., No. 01-98-01429-01, 2001
Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *120 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2001).
52. At times courts refer to these relationships as "legal" fiduciary relationships or fiduciary
relationships "as a matter of law." See, e.g., Davion v. Williams, 352 So. 2d 804, 807 (Miss. 1977);
Cacciatore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2000 WL 1029168, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Confusingly, courts also
refer to informal fiduciary relationships as "implied in law." See, e.g., Reebles, Inc. v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 25 P.3d 871, 874 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (describing relationships "implied in law due to
the factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the parties to
each other and to the questioned transactions").
53. "Confidential relationships" and "fiduciary relationships" are not congruent, but the
overlap between the two concepts is substantial. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Discussion Draft 2000) § 15 cmt. b (stating that undue influence might
arise in fiduciary relationships or in other confidential relationships); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 825 n.100 (1983). Ray Madoff has stated, "Confidential relationships
can be understood as both a form and an extension of fiduciary relationships." Ray D. Madoff,
Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 583 (1997). The primary difference between
the two relationships seems to lie in the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff:
If one person is in a confidential, but not a fiduciary, relation to another, a transaction
between them will not be set aside at the instance of one of them unless in fact he
reposed confidence in the other, and the other, by fraud or undue influence or
otherwise, abused the confidence placed in him.... The existence of a confidential
relation is simply one of the elements to be considered in determining whether there
is fraud or undue influence or overreaching.
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those in which the court imposes fiduciary duties based on a
qualitative evaluation of the relationship.
Courts typically do not attempt to explain why fiduciary duties
are imposed in formal fiduciary relationships. Many of these
relationships have been considered fiduciary in nature for centuries,
and any attempt to explain that status seems unnecessary. By
contrast, courts are incessantly attempting to rationalize the law
governing informal fiduciary relationships. Claims under this heading
are common and involve diverse factual settings. The search for
common principles is inevitable.
While courts use various formulations to describe informal
fiduciary relationships, the common elements are quite simple: (1)
"trust" or "confidence" reposed by one person in another; 54 and (2) the
resulting "domination,"55 "superiority,"5 6 or "undue influence"57 of the
AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (4th ed. 1987); see also
Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the
Counseling Relationship, 74 DEN. U. L. REV. 1, 39 n. 255 (1996) ("The distinction between the
two groups is reflected more in evidentiary burdens rather than in substantive duties.").
A corollary to the foregoing is that fiduciary duty is only one mechanism for controlling
breaches of confidence. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a
Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995) (observing that American courts
"have used three theories of recovery--contract, fiduciary duty and tort-to remedy breaches of
confidence").
54. This requirement appears again and again in the cases. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998) (stating that "confidential relationships may arise when
the parties have dealt with each other in such a manner for a long period of time that one party
is justified in expecting the other to act in its best interest"); Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v.
Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176-77 (Tex. 1997) ("An informal relationship may give rise to a
fiduciary duty where one person trusts in and relies on another, whether the relation is a moral,
social, domestic, or purely personal one .... But not every relationship involving a high degree of
trust and confidence rises to the stature of a fiduciary relationship."); H-B Ltd. P'ship v.
Wimmer, 257 S.E.2d 770, 773 (Va. 1979) ("A fiduciary relationship exists in all cases when
special confidence has been reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in
good faith and with due regard for the interests of the one reposing the confidence.").
55. See, e.g., Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Iowa 1996) ("Although domination
and control are significant factors, neither [is] determinative by [itself]."); Union State Bank v.
Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 721 (N.D. 1989) (stating that the "party reposing the confidence must be
in a position of inequality, dependence, weakness, or lack of knowledge"); Lowrance v. Patton,
710 P.2d 108, 111 (Okla. 1985) (concluding that a fiduciary relationship exists where "there is
confidence reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence on the other").
56. The nature of superiority required here is elusive. Just because one party to the
relationship has greater skill or expertise does not result in the formation of a fiduciary
relationship. See, e.g., Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 761 A.2d 1268, 1280 (Conn. 2000)
("Superior skill and knowledge alone do not create a fiduciary duty among parties involved in a
business transaction."); High Plains Genetics Research, Inc. v. JK Mill-Iron Ranch, 535 N.W.2d
839, 842 (S.D. 1995) (observing that one party "may have had superior knowledge and technical
skills," but the other "was not in a dependent position, lacking in mental acuity, business
intelligence or knowledge of the basic principles involved").
With regard to the claim that "[fliduciary duties redress the inequality of information or
power between the parties to a contract," Easterbrook and Fischel respond, "Nice try, but it is
1414 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 55:1399
other. 58 Trust alone is not enough, 59 though courts often speak loosely
in ways that suggest otherwise60-nor is vulnerability. 61 Only in the
aggregate do these factors give rise to a fiduciary relationship.6 2
hopeless as a description-for the most conspicuous differences in size, power, and
sophistication ... produce transactions that are most likely to be brought under the umbrella of
contract, which will be enforced to the last detail." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 436.
57. See, e.g., Young v. Kaye, 279 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1971) (stating that a confidential
relationship "exist[s] whenever the relative position[s] of the parties is such that one has power
and means to take advantage of or exercise undue influence over the other").
58. A Missouri appellate court summarized the usual requirements concisely and
completely as follows:
From the foregoing authority, certain basic elements necessary to the establishment
of a fiduciary relationship arise. In summary, these are: (1) as between the parties,
one must be subservient to the dominant mind and will of the other as a result of age,
state of health, illiteracy, mental disability, or ignorance; (2) things of value such as
land, monies, a business, or other things of value which are the property of the
subservient person must be possessed or managed by the dominant party; (3) there
must be a surrender of independence by the subservient party to the dominant party;
(4) there must be an automatic or habitual manipulation of the actions of the
subservient party by the dominant party; and (5) there must be a showing that the
subservient party places a trust and confidence in the dominant party.
Chmieleski v. City Prod. Corp., 660 S.W.2d 275, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). This summary suggests
much more precision than actually exists in most of the cases.
59. See, e.g., Parello v. Maio, 494 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ga. 1998) (stating that "the mere
circumstance that two people have come to repose a certain amount of trust and confidence in
each other as the result of business dealings is not, in and of itself, sufficient to find the existence
of a confidential relationship"); Smith v. Walden, 549 S.E.2d 750, 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (noting
that "mere friendship and close fellowship, without more, do not create a fiduciary relationship");
Kienel v. Lanier, 378 S.E.2d 359, 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (maintaining that "the mere fact that
two persons have transacted business in the past based on oral commitments or understandings
and that they have come to repose trust and confidence in each other as the result of such
dealings is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant a finding that a confidential relationship
exists between them"); Daktronics, Inc. v. McAfee, 599 N.W.2d 358, 363 (S.D. 1999) ("One party
cannot transform a business relationship into one which is fiduciary in nature merely by placing
trust and confidence in the other party.") (quoting Ainsworth v. First Bank of S.D., 472 N.W.2d
768, 7888 (S.D. 1991)); Semenov v. Hill, 982 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1999) (finding that "merely
depending on another does not create a fiduciary relationship").
60. See, e.g., Mid-Am. Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. First Say. and Loan Ass'n of South Holland, 515
N.E. 2d 176, 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("Where a fiduciary relationship does not exist as a matter of
law, such a relationship may nonetheless occur where one party, due to a close relationship,
relies very heavily on the judgment of another."); Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904-05
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("Broadly stated, a fiduciary relationship is one founded upon trust or
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another. It is said that the
relationship exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which
confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations
and those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in, and relies upon, another.")
(emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Bloomfield v. Neb. State Bank, 465 N.W. 2d 144, 149 (Neb. 1991.)
("[S]uperiority alone does not create a fiduciary duty.").
62. An elegant statement of the usual approach was offered by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in In re Estate of Scott:
The concept of a confidential relationship cannot be reduced to a catalogue of specific
circumstances, invariably falling to the left or right of a definitional line.... The
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These standards are extremely malleable, allowing courts to
tailor their decisions to the particular case. The price of such
flexibility is that the reporters are filled with cases in which the
parties appear to have both an investment of trust and concomitant
vulnerability, but which for some other reason do not seem like
fiduciary relationships. 63 A recent example of such a case is Top of
Iowa Cooperative v. Schewe,6 4 in which a grain elevator ("Top of Iowa")
owed fiduciary duties to a farmer ("Schewe"), who had entered into
risky "hedge-to-arrive" ("HTA") contracts.
An HTA requires the farmer to deliver a specified amount of
grain at a specified date.6 5 In exchange, the farmer agrees to accept a
specified price in exchange for the promised grain. If the market
("spot") price of grain declines between the date of the contract and the
date of delivery, the buyer must nevertheless pay the contract price.
essence of such a relationship is trust and reliance on one side, and a corresponding
opportunity to abuse that trust for personal gain on the other.
316 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. 1974).
63. One set of cases that has been much debated is claims within a family. Family members
are not considered fiduciaries simply because of their familial ties, even though family
relationships have many of the attributes of traditional fiduciary relationships. See, e.g.,
Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Va. 2000); Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999). On the other hand, family members are not
exempt from fiduciary obligations merely because they are part of the same family. See, e.g., Tex.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex. 1980).
Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott noted some of the difficulties in applying fiduciary law to
parents:
Given the extensive scope of the relationship, a prescription that parents must
systematically subordinate their personal interest to that of the child when the two
are in conflict seems unduly burdensome, and ultimately likely to deter prospective
parents from taking on the role. Furthermore, enforcement of such an obligation,
although theoretically feasible, would require costly and intrusive state supervision of
intact families. This effect seems particularly troublesome given the intimacy of the
relationship and the presumed importance of privacy to optimal family functioning.
Moreover, the substantial costs to children of replacing parents and of severing the
filial bond inhibits the imposition of a sanction that is used to discipline fiduciaries in
other contexts.
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2430 (1995).
Despite these obstacles, the authors find much to recommend the conception of parents as
fiduciaries.
64. 149 F. Supp. 2d 709 (N.D. Iowa 2001). The existing standards encourage plaintiffs to
bring fiduciary claims in many circumstances that are quite remote from the fiduciary
framework described by the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Comm. on
Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 676 (Cal. 1983) (rejecting a claim
that a breakfast cereal manufacturer had a fiduciary relationship with the children who
consumed its products); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (rejecting a claim that a drug manufacturer had a fiduciary duty to disclose material safety
facts to all consumers).
65. The Schewe court did not describe the terms of the HTA in that case. For a description
of HTAs, see Glenn L. Norris et al., Hedge to Arrive Contracts and the Commodity Exchange Act:
A Textual Alternative, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 319, 322-26 (1999).
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On the other hand, if the spot price of grain rises between the date of
the contract and the date of delivery, the buyer pays only the contract
price. The buyer hedges against fluctuations in the spot price by
entering into a futures contract that exactly mirrors the HTA. The
farmer obtains only the contract price regardless of fluctuation in the
spot price. The advantage of such contracts to both parties is that the
price is fixed in advance.
The farmer may decide to "roll" the HTA, which means simply
that the farmer may delay delivery of the grain to a future period. For
example, Schewe had agreed to deliver grain in the fall of 1995, but he
decided to roll his HTAs into the spring of 1996-purportedly on the
advice and encouragement of Top of Iowa. 66 When a farmer elects to
roll an HTA, the price of the contract changes to reflect futures prices.
If prices are rising, the farmer may be forced to purchase grain at the
date of delivery for a spot price in excess of the contract price. In any
event, the purpose of rolling a contract is usually speculative. 67
Schewe's timing was bad, as grain prices were rising in the fall of
1995. Top of Iowa sued Schewe for breaching his contract, and Schewe
counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty. A jury approved both
claims. 68
In the appeal of the grain elevator's motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the court evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence on
Schewe's fiduciary duty claim. Top of Iowa argued that Schewe was a
sophisticated businessman who made his own decisions and that the
parties had entered into an arm's-length commercial relationship. 69
Schewe countered by pointing to evidence of "his reliance on and trust
in" Top of Iowa's grain merchandiser, as well as "copious evidence that
Top of Iowa had superior knowledge about and experience in the grain
industry."70 The court noted evidence that officers of the grain elevator
had extensive experience with hedging transactions and concluded
that "the jury could have reasonably inferred that Top of Iowa
66. 149 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
67. See Norris et al., supra note 63, at 324-25:
In response to the right to roll delivery into farther and farther removed months-and
the chance to make money from the fluctuations of the [Chicago Board of Trade]
without paying margins and commissions-some farmers entered into a great many
HTA contracts. Indeed, many committed a number of bushels to HTA contracts that
exceeded their annual grain production by three, four, or more times. And, in many
cases, the ratio of HTA bushels to actual bushels did not decrease over time: The right
of the producer to roll the HTA contract and sell his crop for cash, combined with
favorable cash prices, encouraged farmers to roll the HTA contracts rather than
deliver on them.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 714.
70. Id.
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possessed superior knowledge and experience with grain transactions
involving any sort of 'hedging' or speculation about the future
performance of the grain market."71
This case illustrates the possibility for error in applying
concepts like trust and vulnerability to distinguish fiduciary from
nonfiduciary relationships.7 2 Even if Schewe trusted Top of Iowa and
became vulnerable as a result, the relationship did not evidence the
potential for opportunism that is characteristic of fiduciary
relationships. Indeed, if Top of Iowa was a fiduciary, it is difficult to
imagine any principle that would distinguish this relationship from
almost any arm's-length contract.
While indeterminacy is a strong objection to the use of "trust"
as a standard for sorting fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships, 73
there is more general criticism of the use of trust to identify fiduciary
relationships. In light of recent scholarship, the concept of "trust"
71. Id. at 718. The court observed that "had the court been the trier of fact, the verdict
would have been different." Id. at 717.
72. The indeterminacy of traditional common-law standards is illustrated vividly by pairing
the following recent cases:
Lender and debtor. In Weltzin v. Cobank, ACB, 633 N.W.2d 290, 293-94 (Iowa 2001), the
court rejected a claim of a fiduciary relationship between a bank and shareholders in a
cooperative that was a debtor of the bank. According to the court, the bank had no obligation to
supervise the management of the cooperative to prevent the cooperative's managers from
harming its members. Id. at 295. By way of contrast, the court in Young v. First National Bank
of Shreveport, 794 So. 2d 128, 135 (La. Ct. App. 2001) found a fiduciary relationship where a
bank officer had "developed a personal friendship with" the debtor and "actively participated in
business decision-making." That relationship required the bank officer to disclose conflict-of-
interest transactions. Id. at 135-36.
Manufacturer and distributor. In Abernathy-Thomas Engineering Co. v. Pall Corp., 103 F.
Supp. 2d 582, 587, 608-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court held that a manufacturer had fiduciary
duties to a distributor where the manufacturer required access to certain confidential customer
information. In contrast, the court in United Magazine Co. v. Murdoch Magazines Distribution,
Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 385, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) held that no fiduciary relationship existed
absent a contractual requirement to share confidential information.
Pharmacist and customer. In Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2001), the court found a fiduciary relationship between a pharmacist and customer with respect
to the sale of a customer's confidential medical information. By way of contrast, the court in
Evans v. Rite Aid Corp., 478 S.E.2d 846, 847-48 (S.C. 1996), held that a pharmacist does not owe
a duty of confidentiality.
In each of the foregoing cases, the plaintiffs claimed to have reposed trust in the defendants.
In each case, the defendants failed to protect the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were harmed. And
in each case, the court struggled to justify its disposition of the fiduciary duty claims. Using the
principles of "trust" and "vulnerability" alone, it would be difficult to distinguish one group of
cases from the other. In all of these cases, however, the courts could have easily resolved the
issue by using the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty.
73. Of course, many courts recognize that subjective trust is insufficient to create a
fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., N.E. Ohio Coll. of Massotherapy v. Burek, 759 N.E.2d 869, 875
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591,
594-95 (Tex. 1992); Robbins v. Payne, 55 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
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simply seems inapt. Although definitions of "trust" vary,74 the term
usually connotes some measure of vulnerability that emanates from
the lack of legal or other protection against harm. For example, it is
now widely argued that trust is pervasive in commercial relationships
and that it plays a crucial role in filling gaps in incomplete contracts.
If trust is present in (nearly) every relational contract, then it cannot
distinguish purely contractual relationships from fiduciary
relationships.
More fundamentally, to the extent that parties rely on legal
constraints for protection, they are not trusting at all, but instead
relying on the law of fiduciary duty for protection. Such reliance
displaces trust.75 This phenomenon is what Oliver Williamson calls
"calculativeness."76
One area in which courts have sometimes employed a critical
resource theory of fiduciary duty-or, to be precise, a "property rights"
theory-is the law of insider trading. In United States v. Chestman,
for example, the Second Circuit described a fiduciary's obligation as
follows:
A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency: One person
depends on another-the fiduciary-to serve his interests. In relying on a fiduciary to
act for his benefit, the beneficiary of the relation may entrust the fiduciary with custody
over property of one sort or another. Because the fiduciary obtains access to this
74. In a helpful taxonomy, Jay Barney and Mark Hansen identify three forms of trust: weak
form, semi-strong form, and strong form. Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as
a Source of Competitive Advantage, 15 STRAT. MGT. J., Winter 1994, at 175. The weak form is
hardly worthy of the name "trust," because it contemplates a relationship in which the parties
rely on legal constraints to govern conduct. Id. at 177. On the other end of the spectrum, strong-
form trust exists when the parties are free to act opportunistically (i.e., there is no legal
impediment), but such behavior would "violate values, principles, and standards of behavior that
have been internalized by parties to an exchange." Id. at 179. As suggested by the name, semi-
strong-form trust falls between the weak and strong forms. It arises where one party is protected
by law (as in the weak form), but that protection may fail, leaving the party vulnerable to
opportunism (as in the strong form). Id. at 177-78.
75. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law V. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 568-71 (2001) (arguing that
law can "crowd out" trust); see also, Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81
B.U. L. REV. 591, 600 (2001) ("[Wlhen we deprive people of the experience of being trusted, as
fiduciary rules are wont to do, we destroy-at least to the extent we have eliminated that
experience-the possibility of trust.").
76. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 453, 463 (1993) (It "can be misleading to use the term 'trust' to describe commercial
exchange for which cost-effective safeguards have been devised in support of more efficient
exchange. Calculative trust is a contradiction in terms."). Williamson has been widely criticized
for narrowing the scope of trust too dramatically. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 75, at 603 ("The
purpose of Williamson's economic analysis is to demonstrate the irrelevance of trust to the study
of economic interactions."); Ribstein, supra note 75, at 557-58 n.17 ("This article is generally
consistent with Williamson's distinction, except that it admits a broader potential for trust
beyond personal relationships.").
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property to serve the ends of the fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to
appropriate the property for his own use.77
The central issue in insider-trading cases is deceptively simple:
whether one person must disclose private information to another
person (or the market as a whole) prior to trading a security. Under
the "classical" theory of insider trading, the insider is a director,
officer, or employee of the company whose shares are being traded.
Each of these insiders owes a fiduciary duty to the existing
shareholders of the company.78 According to the Supreme Court in
Chiarella v. United States, 79 the failure of insiders to disclose material,
nonpublic information about the company prior to trading constitutes
a breach of the duty of loyalty, which qualifies as deception for
purposes of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5, promulgated under that statute.
The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty has little to add to
this classical theory of insider trading. Material, nonpublic
information clearly qualifies as a "critical resource" of the company,
and the existence of a fiduciary duty for the insiders is unquestioned.
Even when liability is extended to a temporary or constructive insider
(such as an attorney, underwriter, accountant, or other agent), the
theory remains solid. In the end, this theory of insider trading has
implications for the content of the fiduciary obligation-thus
triggering federalism concerns 8 -but the existence of fiduciary
relationships is derived from state law and accepted as a given.
77. 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991). For incisive commentary on the property rights theory
of insider trading, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the
Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1252-57 (1995); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights
and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1644-50 (1999) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Path
Dependent].
78. In many instances, the sale of securities involves a counterparty who is not a
shareholder of the company prior to the trade. When insiders deal with prospective stockholders,
they typically owe fiduciary obligations. In contexts outside of insider trading, however,
prospective stockholders do not benefit from fiduciary protection. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna
Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that "prospective stockholders are not
owed fiduciary duties" to challenge a restructuring plan); Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v.
Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174-77 (Del. 1988) (holding that prospective
shareholders in a spin-off of a corporate subsidiary were not entitled to fiduciary protection).
79. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (stating that "one who fails to disclose material information
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.
And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.' ")
(alteration in original).
80. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123
(1998); Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 215.
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As to the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the first test of
the classical theory articulated in Chiarella arose in Dirks v. SEC, 81
which involved a claim of "tippee" liability.8 2 Unlike the insiders and
temporary insiders discussed above, a tippee normally owes no
preexisting fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company. The
Court resolved the doctrinal tensions by holding that the tippee's
liability was derivative of the inside tipper's breach of fiduciary duty. 3
Despite the Court's assertion that "a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty
to the shareholders of a corporation," the tippee is not a fiduciary in
any conventional sense and certainly not under the critical resource
theory (which requires the exercise of discretion84-- implying some
form of authorization-on behalf of the beneficiary). Nevertheless,
whether the tippee is treated as a fiduciary or as someone who merely
participates in the fiduciary's wrongful act is of little moment for
fiduciary law or the law of insider trading. In either case, the tippee is
liable.
The most baffling intersection between fiduciary theory and
insider-trading law arises under the "misappropriation" theory of
insider trading. The Supreme Court recently embraced the language
of property rights in the misappropriation context,8 5 though to mixed
reviews.8 6 As with classical insider trading, misappropriation theory
relies on fiduciary duty to establish the existence of a "deceptive
device or contrivance" that activates the insider trading prohibitions.
In misappropriation cases, however, the duty does not run from an
insider to the company's shareholders, but rather from the trader to
the source of the information. As stated by the Supreme Court, "In
81. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
82. The SEC enforcement action that initiated federal enforcement of insider-trading
prohibitions under Rule 10b-5 was a tipping case. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act
Release No. 34,668 (Nov. 8, 1961). At the time, however, fiduciary duty was not the foundation of
federal insider trading law, and the SEC grounded its opinion on a general duty on the part of
people holding material, nonpublic information to either disclose that information before trading
or to abstain from trading.
83. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (reasoning that "the tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is
derivative from that of the insider's duty").
84. Id. at 660.
85. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997); see also Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987) (explaining the concept of fraud as interpreted under the mail
fraud statute).
86. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Path Dependent, supra note 77, at 1589 (contending that the
Supreme Court "took an area in which the law made a certain amount of policy sense... and
made hash of it"). For additional arguments in favor of a property rights approach, see Kimberly
D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in
the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443, 465 (2001). For criticisms of that approach, see Alan
Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 434
(1999).
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lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company
insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-
trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to
confidential information. 87
Reliance on fiduciary concepts to establish the link to securities
fraud is completely different in the misappropriation context than in
the classical insider trading case. In the classical case, the fiduciary
owes an obligation to the counterparty in the trade. The connection
between the fiduciary's breach and the counterparty's harm is direct
(even if not easily traceable, given that trades occur in impersonal
capital markets). In misappropriation cases, on the other hand, the
counterparty is not the beneficiary of the fiduciary duty. The bizarre
result of the misappropriation theory is that federal insider-trading
regulation provides protection to beneficiaries in fiduciary
relationships, even though such beneficiaries are not the focus of the
regulation.88
Regardless of the merits of insider-trading regulation
generally, or of the misappropriation theory in particular, one thing
seems clear: "From the standpoint of investors, the role of a fiduciary
breach in information acquisition is meaningless."8 9 The connection
between fiduciary relationships and securities fraud is complicated by
the fact that courts are interpreting statutes and regulations. 90 The
SEC attempted to bring some clarity to the scope of the
misappropriation theory in August 2000 by adopting Rule 10b5-2,
which provided a nonexclusive definition of the relationships that give
rise to a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of insider trading
law. 91 According to that Rule, such relationships are formed
87. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
88. Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive Compensation, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 294 (1999) ("[Tlhe focus necessarily ends up on protecting such
relationships-traditionally a concern of state law-much more than protecting the securities
transaction and securities trader that is the focus of federal law.").
89. Krawiec, supra note 86, at 475.
90. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A Breach
in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZo L. REV. 83, 113 (1998) ("The easiest criticism of the property
rights theory is that when Congress passed and subsequently amended the Exchange Act, it was
concerned about fairness and the protection of investors, not the protection of property rights in
information held by issuers and traders."); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider
Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1527 (1999) (stating that "a contractarianlproperty
rights approach does not undergird Rule 10b-5"); Thompson, supra note 88, at 294
("Unfortunately for the sake of theoretical consistency, this property rights justification fits
uneasily within the structure of a federal statute addressing only securities fraud.").
91. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,738 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2).
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"[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence,"
whenever parties sharing material nonpublic information have a
"history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences" that gives rise to
an expectation of nondisclosure, or "[w]henever a person receives or
obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent,
child, or sibling," unless the person obtaining the information proves
that it was not a confidential relationship.
The Rule seems designed to eliminate some of the features of
state fiduciary law that are least compatible with the regulation of
securities fraud, such as the holding in United States v. Chestman,92
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals famously concluded that
"marriage does not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship."93
Moreover, extending securities liability to any relationship where "a
person agrees to maintain information in confidence" extends the
boundaries well beyond fiduciary relationships. 94 This effort to
override and expand on state fiduciary law suggests that the
misappropriation theory is not about fiduciary relationships at all.
Instead, it is about regulating information dissemination in securities
markets, and the animating principle is one of equal access. 95 As a
result, the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty has almost
nothing to say about the misappropriation theory.
92. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
93. Id. at 568; cf. id. at 579 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[F]amily
members who have benefitted from the family's control of the corporation are under a duty not to
disclose confidential corporate information that comes to them in the ordinary course of family
affairs.").
94. Under the critical resource theory, confidential information is a critical resource, but
the person who is entrusted with such information must be given discretion with respect to the
information before a fiduciary relationship arises.
95. This, of course, hearkens back to the initial developments in insider trading law. See In
re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34,668 (Nov. 8, 1961); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that a press release issued by the
defendant was "reasonably calculated to affect the market price"). Others have suggested that
O'Hagan is based on an equal access rationale. See Bainbridge, Path Dependent, supra note 77,
at 1648 (noting that O'Hagan represents an "arguable revival of the long-discredited equal access
theory of liability"); Elliot J. Weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of
Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395, 437 (1998) (O'Hagan "recharacterizes the holdings of
Chiarella and Dirks in terms that suggest that the Court's support of federal prohibitions on
insider trading and tipping is rooted in the Court's sense of the need to protect investors from
informational disparities that cannot fairly be overcome.").
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III. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO FIDUCIARY DuTY
While ambiguity has some virtues in the application of
fiduciary duty,96 it does not seem particularly beneficial when deciding
whether a fiduciary relationship exists. The need to have a clearer
understanding of which relationships are fiduciary and which are not
has prompted efforts to rationalize the cases. The numerous attempts
to rationalize the law of fiduciary duty provide some insights into the
nature of fiduciary obligation, 97 but they share a common failing,
namely, the inability to simultaneously identify all fiduciary
relationships and distinguish fiduciary relationships from
nonfiduciary relationships.98 This section provides a brief description
of the failed search for a theory of fiduciary duty.
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to uncover a unifying
principle of fiduciary obligation was made by Tamar Frankel.
96. See William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894 (1997); D.
Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model Business Corporation
Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1999).
97. For notable examples, see DeMott, supra note 3; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13;
Frankel, supra note 53; Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949);
L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified
Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 51 (1981) [hereinafter Shepherd, Unified
Concept]; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975); see also
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1675, 1682-88 (1990) (describing the "central components" of a fiduciary relationship).
98. The failure to distinguish fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships generally is one of
overinclusiveness. Theories exhibiting this flaw are the most common and are the focus of this
section. The scholarship in this area is also occasionally characterized by underinclusiveness. For
example, Lawrence Mitchell asserts that "in the typical fiduciary relationship, the dependent
will be precluded from exercising any control over that area." Mitchell, supra note 97, at 1685. As
noted by Allan Vestal, this requirement would exclude partnerships from the realm of fiduciary
relationship. Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 524-25 n.6 (1993).
Ernest Weinrib also errs by being underinclusive. Weinrib proposes "[t]wo elements [that]
form the core of the fiduciary concept and ... delineate its frontiers. First, the fiduciary must
have scope for the exercise of discretion, and, second, this discretion must be capable of affecting
the legal position of the principal." Weinrib, supra note 97, at 4. Weinrib relies on both
requirements to act as limiting principles. The first would exclude relationships in which one
party's functions are completely ministerial. The suggestion, which is also employed in the
description of the critical resource theory below, is that a person who is fully protected from
harm by contract (or other means) does not need the protection of fiduciary duties. The second
requirement excludes from fiduciary treatment those cases in which the fiduciary is unable to
affect the beneficiary's legal position. While this may describe some fiduciary relationships, it
does not capture physicians, priests, and other counselors who are held to have fiduciary duties
of confidentiality. Recognizing that fiduciary duty applies beyond the contexts described, Weinrib
articulates an additional principle: fiduciary duty "is part of a pervasive policy of the law to
protect the integrity of. commercial organizations."Id. at 15. Even with this additional
justification, Weinrib is unable to capture all of the contexts in which fiduciary duty routinely
applies.
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Recognizing the insufficiency of the trust-vulnerability rationale used
by most courts,99 Frankel attempted to formulate an overarching
theory of fiduciary duty.100 She identified "abuse of power" as the
central problem inherent in fiduciary relationships. 101 To the extent
that "power" refers to the ability of the fiduciary to inflict harm on the
beneficiary, it is critical to all accounts of fiduciary duty, 10 2 including
the critical resource theory described in this Article, which uses the
notion of "opportunism" as a synonym for "abuse of power." Frankel
also asserts that fiduciary duties are necessary only because the
"entrustor" is unable to prevent abuse through other legal or social
mechanisms.'0 3 This "gap" in protection also plays a central role in the
critical resource theory of fiduciary duty. The intuition here is
straightforward: If the beneficiary is fully protected by self-help,
contract, regulation, or some other mechanism, fiduciary duty is not
99. Although Frankel distances herself from the traditional analysis of fiduciary obligation,
she appeals to the same notions of trust and vulnerability that characterize that approach. For
example, she speaks of the two parties to a fiduciary relationship as a "fiduciary" and an
"entrustor." Frankel, supra note 53, at 800. She also justifies the imposition of fiduciary duties
by reference to the "entrustor's vulnerability." Id. at 810.
100. See id. at 807-08:
A more useful approach to fashioning fiduciary law would begin with the general
reason for legal intervention in fiduciary relations, namely, the nature and severity of
the problem that the law is designed to solve. This Article shows that all fiduciary
relations give rise to the problem of abuse of power, that the purpose of fiduciary law
should be to solve this problem, and that the differences in the rules applicable to
various fiduciary relations stem from differences in the extent of the problem. This
analysis will identify the benefits that flow from fiduciary relations, and will develop a
method to maximize the benefits and minimize the harm to both parties in a fiduciary
relation. The purpose of this analysis is to develop a unified approach to the law
governing fiduciary relations.
101. See id. at 809 ("[W]hile the fiduciary must be entrusted with power in order to perform
his function, his possession of the power creates a risk that he will misuse it and injure the
entrustor.").
102. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 97, at 1684 ("A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of
power and dependency in which the dependent party relies upon the power holder to conduct
some aspect of a dependent's life over which the power holder has been given and accepted
responsibility.").
103. Frankel, supra note 53, at 811 ("If the entrustor can protect himself from abuse of
power, there is no need for the intervention of fiduciary law."). Frankel coined the term
"entrustor," and it has found a home in numerous academic treatments of fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1149-50 (1999). Others find the
word too limiting. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and the Elusive Quest for
Accountable Health Care, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 65, 80 n.55 (1996) (arguing that the word
"suggests that the entrustor is giving power or authority to the trustee, which is not so in all
situations. Sometimes a third party grants the authority or power to the fiduciary for the benefit
of another."); Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L.
REV. 21, 27 n.26 (1992) ("The term is appealing, but, as Frankel recognizes, also potentially
misleading insofar as the power may be entrusted to the fiduciary by someone other than the
person to whom the fiduciary obligation is owed.").
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required. 10 4 Implicit in this form of analysis is the assumption that
fiduciary duty is a relatively costly way to constrain behavior.
Although Frankel correctly identifies the potential for abuse of
power and gaps in protection as justifications for finding a fiduciary
relationship, she is unable to define such relationships in a manner
that excludes nonfiduciary relationships. She identifies two attributes
that characterize fiduciary relationships: (1) A fiduciary "serves as a
substitute for the entrustor," and (2) a fiduciary "obtains power from
the entrustor or from a third party for the sole purpose of enabling the
fiduciary to act effectively." 10 5 According to Frankel, substitution
without the delegation of power is insufficient to create a fiduciary
relationship because it does not distinguish fiduciary relationships
from other relationships, such as an electrician's relationship with a
homeowner or a parent's relationship with a child.106
But how is "delegation of power" helpful to this analysis?
Frankel broadly defines "power" to mean "an ability to make changes
that affect the entrustor."'0 7 It is the breadth of this definition that
deprives it of descriptive force. For example, an electrician receives
"power" from the homeowner "solely for the purpose of facilitating the
performance of his functions.' ' 08 Likewise, a parent obtains power
from the state'0 9 "for the sole purpose of enabling the [parent] to act
104. See also Davis, supra note 10, at 44 (arguing that the "preemptive nature of the law's
response to fiduciary opportunism in the trust and agency areas suggests that the law has little
faith in a principal's capacity to fend for himself and little faith in the ability of market forces to
check the fiduciary"). The scope of protection offered by contract remains uncertain. See Gilles,
supra note 53, at 16 (opining that "outside the realm of commercial relations, contract law will
often have little to offer a plaintiff who lacks a written contract"). To compensate for the absence
of contractual remedies, some plaintiffs have successfully pursued remedies under the theory of
promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989), affd in part and rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 203-05 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 663,
666-72 (1991), on remand to 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
105. Frankel, supra note 53, at 808-09.
106. Id. at 808. Patricia Illingworth argues that Frankel's "delegation of power" requirement
does not accurately describe psychiatrist-patient relationships because "psychiatrists are unlike
non-psychiatric physicians because they do not tell patients what to do (take action on their
behalf) nor, do they give advice to patients." Patricia A. Illingworth, Patient-Therapist Sex:
Criminalization and Its Discontents, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLW 389, 403-06 (1999).
107. Frankel, supra note 53, at 809 n.47.
108. Id. at 809.
109. The state's "traditional role as the guardian of persons under legal disability" is the
state's parens patriae power. Maggie Brandow, Note, A Spoonful of Sugar Won't Help This
Medicine Go Down: Psychotropic Drugs for Abused and Neglected Children, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1151, 1152 n.3 (1999) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979)). Donald Hubin
describes two interpretations of the parens patriae doctrine: the classical interpretation and the
contemporary interpretation. Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 123, 127 (1999). Under the classical interpretation, the state holds the fundamental right
to determine the care and custody of the child but delegates this right to the parents. Id. The
contemporary interpretation suggests that the state has an interest in the care and custody of
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effectively."' 10 In the end, therefore, Frankel does not realize her
aspiration to "develop a unified approach to the law governing
fiduciary relations"11' because she fails to provide the necessary
content to the concept of "power."'112 In addition, despite widespread
use of Frankel's framework by academics, 113 courts have not embraced
it. 114
the child, but that parents' rights are not derived from this interest. Id. Both views are
consistent with the common law approach to parents' rights. The Supreme Court has
consistently found that parents have a "fundamental right to direct the upbringing and
education of their children." Linda L. Schlueter, Parental Rights in the Twenty-First Century:
Parents as Full Partners in Education, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 611, 618 (2001). If parents abuse their
parental rights in ways that conflict with the rights of their children, the state may intervene
using its parens patriae power (as defined by either interpretation). Jennifer L. Sabourin, Note,
Parental Rights Amendments: Will a Statutory Right to Parent Force Children to "Shed Their
Constitutional Rights'at the Schoolhouse Door?" 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1899, 1908 (1999).
110. Frankel, supra note 53, at 809.
111. Id. at 808.
112. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 436 (asking rhetorically, "What kind of
power, under what circumstances, with what ensuing duties?").
113. Frankel's twofold description of fiduciary duties has been widely adopted by academic
commentators. See, e.g., Greta M. Fung, A Common Goal from Two Different Paths: Protection of
Minority Shareholders in Delaware and Canada, 57 ALB. L. REV. 41, 44 (1993); Susan M. Gilles,
Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV.
1, 46 n.202 (1995); Illingworth, supra note 106, at 403-06; Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and
Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47
AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 620-21 (1999); Linda Jorgenson & Rebecca M. Randles, Time Out: The
Statute of Limitations and Fiduciary Theory in Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct Cases, 44
OKLA. L. REV. 181 (1991); Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer In Other
Fiduciary Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357 (1994); Villiers,
supra note 53, at 38-42; Paul Zwier, Is the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute Based
on a Male-Oriented Ethical Model?, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 368 (1989).
114. Frankel's article is cited in seven reported cases, and all but one of these cases cite
Frankel for general propositions about fiduciary duty rather than her suggested approach to
determining the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See Wirum & Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837
P.2d 692, 702 n.14 (Alaska 1992) (citing Frankel to support the proposition that "[cilear financial
records delineate the parties' individual interests and deter self-dealing and mismanagement by
providing a monitoring mechanism"); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (Cal. Ct.
Appeals 1983) (citing Frankel to show that "[tiechnically, a fiduciary relationship is a recognized
legal relationship such as guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary, principal and agent, or
attorney and client"); Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 806 n.l (Conn. 1994) (citing
Frankel for historical background); Schneider v. Plymouth State College, 744 A.2d 101, 105
(N.H. 1999) (citing Frankel to support the assertion that "the party reposing confidence becomes
dependent on the fiduciary because he or she must rely on the fiduciary for a particular service");
Lash v. Cheshire County Say. Bank, 474 A.2d 980, 981 (N.H. 1984) (citing Frankel in support of
the statement that "once a person becomes a fiduciary, the law places him in the role of a moral
person and pressures him to behave in a selfless fashion"); Nat'l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey,
924 S.W.2d 123, 148 (Tex. 1996) (citing Frankel to show that "the circumstances out of which a
fiduciary relationship will be said to arise are not subject to hard and fast rules").
The one exception to this use of Frankel's article is Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 156 (D. Conn. 1998), where the court used Frankel's
reasoning to determine that a party such as the abusive Bishop in this case has tremendous
opportunity to abuse the power relationship by dissembling and nondisclosure. The Court then
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Other attempts to describe the fundamental attributes of
fiduciary relationships have met a similar fate. 115 For example, L. S.
Sealy reviewed the development of fiduciary law and purported to find
four categories of fiduciary relationships: (1) "where one person has
control of property which ... in the view of a court of equity is the
property of another"; (2) where a person "has undertaken or is under
an obligation ... to act on another's behalf or for another's benefit"; (3)
where a person with limited or partial interests in property obtains
renewed or additional rights in the property; and (4) where "undue
influence" exists, as in a "priest-devotee relationship."11 6  The
multiplicity of categories appears to be the result of Sealy's insistence
on tying each category to a specific case or set of cases.11 7 A time-
honored method of systematizing the common law, this approach to
fiduciary duties may effectively cover the field as of the day it is
written, but it has limited utility in deciding future cases that do not
fit neatly into one of the existing, narrowly drawn categories.' 18 .
Austin Scott defined a fiduciary as "a person who undertakes to
act in the interest of another person."1 9 This principle may not
account for fiduciary relationships that are formed inadvertently, such
as general partnerships.1 20 Even if the "undertaking principle"
accurately described all fiduciaries, 121 it contains no limiting principle
that would exclude, for example, a random act of kindness.122
noted, "the ability of the beneficiary party ([the plaintiff] and his family) to monitor the other
party's use of that power would be prohibitive, impossible, and quintessentially disrespectful of
the Bishop's authority and its divine derivation, as taught to the plaintiff by the defendant." Id.
115. The theories discussed here do not comprise an exhaustive list. For others, see supra
note 98.
116. Sealy, supra note 97, at 74-79.
117. By stepping back from the specific cases, we observe a pattern remarkably consistent
with the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty. In each instance, two or more persons or
entities share ownership of or discretion with respect to critical resources.
118. See Shepherd, Unified Concept, supra note 97, at 72-73. See infra Part V.B for
discussion of hard cases.
119. Scott, supra note 97, at 540.
120. See Lisa M. Fairfax, 'With Friends Like These. Toward a More Efficacious Response
to Affinity-Based Securities and Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63, 103 (2001).
121. This is a highly contestable assertion. See DeMott, supra note 3, at 911 ("A search for
the parties' dispositive 'undertaking' of fiduciary obligation will only waylay analysis of the
parties' relationship. Surely the appropriate inquiry is broader and encompasses whether the
relationship was characterized by mutual trust and confidence, or whether it failed to progress
beyond mere arm's-length negotiation.").
122. Scott uses the language of agency to illustrate his fiduciary principle, and he discusses
the implications for liability of the agent of having or not having the principal's consent, but he
does not acknowledge that consent is a prerequisite to forming such a relationship. Scott, supra
note 97, at 541-43. J.C. Shepherd suggests that the "theory itself is really somewhat fuller than
Professor Scott states. . . . In essence, this theory suggests that a fiduciary relationship exists
where one person relies on or trusts another." Shepherd, Unified Concept, supra note 97, at 65. If
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J. C. Shepherd attempted to extract principles from the major
attempts to rationalize fiduciary duties and combined them as follows:
"A fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person receives a power
of any type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilize
that power in the best interests of another, and the recipient of the
power uses that power."'123
The requirement that a fiduciary receive power "on condition
that he also receive with it a duty" begs the question Shepherd is
attempting to answer. Certainly, if that condition is explicit in a
contract, fiduciary duties will adhere to the relationship, but the most
difficult cases are those where the question of duty remains
unanswered.
Economic analysis has not left fiduciary law untouched.
Nevertheless, most of the work employing economic analysis has used
principal-agent theory to examine the scope of fiduciary duties. 124 As
to the existence of fiduciary duties, economic analysis has a very
simple story: Courts supply fiduciary duties as default rules toreduce
the costs associated with providing the fiduciary with incomplete
instructions. 125 As Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have argued,
"the duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility of writing
contracts completely specifying the parties' obligations."'126 This
account glosses over the fact that incomplete contracts are ubiquitous,
Shepherd is right, then Scott's theory is little different from the standard judicial approach
described in Part II and subject to all of the same criticisms.
123. Shepherd, Unified Concept, supra note 97, at 75. Shepherd identifies the following
theories of fiduciary duty: unjust enrichment theory, commercial utility theory, reliance theory,
unequal relationship theory, property theory, undertaking or contractual theory, power and
discretion theory, and rule or dualistic theories. Id. at 53-73.
124. See, e.g., Cooter & Freedman, supra note 15. Cooter and Freedman offer the following
description of "paradigmatic" fiduciary relationships: "[Al beneficiary entrusts a fiduciary with
control and management of an asset." Id. at 1046. They do not attempt to generalize this
description, however. Instead, they focus on the appropriate scope of fiduciary duties.
125. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from
Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (1999) (noting that "the common law's concept of
fiduciary duty both enables and instructs the common law judge to fill in the gaps in an
incomplete contract"); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 23, 25 (arguing that "fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a method of gap-filling in
incomplete contracts").
126. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 426; see also, id. at 427 (contending that "a
'fiduciary' relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and
monitoring"); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 15, at 1048 ("If the parties to this agreement
possessed perfect information, disloyalty could be controlled or prevented by contract. In
fiduciary relationships, however, the parties are unable to foresee the conditions under which
one act produces better results than another.").
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but fiduciary duties are imposed only in a subset of those
relationships. 127
Edward Rock and Michael Wachter have made the only
attempt to apply the property rights theory of the firm to fiduciary
duty law, 128 though their goal was much different than the current
effort. Rock and Wachter set out to show that the purpose of corporate
law, including fiduciary duty, is to resolve problems of opportunism by
facilitating norm governance. 129 Under a system of norm governance,
when participants in a corporation are confronted with the temptation
to act opportunistically, they are also confronted with the
corresponding costs, which do not depend on judicial enforcement, 130
but rather on informal enforcement by other participants in the
firm.1 31 In this setting, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is reserved for the
most extreme instances of self-dealing. While most opportunistic
127. As noted above, see supra note 49, at 1098, fiduciary relationships need not be
contractual. Nevertheless, most fiduciary relationships are formed by contracts.
128. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms,
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1634-40 (2001) [hereinafter Rock &
Wachter, Islands]. In an earlier paper, Rock and Wachter reject the application of fiduciary law
to some problems in close corporations because of the existence of nonlegal constraints on
opportunism. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 929-47 (1999)
[hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Omelet]. All of this work is closely related in spirit to the critical
resource theory of fiduciary duty presented in this Article.
129. Rock & Wachter, Islands, supra note 128, at 1622. Rock and Wachter refer to norms in
this context as "NLERS," an awkward acronym that stands for "nonlegally enforceable rules and
standards." Id. at 1623.
130. Indeed, Rock and Wachter suggest that the role for courts in intrafirm disputes should
usually be "forbearance." Id. at 1650.
131. Rock and Wachter offer this illustration of norm enforcement:
Suppose, for example, that it is an NLERS of the executive suite that investment
proposals must pass a discounted cash flow ("DCF"') test. Suppose a CEO is
considering having the firm make a "vanity purchase" (say, a sports team) despite the
fact that the purchase does not pass the DCF test, at least in part because of a
willingness to overbid in order to satisfy the CEO's vanity. Assuming the firm is large
enough (and with enough free cash flow) to cross-subsidize the sports team, the CEO's
vanity would not be checked by the discipline of the product market. Similarly,
although the stock price might drop a couple of points, that would not be enough to
put the company into play, insulating the purchase from the discipline of the capital
market.
Yet, we find relatively few of these types of purchases. Because the board, in Many
(although not all) cases, might well turn down such a proposal, and might well hold it
against the CEO if that person were already in trouble, the CEO is constrained from
either proposing it or pushing it on a reluctant board. Here, it is not the product of
capital markets that constrain the CEO's conduct, nor is it narrow self-interest (the
fun of owning the sports team might well outweigh the cost of a slightly lower stock
price). Rather, when the sanctions for breaching the NLERS are taken into account,
the CEO is discouraged from pursuing the investment. In other words, here, as in the
contractual context, the NLERS helps support the relationship by providing an extra
incentive to perform at crucial moments.
Id. at 1652-53.
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behavior can be checked through norms, some temptations are simply
too great. In the words of Rock and Wachter, "if one can get seriously
rich, one can move to Aspen and ski for the rest of one's days. The soft
(socially acceptable) [norms] sanctions cannot constrain such
behavior[,] and so the law is needed." 132
This account of the duty of loyalty is roughly consistent with
the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty presented in this Article.
Both rely on the duty of loyalty to check opportunism. The critical
resource theory contemplates other methods to combat opportunism
besides fiduciary duty. As described below, 133 the property rights
theory of the firm holds that residual control rights play a central role.
Rock and Wachter simply add norms to the mix.
For some commentators, the inability to accurately define
fiduciary relationships has led to resignation. Deborah DeMott
evaluated various approaches and concluded that no single theory
could adequately explain the myriad applications of fiduciary duty in
the law. She observed:
One could justifiably conclude that the law of fiduciary obligation is in significant
respects atomistic. Common core principles may justify the outcomes reached by courts
in types or patterns of relationships, but they lose force as applied to other types of
relationships.... Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is a device that
enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one
person's discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's
relationship with another. This instrumental description is the only general assertion
about fiduciary obligation that can be sustained. 134
Such reasoning flows naturally from examining the
development of fiduciary law. The common-law courts have created
and expanded fiduciary duties in a long process that seemed to rely
more on metaphor than principle. 135 Nevertheless, the common law
often displays more rationality and foresight than any individual
judge. 136 The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty presented in the
132. Id. at 1662.
133. See infra Part N.A.
134. DeMott, supra note 3, at 915.
135. See Frankel, supra note 53, at 804 ("Courts currently examine existing prototypes, such
as agency, trust, or bailment that are defined as fiduciary. Then, courts create rules for new
fiduciaryrelations by drawing analogies with these prototypes."); Weinrib, supra note 97, at 1
("This piecemeal treatment, effective enough for the disposition of individual disputes as they
arise, has not on the whole been appropriate for the elucidation of the broader problems of policy
which underlie the whole fiduciary concept.").
136. This is not intended as a claim that the common law is efficient. See generally E. Donald
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985); George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996);
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). Instead, it is
merely an acknowledgement that the common law should be taken seriously. Cf. Weinrib, supra
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next part of the Article attempts to extract shared principles from the
various fiduciary relationships and weave a coherent story of fiduciary
duty.
IV. THE CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
As noted above, the thesis of this Article is that fiduciary duties
are imposed in relationships that have attributes similar to an
economic "firm. ' 13 7 While some fiduciary relationships do not qualify
as "firms"-a term that is limited to commercial enterprises-all share
a common structure. The purpose of this section is to describe that
structure as a theoretical matter, then to apply that theory to various
real-world relationships.
Section A explores the structure of fiduciary relationships
through the lens of the property rights theory of the firm. The next
three sections each deal with one attribute of the fiduciary
relationship: Section B explains the "on behalf of' requirement;
Section C describes the shortcomings of "property" as an animating
concept for a theory of fiduciary duty and argues that a new concept-
"critical resources"-is needed; and Section D explores the "discretion"
requirement of the critical resource theory with special reference to
the difficult case of service providers.
note 12, at 5 ("The common law is a sophisticated justificatory practice that has been elaborated
over many centuries. Such a practice could not have developed and endured unless it took its
own systematic coherence seriously.").
137. This term is not confined to legal firms such as partnerships and corporations.
Corporations with a single stockholder and no employees are legal firms, but they do not embody
the relationship essential to the formation of an economic firm as described here. Similarly,
parties who have not formed a legal firm may establish an economic firm by contract.' In short,
relationships are crucial to the conception of the firm. Cf. HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 15 (1995) (observing that a "single person
can constitute a firm, producing goods for the use of others," but noting that "organizational
problems arise for the multi-person firm that do not arise for single-person firms"). For more on
the distinction between legal and economic firms, see Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A
Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 265 (1998).
Despite the many insights offered by economic theorists of the firm, a concise definition of
"firm" is nowhere to be found. See DEMSETZ, supra, at 6 ("It is a peculiarity of Coase's and
Knight's discussions, and much of the new literature on the firm, that precise definitions of the
firm are lacking."). In their foundational paper, Grossman and Hart offered the following: "We
define the firm as being composed of the assets (e.g., machines, inventories) that it owns."
Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 692. The self-referential description is clearly inadequate,
but improvements have been slow to develop.
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A. The Structure of Fiduciary Relationships
Much of the economic analysis of fiduciary duties over the past
two decades has employed principal-agent theory.1 38 While similar to
the critical resource theory in its reliance on opportunism, principal-
agent theory does not provide an account of the boundaries of the firm
that would be useful for distinguishing fiduciary from nonfiduciary
relationships. 139 Indeed, the notion of a firm as a "nexus of contracts"
implies the absence of any fixed boundaries. 140
The development of transaction-cost economics ("TCE") was a
major step toward a more realistic theory of the firm. This theory
builds on the work of Ronald Coase,141 who supplied the initial
impetus to develop a theory of the firm with his 1937 article, The
Nature of the Firm.1 42 Acknowledging the powerful effect of markets to
coordinate productive behavior, Coase asked the now famous question,
"Why is there any organization?"1 43 Coase suggested that the answer
to this question lay in the firm's ability to economize on transaction
costs. This insight remains at the core of all economic theories of the
firm. 144
138. For seminal works on principal-agent theory, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV., May 1973, at
777; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.
301 (1983); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979);
Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.
ECON. REV., May 1986, at 323; Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Stephen
A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV., May 1973,
at 134.
139. See HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 18-21.
140. Jensen and Meckling argue, "it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those
things which are 'inside' the firm ... from those things that are 'outside' of it. There is in a very
real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the
firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output." Jensen
& Meckling, supra note 138, at 311.
141. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in RONALD H.
COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
142. Id. More thorough treatments tend to push the discussion back to the work of F.H.
Knight, whose classic book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit was cited by Coase, supra note 141, at
42 n.236. See Demsetz, supra note 137, at 2-4.
143. COASE, supra note 141, at 36.
144. Harold Demsetz argues that modern theories of the firm conflate two questions: (1) Why
do firms exist, and (2) what accounts for the internal organization of firms? DEMSETZ, supra
note 137, at 1. Moreover, he contends that this confusion started with Coase. Id. Regardless of
the confusion, Demsetz argues that it is necessary to address transaction costs in order to
answer both questions. See id. at 11 (noting that firms are efficient, among other reasons,
because of the "prevalence of low, not high, transaction costs"); id. at 19 (observing the ability of
firms to reduce problems associated with opportunism).
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Oliver Williamson picked up where Coase left off, focusing on
transactions-which he called "the basic unit of analysis"145-and
asking why firms had a comparative advantage over markets in
organizing some transactions and not others. 146 Williamson's brand of
TCE is based on two behavioral assumptions: (1) All human agents
are constrained by bounded rationality-the notion that, try as they
might, people cannot foresee all future contingencies;1 47 and (2) all
human agents are given to opportunism, which Williamson defines as
"a condition of self-interest seeking with guile."1 48 In addition, TCE
relies on the concept of asset specificity, which Williamson identifies as
the "most critical dimension for describing transactions."'1 49 Asset
145. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 18. He defines "transaction" as
follows: "A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically
separable interface." Id. at 1. Presumably, a relationship as used in this Article would be
comprised of numerous transactions.
146. Harold Demsetz objects to the framing of the issue in terms that compare the managed
coordination of production decisions within firms to the coordination of production decisions by
the price mechanism. He contends that it "comes close to identifying managed coordination as
the essence of the firm." DEMSETZ, supra note 137, at 15. The firm in this Article is not
characterized by managed coordination alone, but the existence of a relationship is nevertheless
fundamental.
147. Actually, bounded rationality is more complex than being limited in cognitive
competence. It might also include an inability to negotiate future plans because parties "have to
find a common language to describe states of the world and actions with respect to which prior
experience may not provide much of a guide." HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 23. Finally,
bounded rationality might include an inability to write contracts in such a way that they can be
enforced by a third party. Id.
Williamson suggests that economic agents cannot engage in comprehensive contracting, but
they will nevertheless "learn and.., look ahead, perceive hazards, and factor these back into the
contractual relation." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 9 (1996)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS].
As Williamson acknowledges, the term "hounded rationality" was coined by Nobel Laureate
Herbert Simon. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957) (describing the "principle of
bounded rationality"). Williamson traces the recognition of this idea even further back, to the
work of Chester Barnard. See CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 12-45
(1938).
148. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 30. He also observed:
I do not insist that every individual is continuously or even largely given to
opportunism. To the contrary, I merely assume that some individuals are
opportunistic some of the time and that differential trustworthiness is rarely
transparent ex ante. As a consequence, ex ante screening efforts are made and ex post
safeguards are created. Otherwise, those who are least principled (most opportunistic)
will be able to exploit egregiously those who are more principled.
Id. at 64.
149. Id. at 30. Elsewhere, Williamson notes, "it is the condition of asset specificity that
distinguishes the competitive and governance contracting models." Id. at 42. For another well-
known perspective on asset specificity, see Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298-302
(1978). For a skeptical view of asset specificity, see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer,
Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile
Industry, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2636 (2000).
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specificity is an awkward term used to describe a simple concept-
namely, the extent to which an asset can be moved from one use to
another without losing productive value. 150
Williamson combines these three concepts to explain the
function of firms. If contracting parties are subject to bounded
rationality, they cannot produce contracts that will fully anticipate all
future contingencies. The resulting incomplete contracts fail to protect
the value of relationship-specific assets, thus leaving the owners of
those assets open to opportunism. The type of opportunism
Williamson envisions is commonly referred to as a holdup problem. 151
When one party owns relationship-specific assets, the other party may
threaten to terminate the relationship unless new concessions are
forthcoming. Under this view, the firm is a governance mechanism, the
function of which is to eliminate the risk of holdup opportunism.
These insights represent an important step in understanding
the contracting process and the formation of firms. It is important to
note that integration solves the potential opportunism that concerned
Williamson (the holdup problem). His approach was later criticized for
"not spell[ing] out in precise terms the mechanism by which [the]
reduction in opportunism occurs,"'152 but he effectively solved the
150. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 147, at 59.
151. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 78 (noting that
"[m]arket contracting gives way to bilateral contracting, which in turn is supplanted by unified
contracting (internal organization) as asset specificity progressively deepens"). For an excellent
description of the holdup problem, see Klein et al., supra note 149, at 298-302.
As suggested by the foregoing text, opportunism is central to Williamson's account of the
firm. In this respect, he seems to differ with Coase. See DEMSETZ, supra note 137, at 20:
Opportunistic behavior is not a problem that is mentioned by Coase in his famous
paper, but it is clear from his later writings... that he does not believe opportunism
offers a special justification for vertical integration. Therein lies a difference between
Coase and those who see opportunism as an important source of vertical integration.
Coase believes that there is a wide variety of coordination problems, of which
opportunism is only one, and that all of these are candidates for resolution through
managed coordination or through contractual arrangements made across markets.
Which institutional arrangement seems best requires a judgment about the tradeoff
between transaction and management costs, even in the case of opportunism.
This difference in view has important implications for the ability of economists to explain
why vertical integration exists. Demsetz seems right when he observes that vertical integration
has many explanations other than opportunism, including monopoly, "continuity of operations,"
and "informational advantages accruing to managed direction of activities." Id. at 21.
Nevertheless, this debate is wholly beside the point when using the concept of firms to
distinguish fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships. As will be shown below, one of the main
rationales for imposing fiduciary duties is to combat opportunism, but the potential for
opportunism need not completely justify the existence of a firm. As long as the potential for
opportunism exists in firms and that potential is not completely addressed by governance
mechanisms, fiduciary duties have a purpose.
152. Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1757, 1763 (1989) [hereinafter Hart, Perspective].
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problem that most concerned him. Because the holdup problem is
caused by the structure of an independent contracting relationship,
integration itself is the mechanism that curbs opportunism.
Williamson fell short of a complete theory of the firm in the
sense that he did not identify a mechanism to combat the type of
opportunism that emerges once firms are formed. Observing this
shortcoming in transaction cost economics, 153 Sanford Grossman,
Oliver Hart and John Moore ("GHM") set out to construct a more
robust theory of the firm that would account for such intrafirm
opportunism. Building on the foundation laid by Coase and
Williamson, 154 this theory recognizes that asset specificity creates the
potential for opportunism in market transactions, and that such
opportunism cannot be eradicated in the market setting because of the
inevitability of incomplete contracts. Moreover, the theory recognizes
the efficiencies gained through asset specificity as crucial to the
formation of a firm. But GHM go beyond Williamson by identifying
asset ownership as the mechanism that combats opportunism within a
firm. The intuition here can be illustrated by the following simple
example: 155
Two parties-A and B-agree to work together to produce gourmet cheesecakes for sale
to third parties. A has experience working in a bakery and has developed a proprietary,
award-winning cheesecake recipe. A has agreed to use the recipe and to supply all of the
ingredients necessary for producing cheesecakes. In addition, A will supervise
production of the cheesecakes. For her part, B agrees to purchase and equip a
production facility.
As an initial matter, B must choose whether to install customized baking equipment
that is uniquely suitable for the manufacture of cheesecakes or more general equipment
153. Cf. Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 692:
While these statements [of transaction-cost economists] help us understand when the
costs of contracting between separately owned firms may be high, they do not
elucidate what the benefits are of "organizing the transaction within the firm." In
particular, given that it is difficult to write a complete contract between a buyer and
seller and this creates room for opportunistic behavior, the transactions cost-based
arguments for integration do not explain how the scope for such behavior changes
when one of the self-interested owners becomes an equally self-interested employee of
the other owner.
Cf. DEMSETZ, supra note 137, at 6:
'Managed coordination" is used to represent the firm. [Modern theorists of the firm]
treat the firm as if the managed coordination of resources is unique to the firm, but
managed coordination is not so clean a cutting edge as their discussions suppose.
Management takes place in households, which, I presume, are not firms.
Furthermore, market transactions, which certainly are not regarded as firms in this
literature, almost always require at least a modicum of management.
154. Hart, Perspective, supra note 152, at 1765.
155. The classic illustration of the importance of asset ownership is the well-known case of
General Motors and Fisher Body. See HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 29-33; Klein et al., supra
note 149, at 308-10. The details and implications of this case are much debated. See, e.g., R.H.
Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15 (2000).
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that could easily be converted to other uses. The customized equipment would not cost
materially more than the general equipment, but it would produce more and better
cheesecakes, thus generating additional profits for the business. On the other hand, if B
invested in the customized equipment, she would open herself to the potential for "hold
up" by A. For example, once B invested in the customized equipment, A might threaten
to withhold his recipe unless B would agree to adjust the compensation agreement to
give A some larger share of any revenues generated by the business. As long as A cannot
easily be replaced (in this case, because A has residual control over the award-winning
cheesecake recipe), A's threat will likely be effective. 1 5 6
If A and B could write a complete contract-one that
anticipated all potential actions by both sides-the potential for
holdup could be addressed. When contracts are incomplete, however,
there is a "distortion in relationship-specific investments.'1 57 That is,
if B anticipated A's threat, B might refuse to invest in the specialized
equipment, thus creating a less efficient operation, but one in which
any threat of defection by A could be met by an equally plausible
threat of defection by B (because general kitchen equipment could be
easily redeployed to another relationship).
From an efficiency standpoint, a better solution would allow B
to invest in the specialized equipment and avoid the potential of
holdup by A. Assuming that incomplete contracts are inevitable, the
obvious means to accomplish this efficiency goal would be for B to
acquire the award-winning cheesecake recipe. If B owned both the
specialized kitchen equipment and the cheesecake recipe, A could not
credibly threaten to defect because B could simply replace A with
another person who could provide the necessary labor. In this way, the
proper allocation of ownership rights158 eliminates the potential for
156. As illustrated by this example, market power may arise after a relationship is formed.
See Klein, supra note 149, at 299 ("There may be many potential suppliers of a particular asset
to a particular user but once the investment in the asset is made, the asset may be so specialized
to a particular user that monopoly or monopsony market power, or both, is created.").
157. HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 31.
158. The term "ownership" is typically associated with legal property. As a consequence, it
fits nicely into the property rights theory of the firm, but seems somewhat awkward in the
critical resource theory of fiduciary duty. Therefore, when discussing the critical resource theory,
I will avoid using the term, favoring "residual control" instead. Residual control resides in the
beneficiary and should be contrasted with "discretion," which is exercised by the fiduciary.
GHM contend that "possession of residual control rights is taken virtually to be the definition
of ownership." HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 30. Of course, the reference to "residual control
rights" implies some access to legal enforcement, which may or may not be available with respect
to critical resources that do not constitute legal property. Id. Even if the law does not generally
recognize property rights with respect to a critical resource-for example, one's personal data or
one's body-those who exercise discretion with respect to those resources may have a right to
exclude others from using them. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1125, 1130-31 (2000). Even absent such legal rights, we still perceive discretion in the
fact of possession. For example, one who possesses noncommercial confidential information can
choose whether to disclose the information (at least in the first instance, though they may not be
able to inhibit subsequent disclosures).
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holdup opportunism. Of course, the potential for opportunism is not
necessarily eliminated when B takes ownership of the cheesecake
recipe. For example, A may still remember the recipe (or have access
to it in the course of his labor), and he could sell it to a competitor.
This threat is the type of intrafirm opportunism imagined by GHM.
Under this property rights theory of the firm, the allocation of
residual control rights determines the boundaries of the firm. 15 9 GHM
focus on residual control rights rather than residual financial rights' 60
because residual financial rights are so easily contracted away. When
two parties enter a profit-sharing agreement, both are residual
claimants. While both may also share residual control rights-as in a
partnership-that is not always the case. For GHM, therefore,
"residual income may not be a very robust or interesting theoretical
concept."'161 Of course, because residual financial rights typically follow
residual control rights, 162 this distinction will not matter in most
relationships.
There is a more pragmatic objection to the use of residual
financial rights when determining fiduciary relationships-namely,
that many "critical resources" that are the focal point of these
relationships have no profit-generating potential. As will be discussed
in some detail below, counseling relationships have a fiduciary
character because of the confidential information conveyed during the
159. Because ownership is the core concept in the property rights theory of the firm, much is
at stake in defining it. Grossman and Hart suggest that residual control rights are "all the rights
except those specifically mentioned in the contract." Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 692;
see also id. at 694 (stating that "ownership gives the owner all rights to use the machine that he
has not voluntarily given away or that the government or some other party has not taken by
force."). Hart and Moore offer a slightly refined interpretation, arguing that "the sole right
possessed by the owner of an asset is his ability to exclude others from the use of that asset."
Hart & Moore, Property Rights, supra note 18, at 1121. Rajan and Zingales propose the notion of
access, defined as "the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource." Rajan & Zingales, supra
note 19, at 388. The ability to exclude (Hart and Moore) and the ability to grant access (Rajan
and Zingales) seem like flip sides of the same coin and any differences are immaterial for present
purposes. Rajan and Zingales contend that the "property rights view does not consider employees
part of the firm." Id. Rajan and Zingales define the firm "both in terms of unique assets (which
may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to those assets." Id. This
view "brings people other than owners within the boundaries of the firm." Id. at 390.
160. Residual financial rights play a prominent role in the formation of partnerships. See
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 7(4) (1914) (stating that "receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business"); REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
202(c)(3) (1997) (stating that a "person who receives a share of the profits of a business is
presumed to be a partner in the business"). Residual financial rights are also significant in many
accounts of corporations. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983) (arguing that shareholders have the right
incentives to maximize the value of the firm).
161. HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 64.
162. Id. at 64 (arguing that "residual control and residual income should often go together").
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course of the relationship. While this information may constitute a
"critical resource" and may have value to the owner, it is not
necessarily capable of being sold for a profit (unless one includes
extortion among the methods of "sale").
Once different types of opportunism are distinguished, the
differences between Williamson and GHM are apparent. Williamson
argues that firms form to solve the holdup problem, but GHM observe
that the potential for a new kind of opportunism is created by the
formation of a firm (e.g., appropriation of the firm's assets). The key
issue for GHM is identifying the mechanism that addresses this
intrafirm opportunism. Their answer is that intrafirm opportunism
can be mitigated through ownership rights-the same ownership
rights that attack the holdup problem. While GHM apply their
analysis to the question of why firms exist, the explanatory power of
their theory also reaches the broader issue of how the allocation of
residual control rights in critical resources mitigates opportunism in
all fiduciary relationships, even those that are not "firms."16 3
B. The "On Behalf Of" Requirement
A fiduciary acts on behalf of a beneficiary. This requirement is
familiar, appearing most prominently in the law of agency,' 64 but also
arising in many common-law decisions involving fiduciaries outside
the law of agency. In the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty, the
primary function of this requirement is to distinguish fiduciary
relationships from relationships in which one person exercises
discretion over critical resources belonging to another, such as
transfers of property rights like leases or exclusive licenses. The "on
behalf of' requirement cannot effectively distinguish fiduciary
163. Distinguishing between the two forms of opportunism discussed here reveals why the
holdup problem is irrelevant to fiduciary duty: It occurs only in relationships that do not fit the
fiduciary mold, that is, in independent contractor relationships. Once the assets of the parties
are integrated into a single firm, holdup is impossible. Therefore, any concern over asset
specificity in the literature on the theory of the firm does not implicate the analysis of fiduciary
duties.
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft 2001) ("Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another
person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and the consent by the other so to act.").
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relationships from many arm's-length contracts because mutual
benefit is a central feature in most contracting relationships.1 65
The "on behalf of' requirement is rarely defined in abstract
terms. 166 One who represents another in transactions with third
parties certainly satisfies the requirement, 167 but such outside
interactions are not prerequisite to the formation of a fiduciary
relationship. More broadly, one person works on behalf of another by
acting in accordance with the other's instructions. 168 Again this
conception seems too narrow in that the existence of a fiduciary
relationship depends on the exercise of discretion. In other words, the
most interesting behavior occurs in the absence of explicit
instructions. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Agency often
used the phrase "primarily for the benefit of' as a synonym for "on
behalf of."169 While this standard encompasses many relationships
that are not fiduciary in nature-including random acts of kindness-
it provides a useful touchstone for identifying some fiduciary
relationships. 170
Relationships of every kind are formed in hopes of conveying
mutual benefits. Relying on the concept of "benefit" to distinguish
165. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (Discussion Draft 2000) ("In any
relationship created by contract, the parties contemplate a benefit to be realized through the
other party's performance. Performing a duty created by contract may well benefit the other
party, but the performance is that of an agent only if the elements of agency are present.").
166. The most incisive comments on this requirement have come from Dennis Hynes. See J.
DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 6-7 (4th ed. 1997); J.
Dennis Hynes, Chaos and the Law of Borrowed Servant: An Argument for Consistency, 14 J.L. &
COM. 1, 13-14 nn.45-46 (1994) [hereinafter Hynes, Chaos]; J. Dennis Hynes, Lender Liability:
The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor, 58 TENN. L. REV. 635, 635-39, nn.66-68 (1991)
[hereinafter Hynes, Dilemma].
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 165, at § 1.01 cmt. g ("Employee and
nonemployee agents who represent their principal in transactions with third parties act on the
principal's account and behalf.").
168. Id. (stating that an employee works on behalf of an employer by doing "the work that
the employer directs and [doing] it subject to the employer's instructions").
169. See Hynes, Dilemma, supra note 166, at 640 n.17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 13 cmt. b, supra note 164, which states: "the understanding that one is to act
primarily for the benefit of another is often the determinative feature in distinguishing the
agency relation from other relations."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14J, supra
note 164, (maintaining that "whether [one] is an agent for this purpose or is himself a buyer
depends upon whether the parties agree that his duty is to act primarily for the benefit of the
one delivering the goods to him or is to act primarily for his own benefit"); id. at § 14K ("One who
contracts to acquire property from a third person and convey it to another is the agent of the
other only if it is agreed that he is to act primarily for the benefit of the other and not for
himself.").
170. Professor Warren Seavey was the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Agency. He
distinguished "primarily for the benefit of' from mere "benefit" and relied heavily on this
distinction. See Hynes, supra note 166, at 641 n.22 (quoting A Discussion of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, 32 A.L.I. PROC. 174 (1955)).
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fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships, therefore, may seem like an
odd choice. Nevertheless, by expanding the notion from mere benefit
to "primarily for the benefit of," the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency strove to exclude arm's-length contracts from
qualifying as principal-agent relationships. While many contractual
relationships are more easily segregated using the "discretion" and
"critical resource" requirements discussed below, 171 the requirement
that fiduciaries act "on behalf of' a beneficiary can assist in cases
where a purported fiduciary meets both of the other requirements.
The case of A and B discussed in the previous section provides
a useful illustration of the "on behalf of' requirement. If A were
employed by B, then A would owe B fiduciary duties. A would not be
allowed to use the proprietary cheesecake recipe to establish a new
company without disgorging any profits to B. In other words, the duty
of loyalty requires A to refrain from using any "critical resource"
belonging to B to engage in self-interested transactions that constitute
a wrong to B.
This fiduciary relationship differs from a relationship based on
the transfer of rights in the cheesecake recipe, or more specifically, a
relationship between a licensor and an exclusive licensee. If A were an
entrepreneur whose company entered into an exclusive license for the
cheesecake recipe from B, there would be no fiduciary relationship. An
exclusive license to use the recipe may transfer rights in the recipe, 172
but A's use of the recipe in a self-interested manner does not breach a
duty to B, even though A exercises discretion with respect to the
recipe in the same manner as she did while an employee of B. If
anything, A has more control in this setting. The difference between
the two cases is that A qua entrepreneur does not use the recipe on
behalf of ("primarily for the benefit of") B, whereas A qua employee
does.173
171. See infra Parts IV.D and IV.C, respectively.
172. See, e.g., Wing v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 278 F.2d 656, 661 (8th Cir. 1960); In re
Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also David R. Kuney, Intellectual
Property Law in Bankruptcy Court: The Search for a More Coherent Standard in Dealing with a
Debtor's Right to Assume and Assign Technology Licenses, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 593, 599
(2001) ("The Copyright Law recognizes the distinction between an exclusive license and a
nonexclusive license.... The holder of the exclusive license is entitled to all the rights and
protections of the copyright owner to the extent of the license.").
173. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 165, § 1.01 cmt. f (providing
examples involving licenses).
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C. The "Critical Resources" Requirement
Like any theory of the firm, the primary goal of the property
rights theory is to explain the existence of firms, not to identify firms
or to differentiate firms from non-firms. In other words, firms are
viewed as analytically prior to the theory.174 This approach suffices for
a theory of the firm because no "real-world" consequences flow from
the distinction between firms and nonfirms as a matter of economic
theory. The theory merely illuminates the functions of firms.
By contrast, the distinction between firms and nonfirms may
have important legal implications. Most significant for present
purposes, that distinction may delineate fiduciary and nonfiduciary
relationships. A useful theory of fiduciary duty, therefore, not only
explains the existence of fiduciary duties, but also identifies fiduciary
relationships and differentiates fiduciary and nonfiduciary
relationships.
Unfortunately, the property rights theory of the firm does not
form a complete foundation for a general theory of fiduciary duty. Two
related shortcomings prevent the unmodified application of the
property rights theory of the firm in the context of fiduciary law. First,
as noted above, many fiduciary relationships are not "firms." While
the boundaries of the firm are not fixed precisely by economic theory,
many fiduciary relationships-notably the counseling relationships
between doctors and patients, lawyers and clients, clergy and
parishioners-do not fit the mold because they are not commercial
enterprises.
Second, the meaning of "property" that lies at the heart of the
property rights theory of the firm is highly contested as a matter of
legal policy. 175 Property theorists frequently begin a foundational
examination of property with the observation that "property" is not a
thing,176 but rather a "bundle of rights" with respect to a thing.177 The
174. That is not to say that GHM are uninterested in the distinctions between firms and
non-firms. See, e.g., HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 58 (distinguishing employment relationships
from independent contractor relationships by reference to who "walks away with.., the
nonhuman assets" upon termination of the relationship). But such distinctions are clearly of
secondary import.
175. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 17, at 147-48 (observing that the "concept of property is too
controversial and has too many manifestations and configurations in our own law to be able to
answer the specific type of questions our doctrine needs to resolve").
176. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (stating, tongue-in-cheek, that "[s]omeone who
believes that property is a right to a thing is assumed to suffer from a childlike lack of
sophistication--or worse").
177. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361
(1954); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) [hereinafter
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tricky part is that the bundle of rights is not the same for all things.178
As a result, the designation of something as "property" does not say
anything about the associated rights. 179 Thus, the label "property" has
come to be seen as "almost meaningless."' 8 0
GHM's assumption that the essence of "property" is the right to
exclude comports with the views of several prominent property
theorists' 8 ' but is far from a consensus view of property. Even if the
right to exclude were universally recognized as the sine qua non of
property, this conception of property is oddly circular: The right to
exclude follows from a determination that property exists. One cannot
identify property by locating a right to exclude.182 As a result, the legal
notion of property is not useful in differentiating fiduciary and
nonfiduciary relationships.
Property rights theorists of the firm have expended limited
resources in defining the scope of the property that is the focus of their
Cohen, Sovereignty]; Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313,
314-15 (1985).
Merrill and Smith observe that this conception of property was a product of realist legal
scholars who wanted to "undermine the notion that property is a natural right, and thereby
smooth the way for activist state intervention in regulating and redistributing property." Merrill
& Smith, supra note 176, at 365. Interestingly, they contend that Ronald Coase popularized a
"hyper-realist conception of property" in his famous essay, The Problem of Social Cost, which
became the foundation for economic analysis of property rights. Id. at 359, 366. Coase wrote: "We
may speak of a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the land-
owner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions." R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960).
178. See Waldron, supra note 177, at 315 (noting that if the bundle of rights "remained
constant for all or most of the cases that we want to describe as private property, the bundle as a
whole could be defined in terms of its contents. But, of course, it does not remain constant, and
that is where the difficulties begin.").
179. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) ("Labeling
something as property does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.").
180. Merrill & Smith, supra note 176, at 357.
181. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); see also Cohen, Sovereignty,
supra note 177, at 12 (noting that "the essence of private property is always the right to exclude
others"); Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 20, at 730 (stating that "the right to exclude others
is more than just 'one of the most essential' constituents of property-it is the sine qua non").
182. Consider the folloing discussion by Merrill and Smith:
When we encounter a thing that is marked in the conventional manner as being
owned, we know that we are subject to certain negative duties of abstention with
respect to that thing-not to enter upon it, not to use it, not to take it, etc. And we
know all this without having any idea who the owner of the thing actually is. In effect,
these universal duties are broadcast to the world from the thing itself.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 176, at 359 (emphasis added). This description of property rights
presupposes the designation of a thing as "property." If the task is identifying fiduciary
relationships, however, the designation of a thing as "property" would be the question to be
answered. The right to exclude offers no guidance on this question.
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theory. While some reference may be made to legal concepts, 183 the
view of property rights in the theory of the firm has not been explicitly
reconciled with any notion of legal property. 184 Of course, many
fiduciary relationships involve property in any sense of the word. 185
The noncommercial confidential information that lies at the heart of
many fiduciary relationships, however, probably would not be
considered property by most courts or informed observers. 186
In the end, the concept of "property" adds nothing to the
analysis of fiduciary duty that a less encumbered concept like "critical
resource" cannot contribute. Whatever concept is selected, it must
serve one crucial function: It must convey the idea that something
resides at the core of the fiduciary relationship. This simple
innovation would have important ramifications for the law of fiduciary
duty. At a minimum, it would eliminate much of the confusion induced
by current judicial standards in cases like Top of Iowa Cooperative v.
Schewe, discussed above.1 87 Perhaps more importantly, as discussed in
Part VI, recognition that a critical resource-and not just misplaced
trust-is the basis for imposition of fiduciary duties goes a long way
toward explaining the varying intensity of the duties imposed in
different contexts. Where self-help protection of the critical resource is
strong, the case for judicial protection through the imposition of
loyalty obligations is weak, and vice versa.
183. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 694 n.2 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOMES, THE
COMMON LAW 246 (rev. ed. 1946)):
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those
incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to
exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is more or
less protected in excluding other people from such interference. The owner is allowed
to exclude all, and is accountable to no one...
184. Cf. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, The Meaning of Property "Rights": Law vs.
Economics (working paper 2000) (forthcoming) (describing differences between legal and
economic conceptions of property rights without reference to the theory of the firm literature).
185. The core idea underlying property rights in law is that if one person has a right, another
has a duty to refrain from interfering with the person. For the classic statement of this position,
see generally Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913-14).
186. In developing a "property approach" to the law of restitution, Daniel Friedmann
recognized the limitations that burden traditional notions of property. He attempted to overcome
these obstacles to his theory in part by expanding the notion of "property" to include "quasi-
property," which are "non-exclusive" property interests. Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of
Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property of the Commission of Wrong, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 504, 509 (1980). But even this expansion of the notion of property is insufficient to reach
fiduciary duty, and he ultimately argues for a separate category encompassing "exceptional cases
of wrongdoing in which the property approach does not apply." Id. In these cases, which include
fiduciary duty claims, a "general principle of deterrence provides an alternative basis for
restitution." Id. at 509-10.
187. See discussion at notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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The natural question that follows from this analysis is: What
things qualify as "critical resources," thus justifying the imposition of
fiduciary duty? This is very similar in form and substance to the
question: What things qualify as "property"? The latter question has
generated much of the voluminous and divided literature on property
theory referenced above. Fortunately, much of that debate is
superfluous for present purposes because the main focus in fiduciary
duty cases is the potential for opportunism. Whether the existence of a
particular thing justifies the imposition of fiduciary duties, therefore,
depends on whether that thing provides the fiduciary with the
occasion to act opportunistically. And whether that thing provides the
fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically will depend in
large part on whether society has made a normative decision that the
thing belongs to the beneficiary. This decision is exogenous to the
critical resource theory.
So what is a "critical resource"? Like property, critical
resources may be tangible or intangible. The "owner" of critical
resources need not have legally enforceable rights in the same way
that an owner of property has such rights, but she must have residual
control rights that, at a minimum, provide practical control over the
resources. For example, a lawyer's client may not have property rights
in the confidential information conveyed to the lawyer, but the client
nevertheless controls the initial disclosure of that information.
Hart contends that something "as little as a place to meet" or
"even just ... the difficulty [the firm's] workers face in co-ordinating a
move to another firm" might serve as the "property" around which a
firm organizes.188 Assuming the "place to meet" is something along the
lines of leased or owned office space-and not a public park-this
seems uncontroversial. On the other hand, treating the "difficulty...
in co-ordinating a move" as "property" stretches that concept beyond
recognition. Even though "critical resource" is a more expansive
concept than "property," it is hard to see how "difficulty ... in co-
ordinating a move" would qualify as a critical resource. While it may
reduce the potential for opportunistic behavior by employees (by
making any threats of departure less credible), the employer in no
sense "owns" it or has a right to exclude the employees from it.
The most important category of potential "critical resources" for
purposes of fiduciary duty analysis is confidential information. 8 9 The
188. HART, FIRMS, supra note 18, at 57.
189. For early works on the value of information, see Harold Demsetz, Information and
Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social
Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971);
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law often treats confidential information as property, 190 but this
treatment does not extend to all confidential information. As a general
matter, confidential information is "property" only when it serves
some commercial purpose. In these circumstances, the owner of
confidential information has long been permitted to restrict its
dissemination in a manner similar to the manner in which an owner
of physical property can restrict its use. Indeed, in many instances,
the question of whether the information is property is irrelevant
because the question boils down to whether the information is
confidential. The reasoning of Oliver Wendell Holmes is instructive:
The word 'property' as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes
some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special
confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be.
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of
them.
1 9 1
Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
683 (1980).
190. "Confidential information" is frequently a defined term in contracts, see David L.
Hoffman & Robert J. Lauson, Tailoring Nondisclosure Agreements to Client Needs, L.A. LAW.
Oct. 2000, at 57, 58 (noting that a nondisclosure agreement "serves two important legal
purposes," one of which is "to define the confidential information"), statutes, see Bruce D.
Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Information: An
Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L.J. 1185, 1185 n.2 (1992)
(referring to state confidentiality laws in an appendix and noting that "[e]ven ignoring
confidentiality laws specifically governing trade secrets and other business interests, all states
have laws governing personal information records"), administrative rules, see 42 C.F.R. §
480.101(b) (2000), and cases, see Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Terminix
International,. No. X03CV0510942, Conn. Super. LEXIS 105, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3,
2002); Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 563-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
The assertion here is not that a breach of fiduciary duty is equivalent to a breach of contract,
a violation of statute, or a breach of confidence in a nonfiduciary setting. These examples are
used merely to show that "confidential information" is susceptible of definition. Moreover,
confidential information is not infinitely malleable. Courts seem quite willing to draw boundaries
around the concept. See, e.g., City Slickers, Inc. v. Douglas, 40 S.W.3d 805, 811-12 (Ark. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that a contract defining "confidential information" as "all information I see, hear,
come in contact with or otherwise gain knowledge of, in connection with my employment" was an
unreasonable and unlawful restraint on trade); Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. News-Journal Corp.,
724 So. 2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1999) (holding that a statute which stated that certain "strategic plans"
are confidential was overly broad).
191. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). Compare
the words of Lord Upjohn in Phipps v. Boardman, 2 A.C. 46, 127-28 (1967):
In general information is not property at all. It is normally open to all who have eyes
to read and ears to hear. The trust test is to determine in what circumstances the
information has been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it
would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another then courts of equity will
restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such cases such
confidential information is often and for many years has been described as the
property of the donor, the books of authority are full of such references; knowledge of
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In recent years, the law's unease with the notion of information
as property has begun to fade as courts routinely hold that
confidential information has the attributes generally associated with
other intangible property. In the well-known case of United States v.
O'Hagan, discussed above, in which the Supreme Court adopted the
controversial "misappropriation" theory of insider trading, the
majority asserted, "A company's confidential information.., qualifies
as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use."'1 92 In
connection with wire or mail fraud, several courts have recently noted
that, "confidential information may constitute intangible 'property'
and that its unauthorized dissemination or other use may deprive the
owner of its property rights.'1 93 A federal court in Massachusetts
recently struck down a state law requiring tobacco companies to
disclose the ingredients in their products on grounds that the law
would constitute a "taking" of the tobacco companies' confidential
information. 194 Also, modern courts routinely refer to trade secrets as
"property," despite traditional resistance to such a characterization. 195
secret processes, "know-how," confidential information as to the prospects of a
company or of someone's intention or the expected results of some horse race based on
stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is that it is not
property in any normal sense but equity will restrain its transmission to another if in
breach of some confidential relationship.
192. 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997); see also United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir.
2001). For the seminal case on this point, see Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28
(1987) (treating information appropriated from a newspaper publisher as property under wire
fraud statute). For an argument that O'Hagan is inconsistent with a property rights approach to
insider trading, see Bainbridge, Path Dependent, supra note 77, at 1644-50.
193. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1074 (1st Cir. 1997). See also United States
v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that "confidential information may be
considered property" for purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes).
194. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating,
[T]he record establishes that the plaintiffs have valuable property interests in
confidential brand-specific ingredient information; the confidential information
qualifies as trade secret information under the laws of Massachusetts; the inevitable
effect of the Disclosure Act will be to compel the public disclosure of some or all of the
trade secrets; by destroying the secrecy of the information, public disclosure deprives
the plaintiffs of their property interest in the trade secrets; the Commonwealth's
deprivation of the property interest in the secrets is a "taking" for which the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments require just compensation to be made.).
195. See, e.g., BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1238 (D. Kan. 2000)
("Even if confidential information can be something less than a trade secret, it must at least be a
trade secret to give its owner a property right in it."); Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362
N.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Mich. 1984) ("While an employee is entitled to the unrestricted use of
general information acquired during the course of his employment or information generally
known in the trade or readily ascertainable, confidential information, including information
regarding customers, constitutes property of the employer and may be protected by contract.").
For the seminal case in this area, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)
(describing how trade secrets are like traditional property). But see DTM Research, L.L.C. v.
AT & T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001):
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In the end, however, the critical resource theory of fiduciary
duty does not rely on the notion of information as property. Recent
debates over privacy rights in personal data provide a useful
perspective. While personal information conveyed to a spiritual
advisor, an attorney, a psychiatrist, or other counselor may constitute
a "critical resource" as defined in this Article, personal data is
typically not thought to be "property."'196 The fact that personal data is
not classified as property, however, does not mean that personal data
is unprotected. As Pamela Samuelson noted recently, "[IMndividuals
generally have a legal right to exclude other people from access to
their private data."'197 What is immediately apparent from this debate
is that "ownership" (in the sense of having a right to exclude) is not
limited to "property."
D. The "Discretion" Requirement
Many commentators have observed the importance of
discretion in fiduciary relationships.198 Discretion arises because
While trade secrets are considered property for various analyses ... the inherent
nature of a trade secret limits the usefulness of an analogy to property in determining
the elements of a trade-secret misappropriation claim. The conceptual difficulty arises
from any assumption that knowledge can be owned as property. The "proprietary
aspect" of a trade secret flows, not from the knowledge itself, but from its secrecy. It is
the secret aspect of the knowledge that provides value to the person having the
knowledge.
On the traditional resistance to classifying trade secrets as "property," see Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 365 (1989) ('Trade secret law
has long afforded remedies to the possessor of secret information against those who use improper
means to obtain the secret and those who disclose it in violation of confidential relationships, but
the law has, in general, resisted characterizing the secret itself as property.").
196. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 158, at 1130-31:
Although the law often protects the interests of individuals against wrongful uses or
disclosures of personal data, the rationale for these legal protections has not
historically been grounded on a perception that people have property rights in
personal data as such. Indeed, the traditional view in American law has been that
information as such cannot be owned by any person.
Recent scholarship in this area is vast and expanding. For attempts to characterize personal
information as "property," see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122-35
(1999); Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1644-49
(1999); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the
Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property
Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2393 (1996).
197. Samuelson, supra note 158, at 1130.
198. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 25, at 1784 n.129 (stating that "a key characteristic
of a fiduciary relationship is that the beneficiary cedes a wide range of discretion to the
fiduciary"); Dagan, supra note 17, at 159-60 (noting that "the beneficiary's interests are subject
to the fiduciary's discretion; the fiduciary should control and manage the asset in the
beneficiary's best interest"); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in
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contracts or other documents specifying the obligations of the
fiduciary are necessarily incomplete; however, not all incomplete
contracts form the basis for fiduciary relationships. 199 One of the
primary functions of a unified theory of fiduciary duty is to distinguish
fiduciary relationships from arm's-length relationships, but some form
of discretion is often present in both. Nevertheless, a closer
examination of the object and extent of discretion can aid in making
meaningful distinctions.
The first important clarification of the discretion requirement
relates to the object of discretion. As discussed above, a fiduciary
exercises discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary. In contrast, a contracting party exercises discretion with
respect to performance of the contract. While fiduciaries are often
contracting parties-and therefore may exercise discretion with
respect to performance under the contract-fiduciary relationships are
distinguished from contractual relationships by allocation of discretion
over critical resources. It is this additional quantum of discretion (or
perhaps, one might say, this additional form of discretion) that
justifies the imposition of more stringent loyalty obligations on
fiduciaries than mere contracting parties.
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that one can sort
fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships merely by observing whether
one party works with a critical resource of the other party. Certainly,
parties in a contractual relationship often have access to critical
resources belonging to their opposite number. For example, service
providers, such as Frankel's electrician, typically work with critical
resources belonging to their clients. To say that a fiduciary exercises
discretion with respect to critical resources therefore implies
something more than mere access to those resources. In such cases,
the extent of control over the critical resources is important.
Unfortunately, the lines here are not bright. Fiduciary and
nonfiduciary relationships do not occupy wholly separate realms, but
instead lie on a continuum. Passage from one side of the continuum to
the other is seamless; nevertheless, courts are tasked with locating a
American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1906 (2000) (equating "fiduciary
judgment" with "discretion"); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,
105 YALE L.J. 625, 642 (1995) ("Fiduciary law imposes two broad standards, loyalty and care,
that regulate the exercise of the discretion that modern trustees' powers law bestows."). Of
course, different terms are sometimes used to capture this concept. For example, Larry Ribstein
refers to "management functions." Ribstein, supra note 12. Also, Tamar Frankel refers to the
delegation of "power." Frankel, supra note 53, at 809.
199. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 379-80 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach] (describing how
discretion arises in arm's-length contracts).
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seam.200 Cases involving service providers straddle the divide, and the
only reasonable approach is to articulate a principle that will assist
courts in their sorting function. While bright lines are impossible to
draw, substantial progress is made possible by distinguishing
discretion over a critical resource from mere access to that resource.
The principle advocated here is that fiduciaries must exercise
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary, where "discretion" connotes the power to use or work with
the critical resource in a manner that exposes the beneficiary to harm
that cannot reasonably be evaded through self-help. Discretion
typically involves the exercise of control by the fiduciary to a greater
extent than would occur with mere access. Discretion is granted to the
fiduciary by the beneficiary or someone acting for the beneficiary. This
grant is something short of a conveyance of the critical resource,
however, because the beneficiary retains residual control over the
critical resource. Discretion is also different from "authority" under
agency law. While similar in spirit, a fiduciary need not qualify as an
agent in every case. A recent case decided by the Connecticut Supreme
Court-Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc2 01 -illustrates how the
concept of discretion can be used to distinguish fiduciaries from non-
fiduciaries.
In Hi-Ho Tower, the plaintiff owned a communications tower,
and the defendant provided service to the plaintiff.20 2 The defendant
used the plaintiffs tower in exchange for a monthly fee, which the
plaintiff waived in exchange for the service work.203 When the
plaintiff discovered that the defendant had installed equipment on the
tower and was receiving license fees from use of the equipment, the
plaintiff sued for (among other things) breach of fiduciary duty.20 4
The court recognized the difficulty of distinguishing fiduciary
from nonfiduciary relationships and went to some lengths to articulate
a coherent principle. The court structured its analysis around the
familiar common-law standards requiring trust and vulnerability,
concluding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the "special trust"
required of a fiduciary relationship because the plaintiff "retained
200. James Gordley offers another metaphor to the same effect: "The task of the treatise
writers was therefore like that of a British colonial administrator demarcating a boundary line
between one tribe claiming the hills and one claiming the lowlands. The fact that he can see clear
instances of hills and valleys does not make the boundary between them clear." Gordley, supra
note 8, at 1828.
201. 761 A.2d 1268 (Conn. 2000).
202. Id. at 1270-71.
203. Id at 1271 n.5.
204. Id. at 1271.
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control of the day-to-day operations at the tower, including access to
the tower, customer relations and business transactions." 205 Because
the plaintiff retained such control, it was able to protect its own
interests. 20 6 Even the defendant's alleged superior knowledge did not
sway the court because the plaintiff "fail[ed] to show that [the
defendant] undertook to act primarily for the benefit of the
plaintiff."207
In the end, the court's reasoning is unpersuasive because it
focuses on whether the defendant undertook the obligations of a
fiduciary. As noted above, 208 this aspect of fiduciary relationships
cannot effectively distinguish among fiduciaries and service providers
because everyone in these two categories works "on behalf of' another.
The court should have retained its focus on the defendant's discretion
with respect to the tower. By concluding that the plaintiff retained
control over the tower, the court effectively held that the defendant
did not exercise the type of discretion one would expect of a fiduciary.
Importantly, the court added: "If we were to agree with the plaintiff,
all parties that possess a superior, technical skill, including
electricians, plumbers and mechanics, would owe a fiduciary duty to
their clients."20 9
V. APPLYING THE CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY
The foregoing sections describe a set of requirements that is at
once discriminating and flexible. The need to discriminate arises from
concerns about imposing fiduciary duties in relationships that do not
comport with the requisite fiduciary structure. In such relationships-
routine contractual relationships, for example-the inappropriate
application of fiduciary duties can actually create the potential for
opportunism. 210 On the other hand, flexibility enables courts to adapt
fiduciary duties to varied circumstances. While all fiduciary
205. Id. at 1280.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra Part IV.B.
209. Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. 761 A.2d at 1280.
210. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 75, at 576-77:
A broad and strict duty that ignores ex ante expectations in order to protect the
parties from ex post disappointment ... may give them opportunities to get more than
they bargained for. It follows that imposing extra duties to reduce the parties'
vulnerability to the risk of disappointment may increase their vulnerability to
opportunistic litigation. This, in turn, increases the need for devices to deal with the
new vulnerability. Regulation thereby may increase the friction and attendant
transaction costs that trust is supposed to reduce. Some productive transactions might
be lost if these devices are not feasible.
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relationships follow a similar pattern, they appear in a surprising
diversity of contexts. The following sections explore some of the
contexts in which the issue of fiduciary duty arises and shows how the
critical resource theory clarifies the analysis.
A. "Easy" Cases
This section explores those relationships that courts have
concluded are fiduciary in nature.211 They are "easy" cases in the sense
that courts no longer feel an obligation to explain the existence of
fiduciary duties in these contexts. Such duties are assumed to follow
naturally from the existence of the relationship. If the critical resource
theory of fiduciary duty is to have any prescriptive value, however,
these easy cases must be shown to be in harmony with the theory. To
211. This section does not cover every relationship ever held to be fiduciary. For example, the
United States has been held to be a fiduciary for Native American tribes. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Fiduciary duties have been imposed on nonprofit organizations.
See Sarkeys v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #40, Cleveland County, 592 P.2d 529, 534-35 (Okla. 1979)
(holding that a state attorney general has standing to enforce a charitable trust). Fiduciary
duties have also been imposed on cotenants. See Cooper v. Cooper, 783 A.2d 430, 436 (Vt. 2001).
Courts have also imposed fiduciary duties in myriad exceptional circumstances, many of which
would fit comfortably within "confidential relationships," which are discussed below.
Bailments are sometimes characterized as "fiduciary" in the general literature on fiduciary
duties, see, e.g., Frankel, supra note 53, at 795; Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are
Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 306-07 (1999), but property scholars tend not to view the
relationship as fiduciary in nature. A bailment exists when one person (a bailee) takes possession
of property owned by another (the bailor). The possession requirement has two elements:
physical control over the property and an intention to exercise that control. See RAY A. BROWN &
WALTER B. RAUSENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.2 (3d ed. 1975). These elements
distinguish bailments from mere custody. Id. § 10.4. Despite the bailee's physical control, the
bailor retains residual control rights through title to the property (thus distinguishing bailments
from sales). Id. § 10.5. A bailee's duties are phrased in terms of "care" rather than loyalty. See
Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of Consideration, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1876, 1889 (2001) ("The rule, as extrapolated from Roman law and reiterated in almost
every common law discussion of bailment, was that a gratuitous bailee was responsible only for
gross negligence, or held only to a slight duty of care, while a bailee for hire was responsible for
negligence, or held to a duty of ordinary care.") The bailee has an obligation to redeliver the
subject of the bailment to the bailor-which would prohibit theft of the property-but this
obligation is broader than a duty of loyalty in the sense that it regulates more than self-dealing
on the part of the bailee. See Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 289 N.E.2d 879, 885 (1972) ("[W]e hold
that once the bailor proves delivery of the property to the bailee in good condition and the failure
to redeliver upon timely demand, the burden of proof is irrevocably fixed upon the bailee to prove
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he has exercised due care to prevent the property's
loss or destruction. Our holding extends to all bailment for hire cases, whether brought in tort or
contract, in which the bailee has exclusive control over the property at the time it was destroyed
or damaged.") Although a few cases outside of the United States treat bailments as fiduciary
relationships, that characterization has not been adopted by U.S. courts. See FitzGibbon, supra,
at 307 n.15 (citing Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. Surgical Corp. (1984), 156 C.L.R. 41 (Aust.) and Re
Hallett's Estate (1880), 13 Ch. D 696, 708-09 (Aust.)). Bailments-will therefore be omitted from
further discussion.
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that end, this section provides a brief description of each relationship
and shows how it meets the framework constructed by the critical
resource theory. More specifically, each section describes the parties in
the relationship, shows how some critical resource defines the
relationship, and identifies the holder of residual control rights over
that resource. In addition, each section provides a short description of
the duties imposed in each relationship.
1. Trusts
Trusts are quintessential fiduciary relationships, and they fit
neatly into the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty described
above. 212 Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts describes a trust as
"a fiduciary relationship with respect to property."213 While trusts
appear in myriad contexts, 214 every trust consists of at least one
trustee and at least one beneficiary of the trust.21 5 In addition, trusts
are formed by a settlor, who contributes the trust property and
212. "Trusts" as used here should not be confused with "resulting trusts" or "constructive
trusts," which are often referred to as "implied trusts." See, e.g., Gabel v. Richley, 655 N.E.2d
773, 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (explaining the differences between express trusts and the two
types of implied trusts, resulting and constructive trusts). "Resulting trusts" and "constructive
trusts" may be-but are not necessarily-fiduciary relationships. Id. at 779-80.
A resulting trust is defined as a "reversionary, equitable interest implied by law in property
that is held by a transferee, in whole or in part, as trustee for the transferor or the transferor's
successors in interest." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS].
A constructive trust is remedial. It arises "[w]here a person holding title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
The imposition of a constructive trust does not create a fiduciary relationship. See AUSTIN W.
SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 462 (4th ed. 1987) ("It is to be noted,
however, that a court of equity does not treat the constructive trustee for all purposes as though
he were in reality a trustee; although it will compel him to surrender the property, it will not
impose upon him the numerous fiduciary obligations that are imposed upon the trustee of an
express trust."). Nevertheless, a constructive trust may arise in the context of a fiduciary
relationship. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928); Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919).
213. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 2.
214. The definition of "trust" has been narrowed over time. At common law, "trust" referred
to various confidential relationships, "whether there was any strict trust of property or not." See
Sealy, supra note 97, at 70. In modern usage, "trust" has been given a narrower meaning.
Interestingly, the narrowing scope of "trust" appears to have left a gap in legal concepts that was
quickly filled by the word "fiduciary." See id. at 71-72 ("The word fiduciary (which earlier had
received very little judicial support) was adopted to describe these situations which fell short of
the now strictly-defined trust.").
215. The requirement of two separate parties is contained in the definition of "trust," which
contemplates one person "who holds title to the property" and "deal[s] with it for the benefit of
charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee." RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS § 2.
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establishes the terms of the trust.216 The trustee takes title to the
trust property 217-often called the corpus of the trust-and manages
this property for the benefit of the beneficiary. 218 Nevertheless, the
beneficiary has residual control rights over the property. 21 9
The core fiduciary duty of a trustee is an obligation to act in the
interest of the beneficiary of the trust.220 The most important aspect of
this obligation is a duty to avoid self-interested transactions. 221 Of
216. The trust must have property. See id. § 2 cmt. f:
The elements of a trust. A trust involves three elements: (1) a trustee, who holds the
trust property and is subject to duties to deal with it for the benefit of one or more
others; (2) one or more beneficiaries, to whom and for whose benefit the trustee owes
the duties with respect to the trust property; and (3) trust property, which is held by
the trustee for the beneficiaries.
217. The reference to "property" in the trust context "usually denotes interests in things and
not necessarily the things themselves." Id. § 2 cmt. c.
218. The beneficiary is said to have "equitable title" to the trust property. Id. § 2 cmt. d. By
contrast, the trustee usually holds legal title, though in some cases trustees hold only equitable
title. See id. Whether the equitable interest held by a beneficiary is a right in the trust property
or instead a right against the trustee is unclear. Compare Austin W. Scott, Jr., The Importance
of the Trust, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 177, 178-79 (1967) ("Today it is generally agreed in England as
well as in the United States that the beneficiaries of a trust have a proprietary interest in the
subject matter of the trust and not merely a personal claim against the trustee.") with PATRICK J.
ROHAN, 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 515 (rev. ed. 1995) (stating that "the traditional and
historically sound view (namely, that the beneficiary of a trust has only a chose in action plus
collateral and supplementary protections against interference by third persons) is still
pragmatically the preferred modern rule").
219. The beneficiary has primarily equitable remedies against the trustee. RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS, supra note 208, § 197. These remedies include suits to compel the trustee to perform his
duties as trustee; to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust; to compel the trustee to
redress a breach of trust; to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property and
administer the trust; and to remove the trustee. Id. § 199. Removal of the trustee can be ordered
by a court ("if his continuing to act as trustee would be detrimental to the interests of the
beneficiary") or by any person authorized by the terms of the trust. Id. § 107.
The beneficiary can seek legal remedies if "the trustee is under a duty to pay money
immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary" or if "the trustee of a chattel is under a duty
to transfer it immediately and unconditionally to the beneficiary." Id. § 198. The Restatement
also limits the ability of others to enforce the trust. Id. § 200 ("No one except a beneficiary or one
suing on his behalf can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust or to enjoin or
obtain redress for a breach of trust."). The settlor may retain an interest in the trust property-
or grant powers to a person unconnected with the trust. In these circumstances, the settlor or
other can sue the trustee to protect the designated interest. Id. § 37.
220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1992) ("The trustee is under a duty to
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries."); see also RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS, supra note 208, § 2 cmt. b ("Despite the differences in the legal circumstances and
responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is common to all: a person in a fiduciary
relationship to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the
scope of the relationship.").
221. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b ("In matters within the scope of the fiduciary
relationship, the fiduciary is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the other and not to
enter into competition with the other without the latter's consent, unless properly authorized to
do so by a court or by the terms of the arrangement under which the relationship arose.").
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course, trustees are also obligated to act prudently, but this duty is
"comparable to the reasonable person rule of tort"222 rather than the
duty of loyalty that is the focus of this Article. It is often said that the
"duties of a trustee are more intensive than those of most other
fiduciaries." 223  Nevertheless, for honest trustees, the fiduciary
obligation is not onerous.224
2. Guardianships
Guardianships arise when one person (the "guardian") is
appointed by a court to manage the property and affairs of another
(the "ward"), who is suffering from some incapacity, such as infancy or
insanity. 225 Guardianships are distinguished from trusts primarily by
the fact that the guardian does not take legal title to the ward's
property. 226 While the ward is not capable of exercising residual
control rights over the property, the court exercises such rights on the
ward's behalf. A guardian has a duty to the ward to deal with the
property that is the subject of the guardianship for the benefit of the
ward.
2 2 7
Guardians are often appointed to care for a person as well as
for property. 228 A guardian's duties with respect to the person are
222. Langbein, supra note 198, at 656.
223. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, supra note 208, § 2 cmt. b.
224. Cf. Langbein, supra note 198, at 657:
The prudent investor rule is profoundly protective of trustees who have followed
common investment-industry standards. The duty of loyalty, though it threatens
draconian prophylactic liabilities for breach, is also easy enough to obey in ordinary
cases. It says to the trustee, 'You are left with the entire universe of investment
possibilities as outlets for your entrepreneurial impulses; you are required only to stay
away from the trust assets when you seek your own fortune."
225. Most often the laws governing guardianships are contained in state statutes. The
Uniform Probate Code, which has been adopted in many states, governs guardianships and
conservatorships with respect to minors and other incapacitated persons. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 5-101 to 5-312 (1993).
226. ScOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 53, § 7.
227. See id. § 7; see also GEORGE G. BOGART & GEORGE T. BOGART, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 13 (2d ed. rev. 1984) (maintaining that guardians "are required to work for their
beneficiaries with single-minded loyalty, to exclude all private gain, and to exhibit high candor
and good faith in direct dealings with the one represented, and to perform personally the
important functions of their positions").
228. The statutes that define the duties of a personal guardian are extremely broad. For
example, Illinois's statute reads in part as follows:
To the extent ordered by the court and under the direction of the court, the guardian
of the person shall have custody of the ward and the ward's minor and adult
dependent children; shall procure for them and shall make provision for their support,
care, comfort, health, education and maintenance, and professional services as are
appropriate, but the ward's spouse may not be deprived of the custody and education
of the ward's minor and adult dependent children, without the consent of the spouse,
unless the court finds that the spouse is not a fit and competent person to have that
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considered fiduciary in nature. Although a person is not "property" in
the United States,229 nothing prevents us from viewing the person as a
critical resource. The imposition of fiduciary duties in this context has
obvious appeal. 230
3. Agency
Generally speaking, courts are concerned with distinguishing
agents from nonagents in two contexts: (1) claims by third parties
against purported principals for the actions of purported agents, and
(2) claims by purported principals against purported agents for breach
of fiduciary duty. The efficacy of both sets of claims depends on the
existence of an agency relationship. 23 1 The Restatement (Second) of
Agency defines agency as a "fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so
to act.
' 2 32
When evaluating third-party liability claims, courts correctly
rely heavily on the notion of "control." The justification for imposing
liability on one person for the acts of another rests heavily on the idea
of moral responsibility, and whether one person is perceived to be
morally responsible for the actions of another person often turns on
whether the party to be held responsible exerts control over the other.
custody and education. The guardian shall assist the ward in the development of
maximum self-reliance and independence. The guardian of the person may petition
the court for an order directing the guardian of the estate to pay an amount
periodically for the provision of the services specified by the court order. If the ward's
estate is insufficient to provide for education and the guardian of the ward's person
fails to provide education, the court may award the custody of the ward to some other
person for the purpose of providing education. If a person makes a settlement upon or
provision for the support or education of a ward, the court may make an order for the
visitation of the ward by the person making the settlement or provision as the court
deems proper.
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17 (West 1998).
229. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
230. Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 63, at 2430 (describing the appeal of imposing fiduciary
duties on parents). Interestingly, fiduciary duties are not imposed on parents qua parents,
probably more out of respect for the privacy of the family than out of deference to the concept
that critical resources must be at the heart of a fiduciary relationship.
231. With respect to third-party claims sounding in tort, agency law draws a distinction
between "servants" and "independent contractors." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220
(1958) ("A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who
with respect to physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's
control or right to control.") Principals are liable for torts committed by their servants, see id. at §
219, but generally not liable for torts of independent contractors, even those independent
contractors who are agents.
232. Id. § 1. The substance of this definition remains unchanged in the new Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000).
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Nevertheless, the concept of control is not helpful in defining fiduciary
relationships. What distinguishes fiduciaries from non-fiduciaries is
not the control exercised by the principal, but rather the discretion
exercised by fiduciaries over the critical resources of the principal.
The critical resources at the core of agency relationships are
less visible than in trusts or guardianships, but they are present
nonetheless. Agents have "power to affect the legal relations" of their
principal, through actual or apparent authority or through inherent
agency power. 233 This constitutes discretion over the principal's
critical resources. 234
Like trustees, agents have numerous detailed duties, but
operate under a general obligation of loyalty. According to the
Restatement, "an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely
for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency."235
Many agents are employees, and a nagging question regarding
the employment relationship is why employers do not owe fiduciary
duties to employees. Marleen O'Connor has proposed fiduciary duty as
a means of "encourag[ing] employee trust and reliance upon the new
implicit employment agreements under participatory work
programs."236 Oliver Hart argues that employees have few incentives
to invest in relationship-specific assets without prior compensation or
contractual protection. Others have argued that implicit contracts or
norms protect employees. 237
The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty rejects the notion
that employers should owe fiduciary duties to employees. If the
relevant resource is "human capital,"238 there is no reason (in the
233. On actual authority, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 227, § 7
(power "by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations of consent" to the agent);
on apparent authority, see id. § 8 (power "by transactions with third persons, professedly as
agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third
persons"); and on inherent agency power, see id. § 8A ("power of an agent which is derived not
from authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation").
234. Cf. Weinrib, supra note 97, at 4 (using "discretion... capable of affecting the legal
position of the principal" as one of the two elements forming the "core of the fiduciary concept").
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §. 387 (1958).
236. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 954 (1993).
237. See, e.g., Laurence Summers & Andrei Schleifer, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,
in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan Auerbach ed. 1988) (discussing
implicit contracts); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the
Employment Relationship, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1913 (1996) (explaining the role of norms in the
employment setting).
238. For an analysis of firm-specific human capital in the theory of the firm, see Margaret M.
Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 58, 77-80 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
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usual case) to suspect that an employer exercises discretion over that
resource on behalf of the employee. Like the landlord-tenant case
discussed above,239  this relationship meets the "discretion"
requirement and the "critical resource" requirement, but not the "on
behalf of' requirement. For firm-specific investments in human
capital, implicit contracts or norms may be the only viable
protection. 240
4. Partnerships and Joint Ventures
Partnerships are generally defined by statute to mean the
"association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit."241 Partners are joint owners of the partnership's property,
and each partner shares residual control rights. Although fiduciary
duties have traditionally been formulated by common-law decisions,242
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act codified the duty of loyalty. 243
Larry Ribstein recently advanced the provocative thesis that
fiduciary duties should not apply in the partnership context.244 His
central claim is that "[i]n a horizontally governed firm involving co-
equal owners, the owners can be assumed to have enough access to
information that they do not need ex post judicial monitoring."245 This
position is essentially an argument that ownership interests alone are
sufficient to combat opportunism in the partnership context. Whether
239. See supra Part I.B. The employee is in the position of the landlord as the party who
owns the critical resource. The employer exercises discretion over that critical resource by
dictating the manner in which it is used within the firm. Like the tenant, however, the employer
does not exercise discretion on behalf of the owner of the critical resources, but rather for a
personal benefit.
240. To the extent that employees are observed making relationship-specific investment in
human capital, one might infer that implicit contracts and norms are fairly effective at
protecting that investment. Of course, each time an employer acts opportunistically with respect
to an employee who has invested in firm-specific human capital, one might infer a breakdown of
the protective mechanisms.
241. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT § 6(1) (1914).
242. The most influential case by far in this area is Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928), in which the Chief Judge Cardozo wrote these oft-cited words:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues,
the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.
243. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b) (describing three aspects of the duty of loyalty, including
an anti-theft provision, a self-dealing prohibition, and a proscription against competition with
the partnership).
244. Ribstein, supra note 12.
245. Id.
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Ribstein is correct about the empirical question does not affect the
analysis in this Article. The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty
describes the structure of relationships in which courts apply fiduciary
law. Partnerships fit easily within that structure, and courts
predictably impose fiduciary duties in the partnership context.
Whether courts should apply fiduciary law in all relationships
described by the critical resource theory depends on the relative costs
and benefits of fiduciary protection. That question is left for another
day.
5. Corporations
In most accounts of the theory of the firm, the "firm" is
conceptualized as a corporation. All of the attention showered on the
corporation has not made its place in the theory of the firm less
problematic. The source of these problems is the fact that-at least in
large corporations-actual control resides with the directors rather
than with the shareholders. 246 Under the property rights theory of the
firm, however, the focal point is residual control rights over the firm's
property. GHM deal with this problem by asserting that shareholders
delegate large tracts of authority to the directors.247 While this
assertion is not helpful in defining in detail the relative roles of
directors and shareholders because it does not define which functions
of shareholders should be delegated and which should not,248 it is
helpful in describing the presence of fiduciary duties in the
corporation. It suggests that the key residual ownership right in the
corporation is the right to elect directors.249
246. Incorporation statutes place substantial authority in the hands of directors. See MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1999) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its
board of directors .. " (emphasis added)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2001) ('The business
and affairs of every corporation.., shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of
directors ... ").
247. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 18, at 694 ("In a corporation the shareholders as a
group have control and delegate this control to the board of directors (i.e., management)."). See
also Rajan & Zingales, supra note 19, at 422 (Shareholders "could delegate many of the powers of
ownership that are unlikely to be misused to a managerial hierarchy .... [And they] will retain
the power to fire the production team (or the managing hierarchy) from the assets if it does not
specialize.").
248. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 273 (2001) (arguing that when
examining the division of power between directors and shareholders, "generalizations about the
'delegation' of control rights from shareholders to directors are inadequate.").
249. It follows from the foregoing analysis that as the ability of shareholders to curb
opportunism through director elections diminishes, the importance of fiduciary duty increases.
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The fiduciary duties of directors are sometimes described in
statutes, and other times in judicial opinions. The core element of
these duties, wherever articulated, is a requirement to abstain from
self-interested behavior. 250 Enforcing this obligation is complicated in
closely held corporations, where the norm of majority rule bumps up
against the prohibition of self-interested behavior. Majority
shareholders in a closely held corporation are like partners in a
partnership in the sense that their actions are necessarily self-
interested. In this setting, whether the actions of a majority
shareholder constitute a wrong toward the minority shareholders
(often) depends on vague concepts of fairness.
Perhaps the most troublesome cases in the corporate context
are those involving creditors. Courts have long held that directors owe
fiduciary duties to creditors once the corporation is "in the vicinity of
insolvency. ' 251 Insolvency here is often defined to mean "insolvency in
fact, rather than insolvency due to a statutory filing. '252 To be
insolvent in fact, the entity must be "unable to pay its debts as they
fall due in the usual course of business '253 The usual rationale for
imposing fiduciary duties in this context is that creditors are the
residual financial claimants of an insolvent firm.254
Imposing fiduciary duties in these cases might seem
problematic for the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty because
bondholders do not have residual control rights (i.e., the right to elect
directors) merely because the corporation is insolvent. In many cases,
however, these invocations of "fiduciary" duty are really invocations of
the duty of care. When a court says that the directors owe fiduciary
duties to the creditors in these contexts, the court is typically referring
to a duty to act in the interests of the creditors rather than the
250. The Model Business Corporation Act uses the concept of "[d]irector's conflicting interest
transaction." MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60(2). Delaware cases simply refer to conflicts of interest
or the duty of loyalty.
251. This language is from Chancellor Allen, from the well-known case, Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
252. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
253. Id. at 789. The court in Geyer offered a second definition of insolvency as a company
having "liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of assets held." Id. More recent cases
seem to have abandoned this second definition. See, e.g., Francotyp-Postalia AG & Co. v. On
Target Tech., Inc., No. 16330, 1998 WL 928382, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 24, 1998) (rejecting the
second definition because "[i]t is all too common, especially in the world of start-up
companies . . ., for a Delaware corporation to operate with liabilities in excess of its assets ... ").
Fraudulent conveyance statutes use the broader definition of insolvency. See, e.g., 740 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 160/3(a) (West 1993) ("A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater
than all of the debtor's assets at fair valuation.").
254. See, e.g., In re Troy King Distribs., Inc., 256 B.R. 1, 167 (M.D. Fla. Bankr. 2000).
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shareholders. 255  In other words, the court is overriding the
shareholder primacy norm, which is part of the duty of care rather
than the duty of loyalty.
In other cases, creditors assert fiduciary duty claims based on
activities that implicate the duty of loyalty.2 56 The imposition of
fiduciary duties in favor of creditors in these cases seems reasonable,
even if the creditors do not technically exercise residual control rights
at the moment of the director action. Cases of insolvency invoke
different considerations because they involve a contingent transfer of
residual control rights from shareholders to creditors. 257 Such
transfers do not occur instantaneously or without warning. The
imposition of fiduciary duties can protect creditors during the
transitional period, when they are particularly vulnerable because the
managers of the debtor would recognize the inevitability of the control
transfer.
6. Counseling Relationships
Perhaps the most difficult of the "easy" cases, this category
includes attorneys and clients, accountants and clients, psychiatrists
and patients, medical doctors and patients, clergy and parishioners,
and other relationships involving the provision of professional advice
in a confidential setting. While such relationships may involve the
counselor obtaining access to physical assets, the more challenging
cases from the perspective of critical resource theory are those in
which the fiduciary is given access to confidential information
regarding the client. In such cases, the advice-giver assumes a
nonfiduciary obligation to maintain confidentiality, as well as a
fiduciary obligation to refrain from using the information for personal
advantage.
Even a brief analysis of the counseling cases shows that their
underlying justification fits neatly within the critical resource
255. See, e.g., Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 417 (Del. Ch. 1999).
256. See, e.g., Technic Eng'g, Ltd. v. Basic Envirotech, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1009 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) (describing the transfer of the only significant asset of debtor corporation to another
corporation owned by the same family); Main, Inc. v. Blatstein, No. CIV.A. 98-5947, 1999 WL
424296, at *15 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1999) (stating that "once [the company] became insolvent, both
[defendants, as the company's] directors and shareholders, owed fiduciary duties toward [the
company], and its creditors .... [which] prevented [the defendants] from using [the company's]
assets for their personal gain in a manner contrary to its creditors' best interests").
257. For a model of contingent control transfer that uses debt, see Philippe Aghion & Patrick
Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. EcON. STUD. 473
(1992).
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framework. 258 In the attorney-client context, for example, fiduciary
duty claims usually arise in two contexts. 259 The first involves cases
where the attorney engages in a business transaction with the
client. 260 Although the attorney sometimes exercises discretion with
respect to the client's property in these cases, such discretion is
unnecessary to see the application of the critical resourc6 theory
because the critical resource that often is most relevant to these
258. In many instances, lawyers are literally agents for their clients. While the nature and
scope of fiduciary duties in these cases may be tailored to the context, there is nothing
exceptional about the existence of a fiduciary relationship. For purposes of this section, the cases
involving an attorney's obligation to keep information about the client confidential provide a
more challenging context for examining the application of fiduciary law.
259. Fiduciary duty claims might also arise from other aspects of an attorney's service, but
such claims are easy to place within the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) (involving an attorney who released for an
improper purpose a client's check that had been intended as an appeal bond).
260. These cases sometimes invoke MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1998),
which reads:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client
unless:
the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the client;
the client is advised and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
the client consents in writing thereto.
Alternatively, the cases might invoke Disciplinary Rule 5-104(A), which reads:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing
interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise professional judgment
therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full
disclosure.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104(A) (1980).
In some instances, the cases refer only to the rules. See, e.g., In re Cordoza-Gonzalez, 996
F.2d 1334, 1335 (1st Cir. 1993) (attorney borrowed money from his client without disclosing that
attorney did not own the property pledged as collateral and that he and his wife were involved in
bankruptcy proceedings); In re Horine, 661 N.E.2d 1206, 1207 (Ind. 1996) (lawyer violated Rule
1.8 by negotiating and entering into contract with a client for purchase of a car without fully
disclosing all aspects of the transaction or advising client to seek independent counsel); Comm.
on Profl Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Humphreys, 524 N.W.2d 396, 398-99
(Iowa 1994) (lawyer improperly accepted corporate stock as payment for legal services rendered
in organizing corporation and drafted by-laws to protect his position as officer and director). In
other cases, the courts also refer to fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Jamieson, 426 So. 2d 16,
17 (Fla. 1983) (lawyer used personal influence to induce client to make a gift to a foundation
operated by lawyer); La. State Bar v. Williams, 498 So. 2d 727 (La. 1986) (it is improper to
borrow money from client, interest-free, without having client seek independent counsel); Okla.
Bar Ass'n v. McKenzie, 788 P.2d 1370, 1370 (Okla. 1989) (attorney who induced client to invest
in risky racetrack venture in which attorney had substantial personal business interest breached
fiduciary duty). Finally, in some cases, the courts refer simply to ethical obligations. See, e.g., In
re Dato, 617 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1992) (lawyer purchased property from client at an unfairly low
price and resold for a large profit).
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decisions is the information about the client possessed by the attorney.
The attorney will often be privy to extensive information about a
client's assets and investment preferences that would typically not be
disclosed in an arm's-length transaction.
The second context is cases where the attorney seeks personal
gain by using or disclosing confidential information of the client
outside of direct transactions with the client. 261 To the extent that
confidential information constitutes a critical resource, these cases
also fit neatly within the critical resource theory.
The pattern illustrated by the attorney-client cases holds in the
other counseling relationships. With respect to physicians and
patients, Marc Rodwin has stated, "the law holds doctors accountable
as fiduciaries only in restricted situations."262 Such situations include
"requiring that physicians not abandon patients, keep information
they learn confidential, obtain patients' informed consent to
treatment, and.., disclose to patients any financial interest in clinical
261. These cases are sometimes covered by Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(b), supra
note 260, which reads in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not use information relating to
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after
consultation .. " In other cases, courts cite Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B) , which states that "a
lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of his client." Confidentiality restraints
cover a variety of activities. See, e.g., Quark, Inc. v. Harley, No. 96-1046, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
3864, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 4, 1998) (former corporate counsel disclosed confidential information,
prompting a lawsuit against former employer); Fin. Gen. Bankshares v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (relying on confidential information, lawyer sent letter to a client proposing a
scheme to sell controlling interest of another client's stock to foreign bank at a premium price);
In re Roache, 446 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (Ind. 1983) (lawyer initially represented clients in purchase
of business and then improperly withdrew from representation to represent another client in
offering competing bid); In re Laitsch, 415 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Wis. 1987) (lawyer improperly used
confidences to garnish client's bank account on behalf of another client).
In some instances, the fiduciary relationship associated with the confidential information
that passes between attorneys and clients may extend to other relationships where no formal
representation exists. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319
(7th Cir. 1978).
262. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242 (1995); see also
Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the Doctor's Fiduciary Role in
Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 457 (2000) (describing the "limited version of
fiduciary duty applicable to doctors"). In his attempt to rationalize the treatment of doctors as
fiduciaries, Rodwin uses a metaphor approach common among courts:
Certain features of patient-physician relations closely resemble classic fiduciary
relationships. Physicians have specialized knowledge and expertise. They also control
the use of medical resources which patients need: Only they can admit patients to
hospitals, order diagnostic tests, and prescribe drugs. Patients are often ill or anxious
about their health, which increases their dependence. The patient-physician
relationship presupposes patients entrusting physicians to act on their behalf and
physicians remaining loyal to their patients.
Rodwin, supra note 262, at 245-46. While all of this seems true, at least to the casual observer, it
is utterly irrelevant to the determination of a fiduciary relationship. The key inquiry is whether
the physician works with critical resources that belong to the patient.
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research."263 The requirements to keep information confidential and to
disclose financial interest fit easily into the critical resource theory, as
previous discussion reveals.
The duty not to abandon and the duty to obtain informed
consent are symmetrical-one encouraging the physician to treat the
patient and the other limiting the scope of the treatment to 'matters
for which the physician has obtained informed consent. Most cases
implicating these duties do not involve self-serving behavior, but
rather appear to target negligent behavior (or, in the case of informed
consent, the intentional tort of battery). This fact suggests that a
physician's duty in many instances is not "fiduciary" at all, but merely
the type of duty of care common in many nonfiduciary relationships.264
In cases involving self-interested behavior, the critical resource
seems to be the patient's physical body.265 Although it would not be
considered "property" in a legal sense, the body in these circumstances
serves the same function as critical resources in other fiduciary
contexts, that is, discretion with respect to the patient's body is the
source of the physician's power, just as discretion with respect to
property is the source of power for other fiduciaries.
The most celebrated and controversial case in this area is
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,266 and it deserves
closer inspection through the lens of the critical resource theory. The
case involved a dispute over John Moore's cells.267 Doctors at the
Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles
extracted the cells from Moore while treating him for leukemia. 268 The
doctors subsequently obtained a patent on a cell line established from
263. Rodwin, supra note 262, at 247-48.
264. It may be impossible to find a set of cases in which the legal foundation of the claim is
more confused than "informed consent" cases. Some courts assert that the duty to disclose has
fiduciary origins, while other courts base the duty in negligence and malpractice. Still other
courts throw both together. Willard v. Hagemeister, 121 Cal. App. 3d 406, 417 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) ("The fiduciary relationship in this case also requires that the alternative negligence
theories of malpractice and 'informed consent' be distinguished.").
The duty to disclose seems particular difficult of characterization as either a duty of loyalty
or a duty of care. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate
Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1095-96 (1996) (noting that courts
characterize the corporate duty of disclosure as "an ill-defined hybrid of the duties of care and
loyalty"); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995) (stating that the
"duty of disclosure [is] an obligation that has been characterized as a derivative of the duties of
care and loyalty").
265. Michelle Oberman refers to this set of cases under the rubric, "The Patient's Right to
Autonomy and the Law of Informed Consent." Oberman, supra note 262, at 464.
266. 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990).
267. Id. at 125.
268. Id. at 126.
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Moore's white blood cells. 269 Moore sued the doctors, claiming, inter
alia, breach of fiduciary duty and the tort of conversion. 270 The
California Supreme Court split on the conversion claim, but
unanimously sustained the fiduciary duty claim. 271 The majority
opinion noted, "A physician who adds his own research interests to
[the] balance may be tempted to order a scientifically useful procedure
or test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to the patient. 272
The majority opinion grounded its notion of "fiduciary"
obligation solely on the fact that a physician's "personal interests may
affect professional judgment."273 As noted above, the essence of
"fiduciary" obligation is to avoid behavior that simultaneously serves
the interest of the fiduciary and constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary.
The Court implies that self-interested behavior by physicians may
harm patients, even if that harm is not primarily financial. 274 This
view seems unassailable.
It is worth noting the court's view that the nonphysician
defendants did not stand in a fiduciary relationship with Moore. 275
The court does not explain the basis for this conclusion. It may be that
the court simply did not find any of these defendants to be within the
recognized categories of fiduciary relationships. The critical resource
theory offers a more convincing rationale: None of the other
defendants had discretion with respect to Moore's body. Thus, none of
the other defendants had the power to act opportunistically.
The psychiatrist-client relationship fits awkwardly into
traditional rationales for fiduciary duty. To the extent that those
269. Id. at 127.
270. Id. at 125.
271. The seven justices issued four separate opinions. Four justices joined the majority
opinion. Id. One justice issued a separate concurrence, and two justices dissented on the
conversion claim but concurred with respect to the fiduciary duty claim. Id. In short, the Court
was unanimous in holding that Moore and his physician had a fiduciary relationship that
reached the use of Moore's cell tissue. Id.
272. Id. at 130.
273. The Court stated:
In some respects, the term "fiduciary" is too broad. In this context the term "fiduciary"
signifies only that a physician must disclose all facts material to the patient's
decision. A physician is not the patient's financial advisor. As we have already
discussed, the reason why a physician must disclose possible conflicts is not because
he has a duty to protect his patient's financial interests, but because certain personal
interests may affect professional judgment.
Id. at 131 n.10.
274. At several points in the opinion, the court identifies the potential harm as harm to the
patient's health. See, e.g., id. at 133 (explaining that "the existence of a motivation for a medical
procedure unrelated to the patient's health is a potential conflict of interest and a fact material
to the patient's decision").
275. Id.
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rationales rely on notions of dependence, the fiduciary conception is at
odds with "therapeutic approaches [that] are informed by the value of
individual autonomy."276  Psychiatrists who disclose confidential
information ,may be held liable for a breach of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty. 277 While this result comports with the critical resource theory,
broader fiduciary duties may be unwarranted in this context.278
Even when the confidential information does not involve
commercial transactions, the critical resource theory animates the
underlying fiduciary relationship. For example, all of these counseling
relationships reveal a disturbing pattern of the counselor using
confidential information to pursue sexual relations with the client. 279
The self-interestedness of this action is obvious. As one commentator
has noted, "Preying on the vulnerabilities of someone for whom there
is a fiduciary relationship is only for the benefit of the predator. '280
The usual explanation for granting property rights in
information appeals to the incentive effects of information production.
Information may be extremely expensive to produce, but once
produced, it is easily reproduced. As a result, people who are weighing
the costs and benefits of producing information may decide against
276. Illingworth, supra note 106, at 404.
277. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clingler, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
278. This result cannot be explained under Tamar Frankel's theory. See Illingworth, supra
note 106, at 405:
To fit this into Frankel's framework, we would have to say both that there was a
delegation of power to the psychiatrist, and that the fiduciary is, in some sense, a
substitute actor for the patient. However, there is no sense in which the psychiatrist
serves a substitution role. Ironically, the court's reaffirmation in MacDonald of the
doctor's duty not to disclose confidential information, although grounded in the idea of
a fiduciary relationship, indicates that the doctor is not to act as a substitute.
Consider the following scenario: When a physician takes it upon herself to disclose
private information she is acting as a substitute for the patient. She is doing what
some people might say the patient ought to be doing. For example, if a therapist, upon
hearing from her patient that he is HIV positive and that he, nonetheless, plans to
have sex with his spouse, discloses that information to the spouse, the therapist
arguably is acting as a substitute for the patient.
279. See, e.g., Tante v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ga. 1994) (finding that an attorney
"was a fiduciary with regard to the confidential information provided him by his client just as he
would have been a fiduciary with regard to money or other property entrusted to him by a
client"); Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 243 (Nev. 1986) (explaining that a physician
might be held liable if patient proved vulnerability because of illness); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696
A.2d 697, 705 (N.J. 1997) (holding that a parishioner seeing a clergyman for counseling has a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty if the clergyman uses the vulnerability of the
parishioner to induce her into sexual relations); Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 301 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1975) (holding psychiatrist liable for engaging in sexual activity with a patient).
Cases against religious counselors face First Amendment obstacles not present in the other
contexts. See Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by
Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & LAw 45, 48-53 (2001).
280. Id. at 65-66.
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production unless they are given the means to protect the fruits of
their labors.281 Property rights in information partially address the
concerns of information producers.
In counseling relationships, fiduciary claims (instead of
"property" rights) are granted to encourage information disclosure.
The fact of disclosure creates confidential information, and disclosure
between individuals and their counselors is a valuable activity.
Imposing a fiduciary duty of confidentiality on the counselor
recognizes the fact that the information is a critical resource of the
client or patient and provides the proper incentives for disclosure.
One might complain that the reliance placed on confidential
information in this account of fiduciary duty is no different than the
traditional judicial approach of looking for "confidences." Admittedly,
in many cases, the traditional approach would reach the same result
as property rights theory. The argument here is not that the common-
law judges decided all cases incorrectly, but merely that the standards
used were incapable of distinguishing fiduciary from nonfiduciary
relationships. Under the traditional approach, the notion of
"confidences" stretched beyond cases involving confidential
information to cases in which one person merely trusted another. In
these cases, "confidence" describes subjective reliance, not a critical
resource.
B. Hard Cases
The prior section demonstrated how the critical resource theory
of fiduciary duty provides a unified description of existing fiduciary
relationships. In those contexts, understanding the theory animating
the imposition of fiduciary duties can assist in determining the scope
of the fiduciary relationship. The critical resource theory of fiduciary
281. See Krawiec, supra note 86, at 454 ("Traditional economic theory predicts that suppliers
will recognize the inability to profit from information production due to [the] combination of
inappropriability, high initial fixed costs, and low marginal cost of dissemination and will not
enter the market, resulting in an underproduction of information."). For a lucid judicial
pronouncement along these lines, see Judge Winter's separate opinion in United States v.
Chestman:
Information is ... expensive to produce, and, because it involves facts and ideas that
can be easily photocopied or carried in one's head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those
who pay to produce information will see others reap the profit from it. Where the
profit from an activity is likely to be diverted, investment in that activity will decline.
If the law fails to protect property rights in commercial information, therefore, less
will be invested in generating such information.
947 F.2d 551, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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duty could also assist courts in determining whether innovative
relationships have a fiduciary character. 282
This section begins with a discussion of confidential
relationships. These are the myriad associations discussed in Part II
that do not fit into other established categories of fiduciary
relationships. While confidential relationships and fiduciary
relationships are sometimes distinguished, 283 this section is concerned
with identifying those confidential relationships in which the
imposition of fiduciary duties would be warranted. The sections that
follow examine venture capital, strategic alliances, and franchising. In
each of these contexts, courts have struggled to discern whether
fiduciary duties should apply, and in each instance, the critical
resource theory of fiduciary duty brings more clarity to the inquiry.
1. Confidential Relationships
Confidential relationships are discussed in some detail in Part
II of this Article, and that discussion need not be revisited here.
Nevertheless, a few points of clarification are in order. First, in light of
the foregoing discussion, confidential relationships may be among the
easiest of the hard cases. Focusing on critical resources eliminates
many cases that the "trust" and "vulnerability" inquiry could not
easily resolve. Many confidential relationships involve one person
obtaining service from another, who gains access to or takes
possession of a critical resource of the first. The traditional approach
to these cases is to ask whether the service provider dominated the
owner of the critical resource, 284 but this inquiry cannot systematically
distinguish fiduciary relationships from arm's-length contracts.
The recent case of Daktronics, Inc. v. McAfee 285 is instructive.
In that case McAfee and Baker were partners in a venture to develop
a baseball pitch speed indicator. 286 After initially conceiving of the
idea, Baker contracted with Daktronics to manufacture a prototype of
282. Weinrib, supra note 97, at 7 (arguing that "categories of fiduciary should not be
considered closed").
283. See RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, supra note 208, § 2 cmt. b ("Although the relationship
between two persons is not a fiduciary relationship, it may nevertheless be a confidential
relation.") Conversely, a fiduciary relationship may exist even though the parties do not enjoy a
confidential relationship.
284. See High Plains Genetic Research, Inc. v. K.K. Mill-Iron Ranch, 535 N.W.2d 839, 842
(S.D. 1995) ("High Plains provided a specialized service and Stamison chose how and under what
circumstances that service would be used.").
285. 599 N.W.2d 358 (S.D. 1999).
286. Id. at 360.
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the machine. 287 After successful construction of the prototype, the
parties collectively marketed the machine to Major League Baseball
clubs.288 Over a four-year period, McAfee and Baker ordered four
machines from Daktronics. Several years after McAfee and Baker
ordered their last machine, Daktronics began manufacturing and
selling pitch speed indicators on their own. 289 McAfee and Baker sued,
claiming (among other things) that Daktronics had breached a
fiduciary duty.290 In response to this claim, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota reasoned, "Daktronics may have had superior
knowledge and technical skills in the development and marketing of a
speed pitch indicator, but McAfee and Baker were not in a dependent
position, lacking in mental acuity or business intelligence. '291 As a
result, the court rejected the fiduciary claim. 292
In situations like these, it is useful to ask, what would change
about the relationship if McAfee and Baker had entered into a
partnership with Daktronics? Would McAfee and Baker have less
mental acuity or business intelligence? No, but Daktronics would still
owe a fiduciary duty. What would change is that McAfee and Baker
would become "co-owners" of the business with Daktronics, 293 and each
party would become an agent of the partnership. 29 4
By focusing on the supposed disparity between the positions of
the parties instead of the allocation of ownership rights, courts enter
an inquiry without guideposts. Relationships-particularly business
relationships-always involve parties with disparate positions. It is
difficult to imagine a situation in which the parties are perfectly
symmetrical. One always has more money, more knowledge, more
influence, etc., than the other. Indeed, the justification for trading is
that each party possesses something that the other wants but does not
currently have. As a result, the focus on domination, influence, or
disparity of position leads to an uncertain inquiry into how much
different is different enough to justify the imposition of fiduciary
duties.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 363.
292. Id.
293. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997).
294. Id. § 301(1).
1468 [Vol. 55:1399
2002] CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY 1469
2. Venture Capital (Convertible Preferred Stock)
When venture capitalists invest, they typically demand
preferred stock loaded with various financial and control rights.295
Unlike traditional preferred stock,296 the preferred stock issued to
venture capitalists usually does not have fixed dividends, but carries
the right to vote-including the right to elect representatives to the
board of directors-and the right to convert the preferred stock into
common stock.297 When venture capitalists and entrepreneurs clash,
295. For a useful guide to venture capital contracts, see MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL.,
VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION (3d ed. 1997).
296. This reference to "traditional preferred stock" is intended to connote a security that falls
somewhere between the traditional classifications of equity and debt. A useful description of this
type of security is provided by Arthur Pinto and Douglas Branson:
Preferred shares are equity authorized by statute. Preferred shares are usually
authorized in the articles of incorporation or in a contract which is made a part
thereof. In most cases, preferred shareholders are paid fixed dividends after the
creditors are paid their interest but before the common shareholders are paid
dividends. Since preferred shares are considered equity, their holders have no right to
be paid like creditors. Rather, preferred shareholders are paid when the board of
directors authorizes the payment (that is, declares the dividends). In liquidation, the
preferred shareholders are paid their liquidation preference after the creditors but
before the common shareholders. Therefore, preferred shareholders have higher risk
than creditors in receiving a return and repayment. On the other hand, they usually
do not have the rights of common shareholders to vote and control the corporation or
share in the increased return if the corporation is successful.
Preferred shares are an unusual security which have the disadvantages of debt
(little direct control or potential for increased return) and of common shares (lower
priority and greater risk) without any of the advantages of either. One may ask why
there is a market for preferred shares? Preferred shares attract investors because
they tend to pay higher dividends. In addition, since dividend payments to corporate
shareholders are partially nontaxable, there is a market for preferred shares among
corporate investors.
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAw 70-71 (1999); see
also Brudney, supra note 44, at 648:
Preferred stock investors, like bondholders, have a claim to a prior but limited return,
in exchange for which they offer funds to be risked at the discretion of the common
stock. And like bondholders, their essential economic interest is in the return of
principal and current distributions, rather than (as with common stock) with any
increased inchoate value of the assets of the enterprise. But unlike bondholders,
preferred stock investors commit funds to the discretion of commons without limit of
time. Moreover, they have no unconditional contractual entitlement to receive either
dividends or return of principal during the life of the firm, or during its insolvency.
See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 291-92 (8th ed. 2002) (describing preferred stock as a "hybrid"
of equity and debt). These descriptions are, of course, oversimplified in the sense that the terms
of preferred stock are defined by contracts that may have infinite variations on the theme.
Nevertheless, they provide a useful point of departure for the discussion of preferred stock in the
venture capital context.
297. For a study describing the terms of securities issued in venture capital investments, see
Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strdmberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, REV. ECON. STUD. (forthcoming 2002) (finding
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the rules of engagement have often been worked out in advance
through the extensive terms of the preferred stock.298 As with all long-
term relational contracts, however, those terms do not anticipate
every contingency. 299 When advance planning fails to yield the desired
results, the injured party may appeal to fiduciary duties for
protection. 300
The thought of a venture capitalist seeking judicial protection
through fiduciary duty claims seems almost laughable. After all, the
usual portrait of a venture capitalist shows a dominant personality
who holds all the cards. Indeed, such claims by venture capitalists are
exceedingly rare, suggesting that the extensive contractual and
convertible preferred stock in 189 of 200 financing rounds), available at
http://www.restud.org.udaccepted.htm.
298. The primary terms associated with preferred stock are to be found in the certificate of
designations or restated certificate of incorporation of the issuing company. In conjunction with
the sale of the preferred stock, the parties usually negotiate other agreements, including a stock
purchase agreement, a shareholders agreement, or a registration rights agreement. Throughout
this Article, I refer to those agreements and the certificate of designations or restated certificate
of incorporation collectively as "venture capital contracts."
299. This point was recently noted in a concise fashion by Thomas Smith: "All contracts have
gaps." Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation
of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 234 (1999). Comparing the metaphorical contracts
between shareholders and the corporation with the real contracts between bondholders and the
corporation, Smith usefully observes:
Contractors cannot anticipate all future contingencies. While the nature of
bondholder claims is profoundly different from that of equity, both variable and
fixed corporate claimants will have need of principles to fill the gaps in their
incompletely specified voluntary arrangements.
Id.
Smith concludes that-even though the "obligations owed by managers to creditors are
usually not characterized in law as fiduciary"--the principle necessary to fill gaps in bondholder
contracts is the same principle that should be used to fill gaps in shareholder contracts, namely,
that managers should be required to do "what rational parties would have agreed to ex ante." Id.
at 235. This familiar approach of looking to the hypothetical bargain yields interesting results.
Relying on modern theories of corporate finance-specifically, the Capital Asset Pricing Model
("CAPM")-Smith concludes that managers have a "neotraditional" fiduciary duty to maximize
the value of all financial claims against the firm. Id. at 238. It is probably worth noting that
Smith is not the first to suggest that managers should have a duty to maximize the value of the
firm. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413,
446 (1986) ("The management choice is not limited to maximizing stockholder wealth or
maximizing bondholder wealth. There is another alternative: Maximize the value of the firm,
which benefits both bondholders and stockholders.").
300. Perhaps the best illustrations of this strategy are two cases decided within one month of
each other by Chancellor Allen. See Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 1, 1997); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997). These
cases are particularly instructive because one (Orban) involved a lawsuit by an entrepreneur,
and the other (Adams) involved a lawsuit by the venture capitalists. The principle that seemed
to unify the decisions was that "courts are inclined to enforce the bargain between venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs," rather than relying on fiduciary duties. D. Gordon Smith,
Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 133, 155
(1998) (discussing both cases).
1470
2002] CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY 1471
market protections suffice to prevent entrepreneurial opportunism in
most instances. Nevertheless, the contracts between venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs are incomplete, and instances in which
the venture capitalist is vulnerable may arise. For example, in Equity-
Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, the venture capitalists did not have
the power to liquidate a biopharmaceutical firm that was "on the lip of
insolvency."30 1 In an act of desperation, the entrepreneurs obtained an
outside investment that significantly diluted the venture capitalists'
investments. 02  In considering the venture capitalists' claim of
fiduciary duty protection, Chancellor Allen wrote:
While the board in these circumstances could have made a different business judgment,
in my opinion, it violated no duty owed to the preferred in not doing so. The special
protections offered to the preferred are contractual in nature .... The corporation is, of
course, required to respect those legal rights. But... generally it will be the duty of the
board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of
common stock-as the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be-to the
interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, where there
is a conflict.
3 0 3
While preferred stock is usually in the nonfiduciary
relationship column, such categorization may elevate form over
substance. The preferred stock issued in most venture capital
investments is much closer to common stock than to traditional
preferred stock. From a critical resource perspective, venture
capitalists hold residual control rights through their right to elect
directors and to vote as a single class with the common
shareholders. 30 4 They normally should have the benefit of fiduciary
duty protection.30 5
It is also possible that the entrepreneur would seek fiduciary
protection from opportunistic behavior by the venture capitalist. Since
entrepreneurs usually hold common stock, there is no question that
the board of directors would owe the entrepreneur fiduciary duties. If
301. 705 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Del. Ch. 1997).
302. Id. at 1045.
303. Id. at 1042.
304. It is worth noting that the preferred stock issued to venture capitalists is usually
convertible into common stock. While this right to obtain residual control rights seems very
similar to actually holding residual control rights, the two are actually quite different from a
property rights perspective. The key difference is that the holder of a convertible security must
still make a payment to obtain the residual control rights-not a cash payment (as with an
option), but rather a payment in the form of forfeiting other rights (those rights that make the
stock "preferred"). From an economic standpoint, there is nothing to differentiate this person
from the investor who is contemplating an investment in common stock. The law does not and
should not recognize such potential owners as being in a fiduciary relationship.
305. Cf. William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891 (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that fiduciary duty is
unnecessary if courts will reinvigorate the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
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the venture capitalist acted opportunistically through the board of
directors, therefore, the application of fiduciary duties would be
assured.
In an important contribution to the literature on fiduciary
duties and venture capital, Edward Rock and Michael Wachter have
argued that courts should refrain from attempts to protect minority
shareholders in "Silicon Valley start-ups" through the doctrine of
minority oppression.306 Their conclusion rests on two important
characteristics of Silicon Valley startups: (1) The "defining
characteristic of the Silicon Valley start-up is that its key assets are
specific to the match";30 7 and (2) because the key assets in a Silicon
Valley startup are match-specific, "the company will be capital-
constrained with no easy access to outside financing at an appropriate
valuation of the assets."308 While the firm is in this stage of
development, the argument goes, the potential for opportunistic
behavior is apparent:
If any of the company insiders could trigger dissolution of the enterprise midstream, the
forced sale of the match assets would result in substantial losses to the participants....
If critical insiders could credibly threaten dissolution, they could use the threat to
extract a greater share of the value of the enterprise.
3 0 9
Rock and Wachter then argue that this potential for
opportunism is mitigated, though not eliminated, by the combined
effects of the limitations on exit that are inherent in closely held
corporations3 l0 and the vigorous enforcement of rules prohibiting non-
306. Rock & Wachter, Omelet, supra note 128, at 915. Although they fail to define whether
the "minority shareholders" they have in mind are the entrepreneurs or the venture capitalists,
the context of their discussion suggests that they are most concerned with claims of minority
oppression brought by entrepreneurs against venture capitalists. Nevertheless, their analysis
invokes issues that have application to claims by venture capitalists against entrepreneurs in
the (admittedly) rare circumstances when they arise.
307. Id. at 918. Simply defined, match-specific assets are investments that are of value to
insiders but of little value to outsiders. Id. Rock and Wachter elaborate on the concept of match-
specific assets as follows:
Investments in match are defined as investments that are more valuable to the
contracting parties than to a third party. We use the term "match-specific" investment
in this article in place of the more common "firm-specific" training for several reasons.
First, the term "match-specific" investment captures the broader range of activities
that create a good partnership, including training and learning-by-doing, but also
including adaptations to each other's styles of interaction. In addition, the term is
more general and does not restrain the investments to take place inside of a firm.
Finally, the term match-specific leads one to identify the specific asset created or
improved by the parties' investments.
Id. at 918 n.14.
308. Id. at 918.
309. Id. at 919.
310. These limitations on exit arise because the shareholders in a closely held corporation
lack access to public capital markets, and because, in contrast to partners in a general
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pro rata distributions in corporations. 311 Together, these attributes of
the closely held corporation lock the participants into a relationship,
thus reducing agency costs and encouraging investment in match-
specific assets.31 2
Rock and Wachter readily acknowledge that the lock-in they
describe does not address all of the potential for opportunism, but they
foreclose the possibility of using fiduciary duties (i.e., lawsuits based
on minority oppression) to address that problem. They rely instead on
the self-enforcing norms and other nonlegal constraints that govern
the venture capital relationship, including the close working
relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, which
reduces information asymmetries and transaction costs; 313  the
commonly bargained-for right of venture capitalists to replace
entrepreneurs, which protects venture capitalists and provides them
with an incentive to invest in searching for replacement managers; 3
14
and the market for venture capitalist reputation, which protects the
entrepreneur from opportunistic termination. 31 5
partnership, shareholders in a closely held corporation have no statutory right to trigger
dissolution and buyout.
311. Rock and Wachter discuss both direct and indirect prohibitions. The direct prohibition
prohibits a majority shareholder from paying dividends to itself without paying proportional
dividends to the minority shareholders. Indirect prohibitions include close judicial scrutiny of
self-dealing transactions and special provisions addressing "end-game scenarios," such as the
appraisal right. Id. at 921-22.
312. Rock and Wachter also note that focusing on match-specific assets might help to explain
why some businesses chose partnerships rather than corporations:
The dissolution at will feature of classical partnerships means that the form will best
fit enterprises in which there are few if any assets that are not easily sold to third
parties. In such cases, the benefits of dissolution at will are clear: by providing an
easy exit, it prevents opportunistic rent-seeking. And the costs are minimal: when
there are no sunk costs, when the principal assets are easily divided or sold,
dissolution at will causes little harm.
Id. at 919.
313. Id. at 927.
314. Id. at 928-29.
315. Id. at 929. It seems improper to consider a termination opportunistic if the right to
terminate was reserved in the initial bargaining. See Smith, Information Age, supra note 300, at
141-42 (noting that termination is only opportunistic if the entrepreneur did not get the benefit
of reduced cost of capital). Nevertheless, where the potential for opportunism exists, reputational
constraints are potentially powerful. Rock and Wachter describe those constraints as follows:
VCs are repeat players in the start-up business and are likely to be constrained on a
number of fronts. First, they compete to provide financing for the most promising
start-ups and are thus likely to be constrained by reputational effects in their aim to
maintain their position in relation to other start-up companies. In addition, the VC
has to replace the entrepreneur with another person. Wrongful discharge of the chief
executive officer, even if protected from judicial second guessing by the employment
at will doctrine, is not a strong starting point in any recruitment process. Finally, the
discharge will raise questions with other capital suppliers. It is a negative signal
under the best of circumstances and is likely to raise the company's cost of capital.
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Rock and Wachter are not content to stop with their claim that
minority oppression is unnecessary to address opportunism in the
venture capital relationship. They further assert that judicial
enforcement of fiduciary duties in this context would "jeopardize the
web of features and protections that makes the close corporation form
so attractive and popular for firms with substantial match-specific
assets. ' 316 Their reasoning is that the availability of minority
oppression claims may enable a minority shareholder to act
opportunistically against the majority shareholder.
Although their analysis is elegant, Rock and Wachter
exaggerate the extent to which entrepreneurs and venture capitalists
are locked into the relationship by the existence of "match-specific"
assets.317 The idea that entrepreneurs are locked in is belied by the
fact that venture capitalists routinely insist on employment
agreements and stock-vesting agreements to ensure that the
entrepreneur does not leave the firm too quickly. Indeed, many
entrepreneurs voluntarily leave companies that are not fully
"cooked"318 because their talents lie in starting new companies, not in
managing established companies. These so-called serial entrepreneurs
specialize in starting innovative companies, and they often voluntarily
leave to others the development and ongoing management of the
firm. 319
Venture capitalists avoid lock-in through staged financing,
which provides an opportunity for the venture capitalist to credibly
threaten dissolution of the firm. 320 The threat is credible because of
the combined effect of two nearly universal features (one legal and the
other nonlegal) of venture capital relationships: (1) venture capitalists
typically have a liquidation preference ensuring at least the return of
Rock & Wachter, Omelet, supra note 128, at 929.
316. Rock & Wachter, Omelet, supra note 128, at 930.
317. See generally, D. Gordon Smith, Exits (working paper 2001).
318. As the title of their article suggests, Rock and Wachter compare entrepreneurial firms
to omelets and describe the problems arising from the need to encourage match-specific
investments as follows:
The problem is akin to making an omelet: between the time the eggs are broken and
the omelet sets, the cook knows his grand plan for the omelet, but to outsiders, the
half-cooked omelet is unappetizing. Forced sales of half-developed switches and
uncooked omelets go poorly.
Rock & Wachter, Omelets, supra note 128, at 919.
319. The term "serial entrepreneur" refers to a class of entrepreneurs who start ventures,
sell them, and then repeat the process, often in rapid succession. See Mark Gimein, Silicon
Valley's Serial Netrepreneurs: Why Wait for the IPO?, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at 269.
320. For a thorough discussion of staged financing and the threat of abandonment, see Paul
A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN.
1461 (1995).
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their initial capital investment, and sometimes much more;321 and (2)
the fact that a venture capitalist's refusal to continue funding a
company will likely be interpreted by other venture capitalists as a
"kiss of death" on the company. 322 In other words, because
entrepreneurs have no reasonable funding prospects without the
endorsement of existing investors and because those existing investors
have the right to receive a liquidation preference, staged financing
enables investors to demand concessions from entrepreneurs.
Moreover, the relatively short time periods between stages-usually
less than one year and often just weeks or months-creates an
environment in which entrepreneurs are almost constantly seeking
new money.323 The implicit threat of nonfunding, therefore, provides
an almost constant source of power to the venture capitalists.
In the end, Rock and Wachter correctly identify the potential
for opportunism in the venture capital relationship as real and
significant, and they properly assert that the protection offered to
minority shareholders by the combination of mutual self-interest,
contractual obligation, and reputational constraints is important.
Nevertheless, these protections may be insufficient to completely
address the problem. Although courts have been reluctant to impose
fiduciary duties in the venture capital context, 324 circumstances may
call for such action. Moreover, the limited application of fiduciary
duties would not unduly empower minority shareholders, avoiding
new potential for opportunism against the majority.
3. Strategic Alliances
Alliances are an important source of investment for
entrepreneurial firms. Although the contractual structures vary
321. See MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING
NEGOTIATION 8-11, 8-12 (1998) (describing the development of participating preferred stock).
322. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949,
967 (1999) (noting that the threat of abandonment is "particularly potent because the refusal by
the Venture Capitalist to continue investing will likely be viewed by other potential investors as
a signal that the company is unworthy of capital").
323. Many entrepreneurs attest to this fact. See generally TOM ASHBROOK, THE LEAP: A
MEMOIR OF LOVE AND MADNESS IN THE INTERNET GOLD RUSH (2000); CHARLES H. FERGUSON,
HIGH ST@KES, NO PRISONERS: A WINNER'S TALE OF GREED AND GLORY IN THE INTERNET WARS
(1999); JERRY KAPLAN, STARTUP: A SILICON VALLEY ADVENTURE (1994); FRED MOODY, THE
VISIONARY POSITION: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE DIGITAL DREAMERS WHO ARE MAKING VIRTUAL
REALITY A REALITY (1999); MICHAEL WOLFF, BURN RATE: How I SURVIVED THE GOLD RUSH
YEARS ON THE INTERNET (1998).
324. See Smith, Information Age, supra note 300, at 153-55 (discussing Orban v. Field and
Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams and noting that "courts typically treat these disputes as
entirely contractual").
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widely, the unifying principle is simple: Alliances involve cooperation
among two or more firms to a greater degree than traditional discrete
contracts, but to a lesser degree than mergers or acquisitions. In other
words, alliances are prototypes of the relational contract. These
relational contracts are typically heavily negotiated, nonstandardized
agreements. Their detailed terms may provide the appearance of
completeness, but their scope and length ensures that the contracts
are incomplete. Indeed, disputes among alliance partners are common,
and parties turn to the courts for guidance. 25
The absence of standardization complicates analysis and
undermines efforts to classify alliances. Most alliances consist of two
or more of the following: supply agreements, distribution agreements,
technology license agreements, research and development agreements,
marketing agreements, and investment agreements. In some
instances, alliances are governed exclusively by contracts. In other
instances, the partners elect to form a separate business entity in an
arrangement typically referred to as a joint venture.
The larger party often makes an equity investment in the
smaller party. In these cases, the existence of a fiduciary relationship
follows naturally from the formation of a stockholding relationship. 326
In other instances, the parties invest in a joint project without making
any direct investment in each other. Because of the tendency of
alliance parties to invest more than financial capital, alliances are
often referred to as "corporate partnerships." Leading legal
practitioners in this field have written:
These arrangements typically involve a substantial contribution of products,
technology/intellectual property and/or research and development by one party
(typically the smaller party) and some sort of investment (equity, debt or R&D funding)
and/or services by the other party (typically the larger party). They also usually involve
the allocation of manufacturing and/or distribution rights to technology and products
arising from the arrangement.3 27
As with confidential relationships, determining whether
alliances are fiduciary relationships is extremely fact-intensive, but
the key facts still relate to allocation of ownership rights. A recent
dispute between Tellabs Operations and Riverstone Networks is
325. The number of reported cases in this area is still small because strategic alliances have
blossomed only during the late 1990s. Most strategic alliances are formed among high-technology
or biotechnology companies, and disputes over intellectual property are common.
326. See, e.g., V. Compl. at 17, PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Williams (Del. Ch. No. 18671) (Feb. 15,
2001), available at http://webman.widener.edu/documents/complaints/18671-012.pdf (alleging
that the directors of Genomic Solutions, Inc. (GSI) breached a fiduciary duty to PerkinElmer,
Inc., a substantial shareholder in GS1).
327. THOMAS F. VILLENEUVE ET AL., CORPORATE PARTNERING: STRUCTURING & NEGO-
TIATING DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1-4 (3d ed. 2002).
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instructive. Tellabs and Riverstone both build and sell equipment to
enhance the service quality of communications service providers. 328 On
November 17, 2000, the two companies formed a strategic alliance for
the purpose of manufacturing and marketing specified hardware and
software manufactured by Riverstone. 329
In a complaint filed on August 28, 2001, Tellabs claimed that
representatives of Riverstone made certain representations during
negotiation of the Strategic Alliance Agreement, including statements
regarding the capabilities of Riverstone's products and an assertion
that Riverstone did not intend to compete against Tellabs in the sale
of the products that were the subject of the Strategic Alliance
Agreement. 330 Tellabs contends that Riverstone acted contrary to
those representations by using marketing and pricing information
designated "Confidential" in the Strategic Alliance Agreement to gain
an advantage in selling the products.3 1 Tellabs terminated the
Strategic Alliance Agreement in August 2001 and sued Riverstone on
the same day. Tellabs claims that Riverstone owes Tellabs fiduciary
duties:
Riverstone owed fiduciary duties to Tellabs, which included (but were not limited to): (a)
a fiduciary duty to disclose to Tellabs all material information relating to independent
contacts with Tellabs' client contacts; (b) a fiduciary duty to refrain from exploiting
Tellabs' prospective business advantages for Riverstone's own gain; and (c) a fiduciary
duty to refrain from using Tellabs' confidential pricing information for Riverstone's own
financial gain.
The critical resource in this instance is confidential
information, and the success or failure of Tellabs' fiduciary duty
claims should turn on whether it can convince a court that the
information in question is really "confidential." Without confidential
information, Tellabs would seem to have no viable fiduciary duty
claim, as Riverstone appears to have used its own assets to
manufacture the products.
328. For Tellabs, see Company Profile at http://www.tellabs.com/newslbackgrounder.html
(last visited Aug. 29, 2002), and for Riverstone, see Corporate Backgrounder at
http://www.riverstonenet.com/company/corp-backgrounder.html (last visted Aug. 29, 2002).
329. Strategic Alliance Agreement, Nov. 17, 2000, between Riverstone Networks, Inc. and
Tellabs Operations, Inc. (on file with author).
330. Tellabs Operations, Inc. Compl., available at http://www.tellabs.com/news/river-
stonesuit.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
331. Strategic Alliance Agreement, supra note 329, § 12.2.
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4. Franchising
Perhaps franchising 3 2 should appear under the heading of
"easy" relationships because courts consistently hold that franchisors
have no fiduciary duty to franchisees. 333 Nevertheless, the issue is
persistent. Plaintiff-franchisees regularly make claims against
franchisors based on fiduciary duty, invoking the notions of "trust,"
"confidence," and vulnerability. 334 Franchising certainly looks like a
relationship that could qualify as a fiduciary relationship under
traditional judicial standards, 33 5 but the critical resource theory shows
why the courts have reached the correct conclusion.
The franchise relationship is a contractual relationship, and
both franchisors and franchisees contribute significantly to its
success.3 36  In many instances, both franchisor and franchisee
contribute financial capital. In all instances, however, both parties
332. For a definition of "franchise," see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and
the Franchisor's Duty of Care Toward its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 908 n. 1 (1994) ("A
franchise involves a continuing contractual relationship in which the franchisor grants the
franchisee a right to conduct business or sell products according to the franchisor's marketing
plan and in conjunction with the franchisor's trademark.").
333. Only a few cases have held that a franchisor has fiduciary duties to a franchisee. The
best known is Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), but subsequent cases in
the same circuit have backed away from this conclusion. See Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co.,
692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that "[i]nasmuch as the duty of 'good faith and fair
dealing' is inherent in every business relationship, it was unnecessary to the decision to label
that duty as 'fiduciary.' "). For another case finding a fiduciary relationship, see Mister Donut of
America, Inc. v. Harris, 723 P.2d 670, 673 (Ariz. 1986).
A federal district court in North Carolina recently held that a franchisor and franchisee of a
muffler chain had a fiduciary relationship, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that
"there is no indication that a North Carolina law would recognize the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between franchisee and franchisor." Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops,
Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998).
334. See Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Best Leasing, Inc., No. 99-5137, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19031, at *1, *4-5 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 2000); Amoco Oil Co. v. Gomez, 125 F. Supp. 2d 492,
509-10 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Prince Heaton Enters. v. Buffalo's Franchise Concepts, Inc., 117 F. Supp.
2d 1357, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Marcella & Co. v. Avon Prods., 724 N.Y.S.2d 192, 192 (2001).
335. In an oft-cited article, practicing attorney Harold Brown argued in favor of fiduciary
treatment for franchise relationships. See Harold Brown, Franchising-A Fiduciary
Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1971). He justified this conclusion by arguing that courts
relied on three propositions to explain traditional fiduciary relationships: "the pervasive powers
held by one party; the gross disparity of the parties in a complex transaction usually of long
duration; and the rampant opportunities for abuse, particularly through clandestine self-
preference." Id. at 665. Robert Emerson has also argued that the franchise relationship should be
considered fiduciary with respect to certain clauses of the franchise agreement. Emerson, supra
note 332, at 934.
336. For general background on franchise relationships, see FUNDAMENTALS OF
FRANCHISING (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 1997); BUILDING FRANCHISE
RELATIONSHIPS: A GUIDE TO ANTICIPATING PROBLEMS, RESOLVING CONFLICTS, AND
REPRESENTING CLIENTS (Ann Hurwitz & Rochelle B. Spandorf eds., 1998).
1478
2002] CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY 1479
contribute more than financial capital. The franchise agreement is the
basic governance document for the franchising relationship. Franchise
agreements are notoriously lopsided in favor of the franchisors. 3 7
Even though these agreements have very detailed provisions, they are
incomplete contracts. 338
Franchisors typically contribute three things to the franchising
relationship: (1) trademarks and trade dress;3 39 (2) trade secrets,
which are part of what is often referred to as the "System"; and (3)
services, often including site selection, training, promotion,
bookkeeping, compliance with laws and system standards, and
insurance.34 Franchisees typically pay a one-time franchise fee and
ongoing royalties. 341 These payments are often the source of conflict
between the franchisor and franchisee. The franchisor's incentive is to
maximize the amount of sales-the basis on which royalties are
calculated-which may not require the same actions as those that
would maximize profits for the franchisees. In addition to the payment
of royalties, the franchisee is usually required to pay for the
development of the franchise store according to the franchisor's
specifications. Finally, franchisees often make an enormous personal
investment in the business. For many franchisees, the franchise is
their primary occupation.
337. See, e.g., La Guardia Assocs. v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
119, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The economic dominance of the franchisor may be brought to bear at
the outset of the relationship to create a franchise contract that is unfair to the franchisee.");
Postal Instant Press v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("The relationship
between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing, although not universal,
inequality of economic resources between the contracting parties .... The agreements
themselves tend to reflect this gross bargaining disparity. Usually they are form contracts the
franchisor prepared and offered to franchisees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.").
338. Peter C. Lagarias, Uniformity in California Franchise Agreements, 21 FRANCHISE L.J.
136, 140 (2002) ("Franchise agreements, despite their painstaking detail, are incomplete,
because they cannot possibly cover all current and future aspects of the franchise relationship
and instead simply reserve many rights and considerable discretion to the franchisor.");
Emerson, supra note 332, at 907 ("Franchisors and franchisees.., tend to have legitimate
expectations about their franchise relationship that often go far beyond the terms specified in
their written agreement.").
339. Litigation over intellectual property issues is common in the franchising context. See,
e.g., Re/Max N. Cent., Inc. v. Cook, 272 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 2001); Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v. Donuts,
Inc., No. 99-CV-1141, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17927 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2000); Country Inns &
Suites by Carlson, Inc. v. Two H.O. P'ship, No. 01-1214, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20186 (D. Minn.
Nov. 19, 2001).
340. See Lagarias, supra note 338, at 136 (surveying ten franchise agreements contained in
Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars registered with the Department of Corporations in
California); see also Emerson, supra note 332, at 966 (reviewing one hundred franchise
agreements).
341. Lagarias, supra note 338, at 137; Emerson, supra note 332, at 955-56.
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Most franchise agreements address a franchisee's territorial
rights, usually granting a specific area of exclusivity.342 From the
franchisee's perspective, territorial rights produce a monopoly of sorts
and can significantly improve sales. A frequent source of litigation
between franchisors and franchisees has been the so-called
encroachment claim, where franchisees argue that their territorial
rights have been infringed by the franchisor. 343 If the contract between
the parties is clear, courts will generally enforce it.344 On the other
hand, courts have not been particularly receptive to claims that
restraint is required by an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 345
Most franchises are granted for multi-year terms, usually
between five and twenty years. 346 Long terms encourage franchisees to
make relationship-specific investments. Many franchise agreements
are also renewable, at the option of the franchisee, upon the expiration
of the prior term, as long as the franchisee has maintained compliance
with the terms of the previous franchise agreement. 347 At the time of
renewal, franchisees are typically required to upgrade their outlets to
then-prevailing system standards. Where renewal is contingent on
franchisor approval, some states have adopted statutes prohibiting
franchisors from withholding consent unreasonably. 348 All franchise
342. Lagarias, supra note 338, at 138 (explaining that nine of ten franchise agreements
provide for exclusive territories); Emerson, supra note 332, at 944-45.
343. See generally Ronald R. Fieldstone, Franchise Encroachment Law, 17 FRANCHISE L.J.
75 (1998).
344. See, e.g., Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 210 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 2000) (refusing
to take account of alleged oral representations about the size of exclusive territory that were in
conflict with the franchise agreement).
345. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999); Hobin v.
Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 744 A.2d 1134 (N.H. 2000). But see Scheck v.
Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that franchisee lacked
contractual right to an exclusive territory, but the franchisor may "not act to destroy the right of
the franchisee to enjoy the fruits of the contract"); In re Vylene Enters., Inc. 90 F.3d 1472 (9th
Cir. 1996) (finding breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing where competing
restaurant was constructed within a mile and a half from franchisee's restaurant); Emporium
Drug Mart, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,966 (AAA, Dallas,
Tex. Sept. 2, 2000) (arbitration of a well-publicized case of "Internet encroachment").
For an argument that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be applied
more forcefully against franchisees, see Thomas J. Chinonis, Note, Implied Covenant of Good
Faith: A Two-Way Street in Franchising, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 229 (1998).
346. Lagarias, supra note 338, at 137 (noting that nine of ten franchise agreements provided
terms within five to twenty years).
347. Id. at 138 (describing "qualified" right of renewal). Absent a contractual right to renew,
courts are usually reluctant to imply a right. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. McDonald's Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 1999).
348. See, e.g., Deborah S. Coldwell et al., Franchise Law Update, 54 SMU L. REV. 1477
(2001) (discussing Texas statute). In addition to state statutes, Congress has adopted the
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agreements allow the franchisor to terminate the franchise
relationship upon a material breach by the franchisee. 349 Franchises
are usually not terminable at will,350 but most franchise agreements
and statutes provide ample possibilities for franchisor termination. 351
Even this brief and incomplete description of the franchise
relationship reveals why courts routinely deny claims by franchisees
alleging a fiduciary relationship. While the franchisee is authorized to
use assets of the franchisor, the franchisor does not exercise discretion
over any of the critical resources of the franchisee. Fiduciary claims
arise most often with respect to decisions to terminate the franchise.
Such decisions may have the potential for opportunism, 352 but only if
the franchisee has left herself unprotected in the franchise
agreement. 353
Despite the lack of success in claims by franchisees, franchising
relationships are regularly held to be agency relationships. 354 These
cases are inevitably claims by third parties seeking damages against
franchisors for the actions of a franchisee. These holdings suggest that
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (2002), to protect service station
franchisees. See C.K. Smith & Co., Inc. v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 269 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2001); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Flores, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
349. See Lagarias, supra note 338, at 138 (listing various grounds for termination of
franchise agreements); see also G.M. Garrett Realty, Inc. v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., No.
00-1747, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19286 (4th Cir. Aug. 28, 2001); Zeidler v. A&W Rests., Inc., No.
99.C.2591, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 653 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2001).
350. Even when the franchise agreement allows for at-will termination, state statutes often
impose a "good cause" requirement. See Thomas J. Collin, State Franchise Laws and the Small
Business Franchise Act of 1999: Barriers to Efficient Distribution, 55 BUS. LAW. 1699, 1726-34
(2000).
351. Emerson, supra note 332, at 949 (noting that "franchises are subject to termination by
franchisors for all sorts of violations, even ones that would-absent the contractual clause about
materiality--constitute de minimis breach"). Courts sometimes limit the power of franchisors to
terminate using the contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing. See 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Dar,
757 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
352. The potential for opportunism is enhanced by the fact that most franchisees are subject
to covenants not to compete. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against
Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1049, 1064 (1995). Other areas that seem ripe with potential for
opportunism are the assignment of franchise rights, see Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities,
Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2002), and the repurchase of franchise property, see Victory
Lane Quick Oil Change, Inc. v. Hoss, No. 00-01-73104-DT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16520 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 28, 2001).
353. For a thorough treatment of termination disputes, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor
Discriminates, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 559 (1998).
354. See Sims v. Mariott Int'l, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 616 (W.D. Ky. 2001); Jenson v. Medley,
11 P.3d 678 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Miller v. McDonald's Corp., 945 P.2d 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 1997);
Butler v. McDonald's Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. R.I. 2000). More commonly, franchisors are
not held vicariously liable for harm caused by franchisees. See, e.g., Freeman v. Suddle Enters.,
Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Risner v. McDonald's Corp., 18 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000).
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franchises are sometimes fiduciary relationships, but any fiduciary
duties would run from the franchisee to the franchisor. Given that
franchisors have extensive contractual protections against
opportunism and that franchisees are typically the less wealthy party,
the absence of any decisions imposing fiduciary duties in this context
is understandable.
VI. THE IMPLIED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONTENT OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY
The critical resource theory unifies fiduciary law behind the
notion that all fiduciary relationships conform to the structure
described above, namely, that the fiduciary acts on behalf of the
beneficiary when exercising discretion with respect to a critical
resource belonging to the beneficiary. Moreover, the critical resource
theory holds that the purpose of fiduciary duty is to combat
opportunism in such relationships. When combined, these insights
imply that the content of fiduciary duty should depend on the
potential for opportunism, which in turn depends on various aspects of
the relationship structure. The implication is that courts should
calibrate fiduciary duties to fit the situation before them. The purpose
of this section is to link the foregoing description of fiduciary
relationships with the content of fiduciary duties.
Warren Seavey, Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, has observed, "The duties of loyalty are substantially the
same for all fiduciaries, varying only in intensity."355 Commentators
have from time to time attempted to reconcile the relative strictness of
fiduciary obligation in various settings, but only modest efforts have
been made to catalogue fiduciary relationships along these lines. 356
Still, the general intuition seems to be that fiduciary duties become
more intense as the fiduciary's power grows. 357 The critical resource
theory provides a similar justification for the variable intensity of
355. WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 4 (1964).
356. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the
Commons, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 409-10 (1997) ("The highest level of fiduciary duty is
found in classic trust law.... [T]he acting partner's fiduciary duty is generally less than that of a
trustee."); Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1995, at 81, 83 (1995) (defending RUPA's mandatory fiduciary duties
on the ground that the "basic mission of RUPA is to serve small partnerships").
357. Cf. Dickerson, supra note 356, at 409 (noting that the "level of fiduciary duty owed
should decrease as the fiduciary's relative power and conflict decrease"); Fallany 0. Stover &
Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for Businesses Contemplating the
Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813, 828 (1999) ("The more management authority acquired by the non-
managing members, the greater the level of fiduciary duties owed.").
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fiduciary duty: The law provides protection against opportunistic
behavior, and the strength of that protection varies inversely with the
potential for self-help on the part of the vulnerable party. 358
Courts can vary the intensity of the fiduciary obligation in at
least three ways: scope, scrutiny, and substance. The scope of fiduciary
duty determines which actions are reviewed. Some relationships are
thoroughly fiduciary while others are primarily contractual with some
fiduciary elements. For example, every action taken by corporate
directors qua directors is subject to fiduciary constraint, but
physicians act as fiduciaries in only a narrow range of activities. The
scope of a fiduciary relationship is determined by reference to the
fiduciary's discretion with respect to critical resources belonging to the
beneficiary. 359 Where such discretion exists, fiduciary duties follow.
The level of judicial scrutiny may vary from one situation to the
next. In corporate law, the use of this mechanism is a common
strategy for calibrating fiduciary duty to the potential for
opportunism. 360 Where the potential for opportunism is high, judicial
scrutiny will be intense. Where the potential for opportunism is low,
judges are deferential.
The substance of fiduciary. duty varies depending on the
relationship. Trustees are "under a duty to administer the trust solely
358. Cf. William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of
Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1084, 1119 (1993) ("Self-protective capacity,
anonymity, and speedy entrance and exit have made the traditional fiduciary indicia of power
and dependence less apparent in the corporate atmosphere.").
359. One area in which the proper scope of fiduciary obligation is much debated is the
corporate opportunity doctrine. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARv. L. REV. 998, 998 (1981) (arguing that a "principled
doctrine ... between contexts involving public corporations and those involving close
corporations"); Pat K. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 435, 435 (1989) (proposing "express negotiations between corporations and fiduciaries on
their respective rights, or, absent such negotiations, a heightened judicial recognition of the
parties' reasonable expectations in creating their business relationship"); Eric Talley, Turning
Servile Opportunities into Gold: A Strategic Analysis of Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108
YALE L.J. 277, 280 (1998) (arguing that "the contours of an 'optimal' doctrine turn critically on
the extent to which corporate fiduciaries possess private, unverifiable knowledge about the
relevant characteristics of new projects"). The most difficult issue in this area is deciding which
opportunities belong to the corporation. As noted above, whether a critical resource belongs to
the beneficiary must be decided by principles outside of fiduciary law, but the corporate
opportunity doctrine provides a vivid illustration of the way in which the scope of the fiduciary
relationship makes a difference.
360. For example, the Delaware courts apply "enhanced scrutiny" to defensive actions in the
hostile takeover context to account for the "omnipresent specter" of self-interest. Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del..1985). They apply an "entire fairness" standard
to conflict-of-interest transactions. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). And
they employ a "compelling justification" test when the primary purpose of board action is to
interfere with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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in the interest of the beneficiaries.."361 Similarly, "an agent is subject to
a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in
all matters connected with his agency. '36 2 By contrast, corporate
directors are required simply to treat shareholders fairly. 363
Along each of these dimensions, courts vary the intensity of
fiduciary duty in ways that tolerate more or less self-interested
behavior by fiduciaries. The potential for opportunism depends on the
likelihood of harm and the potential magnitude of the harm. An
examination of the development of partnership fiduciary duties
illustrates how the intensity of fiduciary duty responds to the
potential for self-help by beneficiaries.
Common-law fiduciary duties in the partnership context are
generally seen as fairly strict.364 The classic statement of those duties
is Cardozo's vaulting rhetoric in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions .... Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will
not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court. 3 6 5
Under the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty, the strict
duties imposed in partnerships imply that partners are highly
vulnerable and incapable of adequate self-help. The source of this
vulnerability may be that partners have unlimited personal liability
for obligations of the partnership. This distinguishes partners from
shareholders in a corporation, whose liability is limited.366 It also
361. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1992).
362. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 387 (1958).
363. MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60(2) (1999); 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 144 (Michie 2001)..
364. This characterization typically arises when partnership fiduciary duties are compared
with corporate fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, The Business
Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 593 (2000); Eric Talley, Taking the "I" out of "Team"
Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001, 1035 (1999).
365. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Many cases are full of references to a strict fiduciary
duty for partners. See, e.g., Venier v. Forbes, 25 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 1946) (noting that "the
relationship between partners is essentially one of mutual trust and confidence and that the law
imposes upon them the highest standard of integrity and good faith in their dealings with each
other"); Salhinger v. Salhinger, 105 P. 236, 237 (Wash. 1909) ("There is no stronger fiduciary
relation known to the law than that of a copartnership, where one man's property and property
rights are subject to a large extent to the control and administration of another.").
366. Courts have, from time to time, imposed partnership-like fiduciary duties in the context
of closely held corporations. The most important case in this line is Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), which was later modified by Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). Despite misgivings by the
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distinguishes partners from other beneficiaries-including trust
beneficiaries-whose exposure to harm is limited to the size of the
critical resource under the discretion of the fiduciary. In short,
partners have traditionally been subject to strict fiduciary duties
because the potential magnitude of the harm is high.
The recent trend in partnership law-epitomized by the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA")-has been in the direction
of displacing these traditional standards and substituting fiduciary
duties with a narrower scope and less demanding substance. 367 RUPA
pointedly asserts that a "partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership
and the other partners is limited to" the duties listed in the statute.368
The statute specifies three discrete duties: (1) an "anti-theft" duty;3 6 9
(2) a prohibition against self-dealing; and (3) a prohibition against
Massachusetts Supreme Court, the strict duties imposed by Donohue are still widely employed.
See, e.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2000); Berreman v. West Pub. Co., 615 N.W.2d 362
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); A. Teixeira & Co., Inc. v. Texeira, 699 A.2d 1383
(R.I. 1997). The rationale for strict duties in this context is not unlimited liability, but rather the
absence of exit options. See Donohue, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15:
[T]he true plight of the minority stockholder in a close corporation becomes manifest
[when he attempts to liquidate his investment]. He cannot easily reclaim his capital.
In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could
sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this
market is not available for shares in the close corporation. In a partnership, a partner
who feels abused by his fellow partners may cause dissolution by his "express will...
at any time"... and recover his share of partnership assets and accumulated
profits.... By contrast, the stockholder in the close corporation or "incorporated
partnership" may achieve dissolution and recovery of his share of the enterprise
assets only by compliance with the rigorous terms of the applicable chapter of the
General Laws .... To secure dissolution of the ordinary close corporation subject to
[the state dissolution statute], the stockholder, in the absence of corporate deadlock,
must own at least fifty per cent of the shares ... or have the advantage of a favorable
provision in the articles of organization.... The minority stockholder, by definition
lacking fifty per cent of the corporate shares, can never "authorize' the corporation to
file a petition for dissolution.., by his own vote. He will seldom have at his disposal
the requisite favorable provision in the articles of organization.
Whereas strict fiduciary duties in the partnership context could be rationalized by
appeal to the potential magnitude of harm, strict fiduciary duties in the corporate
context are rationalized by reference to the likelihood of harm.
367. See Robert C. Art, Conversion and Merger of Disparate Business Entities, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 349, 402 (2001). But see Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on
the Limits of Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 53 (2000) (arguing that "Meinhard has aged
well").
368. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b) (1994). According to the Reporter for RUPA, Dean
Donald Weidner of Florida State University, the statute "purports to be an exclusive statement
of fiduciary duties." The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21
U. TOL. L. REV. 825, 857 (1990).
369. This provision was carried over from Section 21 of the Uniform Partnership Act, which
was often referred to as an "anti-theft" provision. U.P.A. Revision Subcommittee of the
Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform
Partnership Act Be Revised? 43 BUS. LAw. 121, 151 (1987).
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competing against the partnership.370 In a dramatic gesture that
shows how far RUPA departed from Meinhard,371 the statute states,
"A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or
under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's
conduct furthers the partner's own interest."372 The most controversial
innovation in RUPA is a provision forbidding the elimination of the
duty of loyalty, though allowing partners to "identify specific types or
categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not
manifestly unreasonable." 373
The drafters of RUPA defended the narrowing of the fiduciary
obligation by claiming that it was a "compromise on an extraordinarily
controversial topic. 3 74 On one side of the debate were those who
criticized the traditional common-law duties, either because they set
an "unrealistically high standard of behavior among partners" 375 or
because partners are not fiduciaries at all, at least not in the same
sense as trustees.37 6  On the other side of the debate were
commentators who approved of expansive fiduciary protection in the
partnership context.37 7 The relative merits of each position are not
central to this Article. Instead, the important point is that the drafters
sided with the critics of traditional fiduciary duties and lessened the
intensity of those duties because they perceived partners as having a
relatively strong capacity for self-help. 378
370. § 404(b)(1)-(3).
371. There is no doubt that Meinhard was the focus of these statutory duties. In describing
Section 404(e), the drafters alluded to Cardozo's language: "RUPA deletes the traditional agency
rule that would require abnegation of self." Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1, 20 (1993).
372. § 404(e). With respect to this provision, Allan Vestal commented, "This shift is
breathtaking. In one stroke of the pen the drafters have made the partners adversaries, whereas
before they were bound by 'the duty of the finest loyalty,' not merely 'the common standards of
competitors.' This is a sea change in the law." Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian
Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 535 (1993).
373. Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 1.03(b)(3)(i). Donald Weidner called this provision
"an unprecedented statutory attempt to specify those aspects of fiduciary law that reflect
mandatory rules, and to distinguish them from aspects that reflect merely default rules."
Weidner, supra note 356, at 86.
374. Weidner & Larson, supra note 371, at 18.
375. Id. at 17.
376. Id. at 17-18.
377. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts:
Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111 (1993);
Vestal, supra note 372.
378. In describing the factors that motivated the changes, Dean Weidner and Professor
Larson rely almost exclusively on this justification:
The specific and exclusive nature of the section was motivated in part by a sense that
vague, broad statements of a duty of loyalty cause too much uncertainty. It was
suggested that overly broad judicial language has left practitioners uncertain about
CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY
VII. ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY
The primary contributions of the critical resource theory of
fiduciary duty described above are that it effectively distinguishes
fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships and provides a coherent
explanation for the judicial imposition of loyalty obligations. In
addition to these contributions, the critical resource theory of fiduciary
duty clarifies certain other issues. Each of the following subjects could
easily justify a separate article-length treatment. Indeed, each of the
topics has attracted the attention of more than one scholar. What
follows, therefore, is simply suggestive of the direction these issues
might take under the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty.
A. Fiduciary Duty and the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The analysis above shows how fiduciary duties supplement
residual control in the battle against opportunism in fiduciary
relationships, but why should courts stop at opportunism in the
fiduciary context? Why not attack opportunism in every setting where
it is found to exist, even in arm's-length contracts? The answer to
these questions is that courts do not confine their efforts to fiduciary
relationships, but judicial efforts to police opportunism in contractual
relationships tend to be limited to the contract doctrine of good faith
and fair dealing. 379 The purpose of this section is to describe the
connection between that doctrine and fiduciary duty.
Fiduciary duty and the duty of good faith and fair dealing are
variations on a theme. 380  Both are judicially imposed loyalty
obligations designed to attack the potential for opportunism in
whether their negotiated agreements will be voided. It was said that lawyers and
their clients want to be able to negotiate transactions, reduce their agreements to
writing, and have some comfort that those agreements will not be undone by "fuzzy"
notions of fiduciary duties.
Weidner & Larsen, supra note 371, at 23.
379. Occasionally, courts recognize claims of tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227-39 (Cal. 1988)
(describing the development of such actions, but rejecting application of tort principles in the
employment context). Steven Burton has observed that the tort action "seems to be dying outside
of the insurance contract context and perhaps closely related contexts involving quasi-fiduciary
relationships." Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and
a State Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 470 n.142 (1990).
380. Other commentators have noticed the affinity of these two doctrines. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 438 n.28 ("The concept of the duty of good faith like the
concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating the terms the parties would have negotiated
had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise to their dispute."); Dickerson, supra
note 356, at 405 (arguing that "good faith and fiduciary duty are on the same continuum").
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relationships. 38 1 Treating the duty of good faith as a loyalty obligation
may seem a bit startling to some who are familiar with the doctrine,
which is sometimes characterized as nothing more than a minor
qualification on the self-interestedness that normally characterizes
contract. 38 2 Courts certainly use the duty of good faith to enforce
reasonable or justifiable expectations of contracting parties, but courts
also use the duty of good faith to "redefine contractual obligations in
circumstances about which the parties probably had no expectations
when the contract was made. ' 38 3 In either role, the doctrine requires
each contracting party to consider the interests of the other
contracting party when contemplating self-interested actions. 38 4 To
that extent, the duty of good faith is similar to fiduciary duty.
Despite this similarity, the scope of these two doctrines is
sufficiently different that they are not often viewed as tackling related
problems. Fiduciary duty is typically more expansive than contractual
duty. While fiduciary duty is determined by the structure of the
relationship, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing emanates
from the terms of the contract.38 5 The varying intensity of these
obligations is attributable to the range of opportunistic behavior
381. In his oft-cited article on the duty of good faith, Steven Burton describes the function of
the duty in terms that are very similar to the "trust" and "vulnerability" approach to fiduciary
duty:
The good faith performance doctrine thus may be used to protect a "weaker" party
from a "stronger" party. Unlike the unconscionability doctrine, however, weakness
and strength in this context do not refer to the substantive fairness of the bargain or
to the relative bargaining power of the parties. Good faith performance cases typically
involve arm's-length transactions, often between sophisticated business persons. The
relative strength of the party exercising discretion typically arises from an agreement
of the parties to confer control of a contract term on that party. The dependent party
then is left to the good faith of the party in control.
Burton, Breach, supra note 199, at 383-84.
382. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 12 (good faith "qualifies rather than negates the
assumption of selfishness that applies to the contract").
383. Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 IND. L.J. 45, 78
(1995). The extent to which the duty of good faith draws content from outside the contract is
hotly debated. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1253 (1999) (arguing that "the duty of good faith can derive its
content not only from the actual, formal agreements of the parties, but also from broader
community expectations of fairness and reasonable conduct").
384. Interestingly, this characterization of the duty of good faith is more likely to emerge
from the writings of scholars whose expertise lies more in the realm of fiduciary law. See, e.g.,
Brudney, supra note 296, at 633 n.101 (concluding that " 'good faith' requires one party to
'consider' the other party's interest in exercising discretion under their contract and thus seeks
limits on the extent to which the party may serve his own interests.").
385. Lawrence Mitchell described the purpose of the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing as
follows: "The purpose of the good faith doctrine is to prevent a contracting party from
opportunistically capitalizing upon the ambiguities of language to defeat the other's legitimate
contractual expectations." Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And
Why We Should Care About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443, 456 (1996).
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possible in each context. As noted above, the intensity of fiduciary
duty should depend on the likelihood of harm and the potential
magnitude of the harm. Both the likelihood of harm and the potential
magnitude of the harm are often less in an arm's-length contract than
in a fiduciary relationship because the allocation of residual control
over the relevant resources provides fewer opportunities for self-
serving behavior. As a result, the duty of good faith is typically weaker
than fiduciary duty.
The content of the implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing in contract law is much debated. The modern debate traces to
the adoption of the good faith standard in the Uniform Commercial
Code 386 and subsequent embrace by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.387 Recent commentary tends to focus on the well-known
positions articulated by Robert Summers and Steven Burton in a
series of articles and responses. 388
Summers views good faith as an "excluder. 3 89 That is, good
faith is best understood as the absence of bad faith. Summers
identifies six categories of bad faith: evasion of the spirit of the deal;
lack of diligence and slacking off; willful rendering of only substantial
performance; abuse of a power to specify terms; abuse of a power to
determine compliance; and interference with, or failure to cooperate
in, the other party's performance.390 This form of analysis is
reminiscent of the efforts made by Sealy to categorize fiduciary
relationships, 391 and it shares the same shortcoming, namely, limited
utility in deciding future cases that do not fit neatly into one of the
existing categories. 392 Moreover, the excluder approach can just as
easily operate from the other direction, beginning with known
386. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2002).
387. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) ("Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.")
388. See Burton, Breach, supra note 199; Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981); Steven J.
Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 497 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, More]; Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
(1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good Faith]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
389. Summers writes, "It is a phrase without general meaning or (meanings) of its own and
serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a particular context the
phrase takes on specific meaning but usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific
form of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out." Summers, Good Faith, supra note 388, at
201.
390. Id. at 232-43.
391. See supra notes 97, 116 and text accompanying note 116.
392. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 31-36 (1995).
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instances of good faith and thereby excluding bad faith.3 93 In short,
Summers's approach to the duty of good faith. is highly
indeterminate.3 94
Just as Deborah DeMott argued that fiduciary duties are
"atomistic," Summers contends that the duty of good faith cannot be
unified.3 95 By contrast, Burton strives to construct a unified theory of
good faith,3 96 which fits nicely astride the critical resource theory of
fiduciary duty. Burton writes:
Good faith limits the exercise of discretion in performance conferred on one party by the
contract. When a discretion-exercising party may determine aspects of the contract,
such as quantity, price, or time, it controls the other's anticipated benefits. Such a party
may deprive the other of these anticipated benefits for a legitimate (or good faith)
reason. The same act will be a breach of the contract if undertaken for an illegitimate
(or bad faith) reason. 39 7
The similarity between this description and the description of
fiduciary relationships under the critical resource theory of fiduciary
duty is striking. In both instances, the duty-owing party exercises
discretion in a manner that has the potential to harm the other party
in the relationship. In both instances, the legal rule is designed to
limit that discretion. 398 The only material difference between the
relationships is that contracting parties "exercise... discretion in
393. Cf. Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration:
Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 202 (1989):
Llewellyn's vision closely resembles the hermeneutic circle. To define the agreement
of the parties, one must look at their language. To understand the language, one must
investigate the commercial background of its use. To determine the expectations of
the parties, one must evaluate both their language and the circumstances
surrounding contract formation. Thus, understanding any single element requires an
understanding of the totality.
394. See, e.g., Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 120 (1998) ("Professor Summers sees no real meaning in good
faith as such. Rather, he sees the concept as something of a safety-valve, allowing the courts to
police agreements and performance for fairness."). For a general criticism of Summers' position,
see Burton, More, supra note 388.
395. Summers, Good Faith, supra note 388, at 204-07.
396. Not surprisingly, Burton justifies his attempt to create a unified theory of good faith on
grounds that the doctrine is too indeterminate. See Burton, Breach, supra note 199, at 371-72
(noting that current standards "direct attention to the amorphous totality of the factual
circumstances at the time of formation, and fail to distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts
within that realm").
397. Id. at 372-73.
398. With respect to the duty of good faith, Michael Van Alstine has observed that "a solid
consensus currently exists in the courts that a core function of the duty of good faith lies in
imposing limitations on a party's exercise of a discretionary power to control an aspect of a
contractual relationship after formation." Van Alstine, supra note 383, at 1256; see also DeMott,
supra note 3, at 896 ('The constraint of a good faith obligation-like that of fiduciary obliga-
tion-applies only to situations in which a person may exercise discretion.").
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performance" whereas fiduciaries exercise discretion with respect to a
critical resource. 399
B. Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duty
Fiduciary duty and the duty of good faith and fair dealing both
exist because contracts are less than complete. 400 In fiduciary
relationships, discretion provides the fiduciary with the opportunity to
expropriate value from the beneficiary; in contractual relationships,
discretion provides one contracting party with the opportunity to
"recapture opportunities forgone at formation. ' 40 1 This account raises
the oft-debated question concerning the ability of parties to contract
around fiduciary duty.
Legal scholars have produced a substantial literature on the
issue of contracting out of fiduciary duties.402 On the one hand, so-
called progressive scholars like Lawrence Mitchell assert that
"fiduciary duty, where it applies, trumps contract."40 3 On the other
399. Burton, Breach, supra note 199, at 394 n.109 ("A fiduciary must act on behalf of the
other party .... It thus forgoes the opportunity to act in its own interest at all. Good faith
performance of a contract creating a fiduciary duty should be understood in this sense.")
400. With respect to the duty of good faith, see Van Alstine, supra note 383, at 1228 ("The
duty of good faith performance springs from the simple idea that certain expectations of fair and
reasonable conduct are so fundamental that the parties rarely mention them in negotiation, and
almost never distill them into express terms."). See also Burton, Breach, supra note 199, at 371:
The good faith question often arises because a contract is an exchange expressed
imperfectly and projected into an uncertain future. Contract parties rely on the good
faith of their exchange partners because detailed planning may be ineffectual or
inadvisable. Therefore, express contract terms alone are insufficient to determine a
party's good faith in performance.
401. Burton, Breach, supra note 199, at 387 ("A recapture by one party of forgone
opportunities necessarily harms the other. A reasonable person accordingly would enter a
contract that confers discretion on the other party only on the belief that the discretion will not
be used to recapture forgone opportunities."). In subsequent writings, Burton has suggested that
this view of the duty of good faith is also captured by the more conventional phrasing, "justified
expectations." STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH 40 (1995)
(contending that "justified expectations ... is a clearer way to express the same thought").
402. For a sampling of important articles, most of which address the issue in the context of
corporate law, see Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1977); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH L. REV. 1 (1990); Brian R.
Cheffins, Law, Economics and Morality: Contracting out of Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties, 19
CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 28 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance 'in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 13; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,
47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1461 (1989); Ribstein, supra note 24; Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on
Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377 (1990).
403. Mitchell, supra note 385, at 458. Mitchell uses this conclusion to distinguish fiduciary
duty from the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing: "[I1f fiduciary duty trumps
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hand, contractarian scholars like Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein
claim that "fiduciary duties are not distinct from the contract but are
simply one of many drafting alternatives. '40 4 Under the critical
resource theory, fiduciary duty supplements self-help in combating
opportunism. Contracts are an effective means of self-help. It would
seem to follow that fiduciary duty can be tailored to fit the
beneficiary's sense of vulnerability. 40 5
This view of the contracting-out debate essentially embraces
the contractarian position without endorsing the notion-sometimes
associated with contractarianism-that fiduciary duties are "not a
distinctive topic in law or economics." 40 6 That parties to a fiduciary
relationship define the contours of their relationship through contract
does not mean that fiduciary duties are simply contractual gap-fillers.
As emphasized repeatedly throughout this Article, the critical
resource theory of fiduciary duty holds that fiduciary relationships are
distinctive.
Nevertheless, in most fiduciary settings, parties may modify
default rules of fiduciary duty through contract.40 7 In the trust
context, for example, the trustee's duty to act "solely in the interest of
the beneficiary" 408 may be modified to allow the trustee to "sell trust
property to himself individually, or as trustee to purchase property
from himself individually, or to lend to himself money held by him in
trust, or otherwise to deal with the trust property on his own
account.' '409 Mandatory minimum fiduciary duties, such as those found
contract, then it can hardly be the case that it is functionally analogous to a doctrine designed for
the limited purpose of ensuring the performance of contracts." Id. The problem here lies not in
Mitchell's logic, but in a faulty premise. As shown in this section, fiduciary duty does not "trump"
contract any more than contract "trumps" fiduciary duty.
404. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 402, at 29.
405. The interrelationship between fiduciary duty and contract may produce strange results.
If the beneficiary is particularly good at self-preservation and bargains for effective protections
in the contract, the scope for fiduciary obligation is diminished. On the other hand, if the
beneficiary is particularly poor at self-preservation and bargains away fiduciary protections, the
scope for fiduciary obligation is also diminished.
406. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 446.
407. For an interesting trilogy of recent cases in which Vice Chancellor Strine of the
Delaware Court of Chancery examined contractual tailoring of fiduciary duties. See Gotham
Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 795 A.2d 1 (Del. Ch. 2001); Gelfman v. Weeden
Investors, L.P., 792 A.2d 977 (Del. Ch. 2001); and Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, L.P., No.
16788, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2001).
408. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1992).
409. § 170(1) cmt. t. For further discussion of the trust context, see Langbein, supra note
198, at 658-60.
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in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, are inconsistent with this
view. 410
C. Restitution for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Modern fiduciary law originated in the English courts of
equity.411 Unlike torts and contracts, 412 fiduciary duty was not
recognized as an action at law. While the usual remedy in legal
actions is money damages measured by reference to the harm incurred
by the plaintiff, the remedy most often associated with a breach of
fiduciary duty is disgorgement of profits.413 Disgorgement is measured
by the amount of the fiduciary's gain rather than by the amount of the
beneficiary's loss, 414 implying that the primary goal of providing, the
remedy is deterrence. 41 5 The purpose of this section is to propose that
410. REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (1997). For a useful debate on this point, see J.
Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle
and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439 (1997); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked
Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA's Fiduciary Provisions, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
465 (1997); Allan W. Vestal, 'Assume a Rather Large Boat...": The Mess We Have Made of
Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (1997); Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA
and Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1997).
Presumably, the duty of good faith and fair dealing would apply to any contract purporting to
modify fiduciary duties; therefore, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act's requirement that any
modifications to fiduciary duty be reasonable may mirror the common law.
411. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 69-72. Nevertheless, the principles of restitution that are
intertwined with fiduciary law originate in the civil law. Gordley, supra note 8, at 1869.
412. As noted by James Gordley, "common lawyers had not thought in terms of tort and
contract," but rather in terms of various forms of action. Gordley, supra note 8, at 1821. The
distinction between tort and contract was borrowed from the civil law. Id. For additional
historical background, see DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 220-44 (1999).
413. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 32, at § 3 cmt. c (noting that
disgorgement is "ordinarily limited to instances of conscious wrongdoing," but that fiduciaries
may be required to disgorge profits that result from an unintentional breach so that the law may
serve a "prophylactic function."); see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 15, at 1051 (describing
"'perfect disgorgement' as a sanction that restores the wrongdoer to the same position that she
would have been in but for the wrong"). The mechanism employed to effect that remedy is a
constructive trust. Id. at 1051 n.14.
414. This principle unifies the law of restitution. See Friedmann, supra note 12, at 1889;
Gordley, supra note 8, at 1869 ("Traditionally, there was no law of restitution as such, but rather
a hodgepodge of remedies with one characteristic in common: the plaintiffs recovery was not
limited by the loss that he had actually suffered."). Of course, if the beneficiary's loss exceeds the
fiduciary's gain, compensatory damages would normally be enforced. See Gergen, supra note 27,
at 1934-35.
415. See Edelman, supra note 34, at 1876 ("The cases in which disgorgement damages have
been recognized have ... been limited to instances in which there is a profound need for
deterrence not fulfilled by compensatory damages," such as in cases involving a breach of
fiduciary duty.). As noted by Cooter and Freedman, however, the effectiveness of fiduciary duty
as a deterrent depends not only on the magnitude of the sanction, but also on the probability
that the sanction will be imposed. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 15, at 1052-53. Fiduciary law
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the dichotomy between compensatory remedies for torts and contracts,
on the one hand, and remedies of deterrence for fiduciary duty, on the
other hand, is not mere historical happenstance. Instead, the different
remedies respond to substantive differences in the structure of the
relationships.
The critical resource theory is consistent with a conception of
private law that accepts the necessity of "correlativity, 416 that is, the
notion that liability imposed on fiduciaries must correspond to the
beneficiary's entitlement. 417 The beneficiary becomes entitled to the
fiduciary's loyalty when the fiduciary exercises discretion with respect
to the beneficiary's critical resources. If the principle of correlativity
holds, this remedial scheme implies that the beneficiary's entitlement
may in some cases exceed the beneficiary's actual loss. 418 This, in turn,
employs a "cluster of presumptive rules," whose purpose is to increase the probability of
enforcement, thus improving the deterrent effect of the law. Id. at 1053-54. But see Weinrib,
supra note 12, at 1 (proposing a view of restitution as corrective justice and asserting that
"[r]estitutionary damages should not be seen as serving a deterrent or punitive function; such a
function cannot account for why the plaintiff, of all people is entitled to the defendant's gain.").
Deterrence is a utilitarian justification for disgorgement. The nonutilitarian defense relies on the
notion that a person ought not to profit from wrongdoing. See Gergen, supra note 27, at 1934.
416. Ernest Weinrib embraces the principle of correlativity as a cornerstone to his theory of
private law as "corrective justice." Weinrib, supra note 12, at 1. The animating idea underlying
corrective justice is that "liability is the consequence of the parties' being correlatively situated
as the doer and sufferer of an injustice, and the remedy is seen as undoing that injustice to the
extent possible." Id. The principle of correlativity holds that "injustice done and injustice
suffered, far from being coincident but independent events, are normatively inseparable." Id. at
3-4. The focus of corrective justice, therefore, is "the bipolar relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant." Id. at 3. Weinrib examines corrective justice in more detail in his book. See
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
While accommodating the concept of correlativity, the critical resource theory of fiduciary
duty does not embrace the view that private law is only about corrective justice. Indeed, Hanoch
Dagan has convincingly argued that corrective justice is an incoherent framework for thinking
about private law. Dagan, supra note 17, at 147-53. The thrust of his argument is that "some sort
of normative apparatus or social vision" is required to define the entitlements that allow law to
make determinations of "injustice." Id. at 149. Correlativity, therefore, is necessarily
distributive. Id. at 150.
417. See Dagan, supra note 17, at 150 (suggesting that correlativity "is essential for any
justificatory theory of private law"). Dagan describes the importance of correlativity in the
following passage:
Correlativity is crucial for private law because private law adjudication-like
adjudication in general-is a coercive mechanism run by unelected officials and
therefore must be a justificatory practice. To be a justificatory practice, private law
adjudication must be able to justify to the defendant each and every aspect of its
state-mandated power. In particular, given the unique characteristic of private
law ... namely, its structure as a zero-sum game between a particular plaintiff and a
particular defendant-private law needs to be able to justify to the defendant both the
identity of the recipient of any detriment imposed on her and the exact benefit this
recipient receives. The correlativity thesis answers exactly this concern....
Id. at 150-51.
418. On the interaction between "harm caused" and "benefit received," see Christopher T.
Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 162-74
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implies that fiduciary law vindicates some value other than the
material well-being of the beneficiary. Hanoch Dagan has identified
that value as control over the beneficiary's entitlement to the
fiduciary's loyalty. 419 As discussed above, the beneficiary controls the
fiduciary in the first instance by exercising residual control rights over
the critical resources that lie at the heart of the fiduciary
relationship. 420 Fiduciary law provides a backstop in the event such
control rights are ineffective.
Restitution is a' remedy that is triggered by various events
often assembled under the heading "unjust enrichment."421 Within the
past fifteen years, commentators have challenged this view of
restitution, arguing that events other than unjust enrichment may
trigger restitution. 422 While the potential causes of restitution vary
depending on the commentator, all who contend that restitution is
broader than unjust enrichment agree that at least two such events
are "unjust enrichment" and "wrongs."423 As noted above, breach of
fiduciary duty would typically be classified as a wrong.424
(1996). Daniel Friedmann has argued that disgorgement in restitution cases is a "windfall" for
the plaintiff, similar to punitive damages in torts. Friedmann, supra note 186, at 552. As applied
to the fiduciary context, this view misperceives the nature of the beneficiary's entitlement. If
that entitlement is conceived as a right to control the fiduciary's loyalty, restitution ceases to be
a windfall and instead becomes a measure of the lost control. Gordley observes that damages
become punitive only when they "exceed the amount by which the wrongdoer has been enriched,"
Gordley, supra note 8, at 1872. While such damages may be justified by the need to deter, this is
"quite different from redressing unjust enrichment." Id.
419. See Dagan, supra note 17, at 160 (contending that fiduciary duty involves a "normative
choice of the extent to which the beneficiary has control over her entitlement to the fiduciary's
loyalty").
420. See supra Part IV.A.
421. See, e.g., LORD GOFF OF CHiEVELY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 3
(Gareth Jones ed., 5th ed. 1998) ("The law of restitution is the law relating to all claims, quasi-
contractual or otherwise, which are founded upon the principle of unjust enrichment."); Kull,
supra note 26, at 1196 ('My proposition is that the law of restitution can be defined exclusively
in terms of its core idea, the'law of unjust enrichment."). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution
asserts, "A person who is unjustly enriched at ,the expense of another is liable in restitution to
the other." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 32, at §
1 (Discussion Draft 2000). This would seem to leave open the possibility of other causal events
for restitution, but the comment to this section states flatly, "The law of restitution is the law of
unjust enrichment." Id. at cmt. b. See also id. at cmt. c ("When used in this Restatement to refer
to a theory of liability or a body of legal doctrine, the terms 'restitution' and 'unjust enrichment'
will generally be treated as synonomous.").
422. See, e.g., I.M. JACKMAN, THE VARIETIES OF RESTITUTION (1998); GRAHAM VIRGO, THE
PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 6-16 (1999). Peter Birks credits Douglas Laycock with
"the honor of being the founding member of the multicausalist camp." Birks, supra note 27, at
1771 (citing Laycock, supra note 23).
423. Birks, supra note 27, at 1770.
424. See supra Part I.
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The existence of a wrong does not necessarily imply the
availability of a restitutionary remedy. 425 The critical resource theory
of fiduciary duty suggests a reason for imposing restitution in
fiduciary duty cases: the deterrent effect of restitution mitigates the
temptation for a fiduciary to act opportunistically. Restitution does not
involve merely giving back something that has been wrongly taken,
but also giving up anything wrongly obtained, even if not obtained
from the party who claims the right to restitution.426 By precluding
the perpetrator of the wrong from benefiting, restitution is well-suited
to achieving the goal of deterrence that animates fiduciary duty.
Disgorgement and similar restitutionary remedies are not
limited to fiduciary claims. In tort and occasionally in contract,427
restitution evinces a "goal of denying a profit from conscious
wrongdoing."428 While not unique to the fiduciary context, therefore,
425. See Birks, supra note 27, at 1783 ("The occurrence of an event with the generic
description 'wrong' may trigger remedial rights of various kinds, rights to compensation, rights
to punitive awards, rights to restitutionary awards.").
426. This phrasing is inspired by Peter Birks. Id. at 1773. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 32, at § 1 cmt. c ("[T]here are significant instances of liability based on
unjust enrichment that do not involve the restoration of anything the claimant previously
possessed."); Laycock, supra note 23, at 1279-83 (discussing various meanings of the word
"restitution").
427. The concept of "restitution" in contract law is ambiguous, but it traditionally referred to
restoration: "its purpose was not the reversal of unjust enrichment, but rather the reversal of a
contractual performance." Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and
the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2029 (2001). This began to change in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, but restitution as remedy for unjust gain remains an unusual
remedy in contract law. Andrew Kull recently described the domain of restitution as follows:
[Disgorgement] is, of course, the characteristic remedial response of the part of the
law of restitution that is concerned with benefits wrongfully obtained: benefits
acquired by a defendant from a consciously wrongful interference with the plaintiffs
legally protected interests. Because the dominant objective of restitution in such cases
is to strip the defendant of any profit from the transaction (thereby removing any
possibility that a transaction undertaken in knowing disregard of the plaintiffs
interests could ultimately be profitable for the defendant), it is no objection to the
disgorgement remedy that it awards the plaintiff more than he lost-more than his
restoration interest-leaving him better off than if the transaction with the defendant
had never taken place. The result is familiar in the context of profitable and
intentional torts (typically trespass, conversion, or infringement) and profitable
breaches of fiduciary duty. A persuasive case can be made that disgorgement is the
appropriate response to one narrow category of breach: cases in which the defendant's
election to default is both profitable and opportunistic. Outside this specific set of
cases, however, the proposition that there could be disgorgement for breach of
contract-meaning a recovery in excess of plaintiffs loss, intended to strip the
defendant of the profits of a wrong-is essentially unknown. The recent decisions in
[EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995)] and
[Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 518 U.S. 839
(1996)] are seemingly the first in which the suggestion has been made.
Id. at 2030-31; see also Gergen, supra note 27, at 1937-38 (justifying disgorgement in some cases
involving breach of contract by a "moralistic view").
428. Kull, supra note 427, at 2021.
CRITICAL RESOURCE THEORY
restitution unites fiduciary claims and promotes deterrence of
opportunism in the fiduciary context.
CONCLUSION
The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty asserts that the
allocation of discretion to a person who acts on behalf of another with
respect to critical resources belonging to the other determines whether
a particular relationship should be treated as a fiduciary relationship.
The line between fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships is drawn in
this way because relationships of the type described are susceptible to
a peculiar form of opportunism. Residual control over the assets-the
right to withdraw them from the relationship-remains with the
beneficiary and decreases the potential for opportunistic behavior.
Fiduciary duties strive to fill the remaining gaps, which are likely to
be substantial in some cases.
Given this framework, the justification for fiduciary duties is
clear. When one person is authorized to act on behalf of another and to
exercise discretion over critical resources belonging to the other, a
duty of loyalty helps to align incentives. This account of the role
played by fiduciary law is consistent with prior learning on the
subject. Tamar Frankel argued that the main problem addressed by
fiduciary duties is "abuse of power." While the beneficiary has power
by virtue of the residual control, the fiduciary has power by virtue of
discretion. As noted by Robert Cooter and Bradley Freedman,
Once a consensual relationship in which the principal relinquishes control or
management of her asset to the agent is formed, the resulting separation of ownership
from control or management creates opportunities for the agent to appropriate the asset
or some of its value. Taking advantage of these opportunities whether by theft,
diversion, conversion, or trespass would violate the agent's duty of loyalty. In general,
however, an agent must choose between two courses of behavior: other-regarding acts,
which the principal prefers, and self-regarding acts, which benefit the agent at the
principal's expense.
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Simply stated, the role of fiduciary duty is to curb such self-
interested behavior in the absence of complete specification of the
fiduciary's obligations. Given that the critical resource theory of
fiduciary duty arrives at the same rationale for imposing fiduciary
duties as other theories, it is not surprising that the resulting case law
is largely harmonious with this new theory. The primary value of the
theory is not that it forces a complete reassessment of fiduciary law,
but rather that it provides a common thread that unifies the cases. It
makes easy cases more consistent, and hard cases easier.
429. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 15, at 1048.
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